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My field of research is rhetoric and rhetorical reading. According to the classical 
theoreticians, Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero, rhetoric is the practice and art of 
– mainly oral – persuasion. Today in deconstructive literary theory it also means 
studying the effects of such rhetorical tropes and figures as metaphor, 
metonymy, hyperbole, chiasmus, allegory, irony, and paradox. In the case of 
rhetorical figures, that is, in figurative language – as Paul de Man remarks – “the 
sign points to something that differs from its literal meaning and has for its 
function the thematization of this difference.”1 While studying the classical 
rhetorical tropes, I became interested in irony, a peculiar figure of speech, which 
as we know is also a figure ‘saying one thing and meaning another’. But if we 
try to define irony offering it theory, we should accept the difficulty of the task. 
With its permanent interruptions and disruptions “irony is precisely what makes 
it impossible ever to achieve a theory of narrative that would be consistent.”2 I 
cannot help quoting Richard Rorty here in his Contingency, Solidarity and Irony 
(1989), where he emphasises the importance of multivocality and the lack of a 
final, single vocabulary. A person’s (final) vocabulary contains the words in 
which he tells the story of his life, while an ironist is aware of the contingency of 
her and others’ final vocabulary.3  
This book contains the texts I have written since my thesis on irony. In my 
dissertation titled On the Concept of Irony — With (Continual) Reference to 
Kierkegaard I studied several ‘ironological’ (irony-theoretical) texts of primary 
importance. The analyses of the conceptual understandings of irony have 
resulted in a specific reading practice that can be called ‘ironical reading’ and 
can mostly be associated with deconstructive interpretative practice — 
sometimes it turns out to be its ad absurdum ironical version. The ironical 
reading implies the questioning of every detail of the text and looking behind its 
rhetorical figures, or rather going beyond its rhetoric. This book gives a selection 
                                                     
1 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight (London: Routledge, 1993), 209.  
2 Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 179. But it 
does not mean that we should give up working on its theory, “because that’s all we can do” – as 
de Man himself remarks here.  
3 I deliberately use ‘she’ here to follow Rorty’s path as he emphatically refers to the ironist as 
‘she’. According to Rorty, the ironist “(1)[she] has radical and continuing doubts about the final 
vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, 
vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that 
argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) 
insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer 
to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself”. Richard Rorty, Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 73.  
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of my writings in two main parts. In the first part the texts are concerned with 
the theoretical approaches of reading. The introductory chapter “The Rhetoric 
and Ethics of Reading” is ‘closely’ related to modern and postmodern reading 
practices; more exactly, it deals with the close reading of the American New 
Criticism and the rhetorical-ethical readings in the works of Yale-deconstructors, 
Paul de Man and J. H. Miller. On the one hand, I concentrate on the possible 
‘goodness’ of the rhetorical deconstructive reading practice, relying on Miller’s 
‘theory’ of the ethics of reading and its different interpretations expressed in his 
works (Theory Now and Then and The Ethics of Reading). On the other hand, 
comparing the main principles of these practices, I pay special attention to the 
recurrent (circular) metaphors used to display their similarities – and their 
differences as well. I can say that my work is ‘turning around,’ centred on the 
metaphor(s) of reading, and its circularity shows the curved path/course of my 
argument. The second chapter, “The Rhetor(eth)ical Reading of the Material and 
Romantic Sublime”, is mainly concerned with some deconstructive 
interpretations of the Kantian sublime. Contrasting and comparing the readings I 
concentrate on two elements of these discourses: the importance of 
imagination/fantasy expressed in the rhetorical figures of figurative language, 
and the ‘possible’ relation between the sublime and ethics.  
The next chapter is dedicated to two significant theoreticians of deconstruc-
tion: Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man and focuses on the ironical allegory of 
narrative. My starting point is Paul de Man’s conclusion in his Allegories of 
Reading, where he refers to irony as the trope of tropes, the essence of rhetoric. 
In his Mémoires for Paul de Man, Derrida tries to tell the ‘story’ of 
remembrance and forgetting. In this particular story, embedded in the context of 
allegory and irony, such flowers of rhetoric flourish as Mnemosyne, Lethe, 
Psyche or Narcissus. I attempt to interpret these rhetorical figures, while the 
recurrent ‘narcissus’ becomes the rhetorical flower of (my) reading. Closely 
related to the Narcissistic text, in the final chapter of part one I pay attention to 
the self-reflexive, life-giving and all-demanding irony of postmodern reading-
theories. “Pygmalions’ Reading of Reading Pygmalions” is concerned with the 
question of self/life-writing and life work in literary criticism. Here I display the 
rhetorical devices and figures used by the theoreticians in their understanding 
and reading of their own works. This chapter also has a central classical figure: 
Pygmalion, whose creative ’life-giving’ story is often alluded to in 
deconstructive critical writings, mainly in de Man’s Allegories of Reading and J. 
H. Miller’s Versions of Pygmalion.  
Moving away from the theories, but not leaving them behind, the second part 
of the book analyses literary and philosophical texts. In the first paper the chosen 
‘romantic’ work, Wordsworth’s lyric poem, is unique as both the modern and 
postmodern critics used the poem to present their ideas on reading practice. In 
my rhetorical reading I analyse the relation between irony and allegory in the 
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temporal structure of the work. The next two chapters discuss the work of my 
favourite romantic poet, William Blake’s Songs of Innocence and Experience 
and the prophecy The Marriage of Heaven and Hell relating them to classical 
works. In the poems – “The Sick Rose,” “My Pretty Rose Tree,” “The Lilly,” 
and “Ah! Sunflower!” – I show ironic Ovidian reminiscences, studying the 
mythical transformation of the amorous metaphorical flower-figures (Clytie, 
Proserpine and Narcissus) borrowed from Metamorphoses. In the prophecy, I 
investigate the rhetorical devices and the tones of the Blakean irony while 
elaborating on the satirical form and apocalyptic context of the work. Finally, in 
the last – rather surprising – chapter I present the rhetoric of irony focusing on 
the weird figures used to characterise the Socratic irony in Kierkegaard’s treatise 
entitled The Concept of Irony – With Continual Reference to Socrates. 
Returning to ‘rhetorical figures of reading’, I had wanted to give my book the 
subtitle Bridge and Abyss to echo Derrida’s “The circle and the abyss”, which he 
planned to use as a title naming his favourite figures.4 In my work the ‘good’ 
reader will find such recurrent tropes as the vault, the bridge, the circle, and the 
spiral, embedded in the ironical contexts. These metaphors are closely related in 
my readings and my readings move along the spiral of understanding in 
concentric circles – or rather in eccentric circles. Yet beyond irony, all the 
figures are used to bridge over the chiastic abyss, the chasm (ch(i)asm) of sign-
and-meaning, of language. To quote from “The Task of the Translator” Walter 
Benjamin’s poetically dispiriting statement, “meaning plunges from abyss to 
abyss until it threatens to become lost in the bottomless depths of language.” 5  
 
                                                     
4 Jacques Derrida, Parergon, in The Truth in Painting, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Ian 
McLeod (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978, 15-147), 24. Originally I 
wanted to title the book Rhetorical Figures of Reading but chose the title Beyond Rhetoric to 
recall the title of my Hungarian collection of essays, Beyond Irony (Túl az irónián, Budapest: 
Kijárat Kiadó, 2007). 
5 Quoted by Joseph Hillis Miller in The Ethics of Reading (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1987, 127).  

 




THE RHETORIC AND ETHICS OF READING 
A book is a dangerous object, and perhaps 
all books should have warning labels. 
(Joseph Hillis Miller) 
 
In my analysis of the irony-perceptions of (modern) American criticism and 
(postmodern) American deconstruction, my attention focused on deconstruction 
and the so-called rhetoric of reading. In studying texts on irony, the conclusion 
of my thesis was concerned with the (possible) ethics of reading – the term – 
borrowed from Yale professor and critic, Joseph Hillis Miller, and his book, The 
Ethics of Reading. The study of this paradoxical term and its meanings – which 
we may look at suspiciously – leads to different reading techniques of 
modernism and postmodernism. I have used the word ‘techniques,’ but I had 
better say ‘practices’ of reading, because both in the American modernist New 
Criticism and postmodern deconstruction, the practicality of theories is 
emphasised.  
We can think about not only the future possibilities, but also the present state 
of criticism and reading – whatever they mean nowadays. In contemporary 
literary criticism the question of responsibility together with such practical 
issues as the changes in the literary canon and curricula, is frequently discussed. 
Joseph Hillis Miller in his Theory Now and Then provocatively claims that “all 
good readers are and always have been deconstructionist”. This expresses the 
basic notion of deconstruction; namely that language is fundamentally figurative 
and, consequently, good reading means the interpreting of the rhetorical figures, 
the tropes of a text.1 In his statement, not only the term ‘deconstructionists’, but 
also the term ‘good readers’, is puzzling. Who can be a good reader? What can it 
mean that a reader is good, deconstructionist, or a good deconstructionist? In an 
interview in 2000, Miller defined the critic’s work as “that of mediation, leading 
the reader back to the text.”2 He also asserts that the rhetorical deconstructive 
reading practice results in good and responsible readings. Focusing on his ethics 
of reading, we should not forget that Miller’s reading practice is related to – and 
according to Critchley, highly determined by – the context of teaching and, 
consequently, it is basically pedagogical.3  
When we speak about deconstruction in the States, we feel compelled to 
point out the influence of the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida’s; 
                                                     
1 Joseph Hillis Miller, Theory Now and Then (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 231. 
2 Adorján István, “An Interview with J. Hillis Miller,” The AnaChronisT (2002: 297-302), 299. 
3 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford UK & Cambridge 
USA: Blackwell, 1993), 47.  
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immediately adding that Derrida does not call himself a deconstructionist and 
that deconstruction was ‘born and brought up’ at the University of Yale in the 
work of the four main deconstructors – Paul de Man’s, J. H. Miller’s, Geoffrey 
H. Hartman’s and Harold Bloom’s, with Derrida’s ‘(dis)seminating’ step-
fatherhood. In his Allegories of Reading de Man defines what the rhetorical 
means to him:  
The deconstruction is not something we have added to the text 
but it constituted the text in the first place. A literary text 
simultaneously asserts and denies the authority of its own 
rhetorical mode, and by reading the text as we did we were only 
trying to come closer to being as rigorous a reader as the author 
had to be in order to write the sentence in the first place.4  
As the antecedents of deconstruction, de Man refers not to Derrida’s impact, but 
names two modernist critics of the school New Criticism: Monroe Breadsley and 
William Wimsatt, who also recognised the importance of the rhetorical in textual 
understanding. He also shows us that if we want to understand the rhetoric and 
later the ethics of reading, we have to map the preliminaries. That is, to 
understand the postmodern reading practice and its ethical implications, first we 
need to know about the modernist view of reading, which gives the immediate 
context of American deconstruction.  
Partly due to its pedagogical root, Miller’s and de Man’s deconstructive 
reading is closely related to the earlier American reading practice, that of New 
Criticism. In the 1940s-50s, having realised that students could not understand 
pieces of literature (especially, poems), university teachers – John Crowe 
Ransom, Robert Penn Warren, René Wellek, Allan Tate, William K. Wimsatt 
and Cleanth Brooks – developed and used a new method to analyse literary and 
philosophical texts. Besides practical textbooks written for students – for 
example, the famous ‘understanding-series’ (Understanding Poetry, Under-
standing Fiction) – their articles and studies were also concerned with the theory 
of literature, literary language and literary criticism. It can be said that their 
mission – and they really took their work in such a way – made them immensely 
influential and productive. They deliberately acted against the branches of 
contemporary criticism, such as sociological, biographical or philological 
criticism, and demanded a more systematic and more rigorous approach in 
reading. They claimed that literary language differed from any other kind of 
language; consequently, critics, teachers, students, that is, readers had to 
concentrate on the texts themselves. In their work, Literary Criticism, Wimsatt 
and Brooks define “the principle task of criticism – perhaps the task of criticism 
                                                     
4 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), 17. 
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– is to make explicit to the reader the implicit manifold of meanings.”5 Like 
Miller, they also undertook the task of improving the readers, not the authors, by 
showing them the complexity and inexhaustible richness of the literary works.  
In the theoretically based approach of New Criticism the key terms are: 
“close reading,” structure and irony. According to the New Critics, the text and 
its language are to be considered without any interest in the author’s age or life; 
in a given work we should pay attention only to the use of language and the 
structure created. The meaning of a literary text is given by and in its semantic 
structure, which is not only dynamic showing the reconciliation of opposites; but 
also organic – nothing is irrelevant and every detail contributes to the whole. As 
Cleanth Brooks describes in his article, “The Heresy of Paraphrase”: “the 
structure meant is a structure of meanings, evaluations and interpretations; and 
the principle of unity which informs it seems to be one of balancing and 
harmonizing connotations, attitudes and meanings.”6 This poetic structure and its 
desired unity is not rational or logical, but – to use Brooksian similes – it 
resembles that of architecture or painting, a ballet or musical composition based 
on the “pattern of resolved stresses.”7  
In poems, tension, conflicts and stresses are given by such ‘problematic’ 
elements as metaphors, symbols, paradoxes and other figures of speech because 
they easily get their connotative meanings from the context. In The Verbal Icon 
Wimsatt says that in a good metaphor “two clearly and substantially named 
objects […] are brought into such a context that they face each other with fullest 
relevance and illumination.”8 In spite of the conflicting or opposing meanings by 
the end of the close reading, an equilibrium of forces, a unity is supposed to be 
given, and “this unity is not a unity of the sort to be achieved by the reduction 
and simplification appropriate to an algebraic formula. It is a positive unity, not 
a negative; it represents not a residue but an achieved harmony.”9 
Using the above mentioned dramatic metaphors, it is possible to imagine 
conflicting forces, more exactly the possible semantic (connotative) meanings of 
the words, were fighting, and their tension resulted in a climax giving the theme, 
a leading idea or conclusion of a text. The whole process of close textual 
understanding is summarised in one word: irony. Nevertheless, in the modern 
New Criticism irony is overused. On the one hand, “it is the most general term 
that we have for the kind of qualification which the various elements in a context 
receive from the context”;10 that is, irony necessarily operates in every context 
                                                     
5 Wimsatt, William K. & Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism – A Short History (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1967), 652. 
6 Cleanth Brooks, The Well-Wrought Urn (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1947), 195. 
7 Brooks, The Well-Wrought Urn, 203.  
8 Wimsatt, William K., The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Lexington: University 
of Kentucky Press, 1954), 111. 
9 Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon, 114-115. 
10 Brooks, The Well-Wrought Urn, 209. 
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and in every reading process. On the other hand, by the end of our close reading 
of a text we have to reveal the work’s (possible) “invulnerability to irony.” 
Brooks introduces this paradoxical idea in the wonderful arch simile:  
Irony, then, in this further sense, is not only an acknowledge-
ment of the pressures of a context. Invulnerability to irony is the 
stability of a context in which the internal pressures balance and 
mutually support each other. The stability is like that of the arch: 
the very forces which are calculated to drag the stones to the 
ground actually provide the principle of support – a principle in 
which thrust and counterthrust become the means of stability.11  
Let us pay attention to two things here: first, the figurative language used by the 
New Critics in their close reading/writing; second, their obsession with a 
wanted, or rather wished equilibrium and totality in textual understanding. While 
the first phenomenon leads us to the deconstructive attack on New Criticism, the 
second one foreshadows the moral implications of close reading.  
Actually, the New Critics do not explicitly speak about ethical questions, 
since for them poetry means “a way of knowing something: (if the poem is a real 
creation,) it is a kind of knowledge that we did not possess before” – as Allen 
Tate claims in The Essays of Four Decades adding: “it is not knowledge ‘about’ 
something else; […] it is the fullness of that knowledge.”12 When Brooks says 
that, optimally, the ironical reading process results in “a unification of attitudes 
into a hierarchy subordinated to a total and governing attitude,”13 he displays his 
totalising and somewhat holistic, though dialectic, worldview. I suppose, it can 
be guessed that due to the critics’ concern with true knowledge and wisdom, in 
close reading “such qualities as wit, ambiguity, irony, paradox, complexity, and 
tension are valued for more than aesthetic reasons; they are indexes to the view 
of reality – and of man and truth – in the work. They are, therefore, not really 
aesthetic or rhetorical but, since they are modes of apprehending reality, 
ontological or, in the broad sense, religious.”14 What’s more, in “Cleanth Brooks 
and the Responsibilities of Criticism” Monroe K. Spears sees the mission of 
New Critics as grounded in the tradition of Christian humanism, giving 
ontological meaning to their reading practice while their irony is taken 
religiously, or at least ethically.  
                                                     
11 Cleanth Brooks, “Irony as a Principle of Structure,” in Critical Theory since Plato, ed. by H. 
Adams (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971, 1041-1048), 1044.  
12 Allen, Tate, Essays of Four Decades (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 104-105.  
13 Wimsatt-Brooks, Literary Criticism – A Short History, 380.  
14 Monroe K. Spears, “Cleanth Brooks and the Responsibilities of Criticism,” in The Possibilities 
of Order: Cleanth Brooks and His Work, ed. by Lewis Simpson (Lousiana State University 
Press, 1976, 230-252), 240.  
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The reader is supposed to find true knowledge, “knowledge of a value-
structured world” in the literary works. As Wellek quotes Brooks’s claim, poetry 
gives “a special kind of knowledge […] through poetry, man comes to know 
himself in relation to reality, and thus attains wisdom.”15 In the concluding 
paragraphs of his “Irony as a Principle of Structure,” Brooks confesses that in 
textual close reading “penetrating insights” can be gained and one of the uses of 
poetry is to make the readers “better citizens.” But poetry, that is, a given 
figurative text, manages it relying on the expressed relevant particulars, not with 
the usage of abstraction. More accurately, it carries us “beyond the abstract 
creed into the very matrix from which our creeds are abstracted.”16 Thus, 
specific moral problems can be the subject matter of literature, but the purpose 
of literature is not to point a moral. The New Critics rejected the ideas of the 
intentionalists in “The Intentional Fallacy” by Wimsatt and Beardsley. Indeed in 
The Ethics of Criticism Siebers points out: “It was through the denial of 
intention, in fact, that the New Critics most forcefully maintained the rhetoric of 
the poem’s autonomy, and the effect of that rhetoric remains a dominant force in 
theory to this day.”17  
In the modernist close reading of New Criticism the belief in the possibility 
of order and the quest for order are emphasised. Moreover, the New Critics also 
believed in a strong sense of community expressed by the romantic idea of 
‘organic unity’. Although I characterised their reading technique as ‘ironic’ 
paying attention to the rhetorical forces of a given text, it is better described as 
“irenic” striving for the equilibrium of those forces. Although we can find the 
New Critical approach quite positive and fruitful, we must admit its basic 
idealistic naivety resulting from the modernist efforts aimed at solving the 
surrounding chaos of the world. Their desired vaulted arch symbolising 
understanding can refer to perfection, but we cannot forget that it is suspended in 
the air between two solid, but imagined buildings.  
As I am obsessed with rhetoric, the arch metaphor with its ideality reminds 
me of György Lukács’s notion of closed cultures expressed in his Heidelberg 
Aesthetics. In connection with the lost golden age of Greece he says that “the 
circle with its closeness meant the essential transcendental core of their life, but 
for us (let me add, in modern times) the circle has been exploded: we cannot 
breathe in a closed world any longer.”18 It can be said that after the loss of 
communal understanding of life (cf. in the Greek polis) with the appearance of 
                                                     
15 René Wellek, “Cleanth Brooks, Critic of Critics,” in The Possibilities of Order: Cleanth Brooks 
and His Work, ed. by Lewis Simpson (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 1976, 
196-229), 228-229. 
16 Brooks, “Irony as a Principle of Structure,” in Critical Theory since Plato, 1048. 
17 Tobin Siebers, The Ethics of Criticism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 47. 
18 Lukács György, A heidelbergi művészetfilozófia és esztétika. A regény elmélete (Budapest: 
Magvető, 1975), 496-7. The translation is mine.  
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possible individual understanding, the circle is opened. In modernity the 
(arch)metaphor of reading becomes an imagined half-circle or a vault, then later 
– in postmodernism – we should be content with its fragmentary pieces: after 
closed (or non) reading, there is close-reading, then the open one.  
In his early critical writings Paul de Man, one of the four Yale-
deconstructors, deals with this shift from ‘close(d)’ reading to the open – later 
with his term named as allegorical – reading. In his early critical writing “Form 
and Intent in the American New Criticism” (in Blindness and Insight) de Man 
claims that though the New Critics noticed the importance of, and paid attention 
to, such distinctive features of literary language as ambiguity or irony, these 
structural elements themselves contradicted the very premise on which New 
Criticism with its central “totalizing principle” was founded. In the key 
paragraph he describes this process:  
As it refines its interpretations more and more, American 
criticism does not discover a single meaning, but a plurality of 
significations that can be radically opposed to each other. 
Almost in spite of itself, it pushes the interpretative process so 
far that the analogy between the organic world and the language 
of poetry finally explodes. This unitarian criticism finally 
becomes a criticism of ambiguity, an ironic reflection on the 
absence of the unity it had postulated.19 
It seems as if de Man had thought over the New Critical approach of reading – 
reading its theory ‘closely’ – and on the basis of its faults or ‘blind spots’ and 
‘insights’ he developed his later ideas. According to de Man, the greatest 
‘blindness’ (and insight) of New Criticism was, while they tried to pay “such 
patient and delicate attention to the reading of forms,”20 the presupposed idea of 
totality forced them to find closed forms and to strive for order. It can be said 
that they simply used Heidegger’s theory of hermeneutical circularity, but they 
forgot about the fact that the (hermeneutical) act of understanding is a temporal 
one. De Man remarks: “yet, the temporal factor, so persistently forgotten, should 
remind us that the form is never anything but a process on the way to its 
completion.”21 And the metaphor that can show the true nature of textual 
understanding is not the circle or the arch, but the spiral line that consists of 
seemingly closed / closing circles displaying the temporal and never-ending 
process of understanding, that is, the rhetoric of temporality.  
In Blindness and Insight, in the essay “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” de Man 
regards allegory together with irony as the key rhetorical tropes in our (textual) 
                                                     
19 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight (London: Routledge, 1993), 28. 
20 de Man, Blindness and Insight, 29. 
21 de Man, Blindness and Insight, 28. 
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understanding. Here he is concerned with the differences of the two rhetorical 
figures, which he defines in their relation to time. Though both show the 
discontinuous relationship between sign and meaning, the experience of time in 
the case of irony means “a synchronic structure, while allegory appears as a 
successive mode capable of engendering duration”22 – that is, it is diachronic. 
Focusing on their temporality, the New Critical irony and de Man’s reading of 
allegory and irony can be derived from the (paradoxical) hermeneutical circle. It 
is quite obvious why de Man feels obliged to distinguish the two tropes: he 
wants to resist, to get detached or differentiated from the new critical reading, 
asserting that “the dialectical play between the two modes, as well as their 
common interplay with mystified forms of language […], which it is not in their 
power to eradicate, make up what is called literary history.”23 We can guess that 
after the New Critical emphasis on irony as a basic principle, in the de Manian 
reading, allegory is given primacy. Having published his theoretical works, de 
Man starts to interpret/read philosophical and literary texts relying on his ideas 
of the rhetorical. In the collection of his readings Allegories of Reading 
(subtitled: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust) de Man 
defines his temporal, allegorical, rhetorical mode of reading:  
The paradigm for all texts consists of a figure (or a system of 
figures) and its deconstruction. But since this model cannot be 
closed off by a final reading, it engenders, in its turn, a sup-
plementary figural superposition which narrates the unreadabil-
ity of the prior narration. As distinguished from primary 
deconstructive narratives centered on figures and ultimately 
always on a metaphor, we can call such narratives to the second 
(or the third) degree allegories.24  
He also claims that the allegorical narratives being “allegories of metaphors […] 
tell the story of the failure to read.”25 But I can immediately add that efforts are 
made again and again as we try to understand, try to read a text and its 
allegories. It means that in the background, not only in the texts but in language 
itself, there should be something that makes the different allegorical readings 
possible and also helps us readers to accept the impossibility of a final reading. 
We ‘need’ this something that is essentially rhetorical; we need irony. Although 
the quoted passage emphasises the allegoricity of reading, the superposed layers 
of reading-efforts are guaranteed by the ironic nature of language. While 
allegory is read as the trope of reading, irony becomes the trope of tropes – 
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quoting the concluding sentences of de Man’s Allegories of Reading: “Irony is 
no longer a trope but the undoing of the deconstructive allegory of all 
tropological cognitions, the systematic undoing, in other words, of under-
standing. As such, far from closing off the tropological system, irony enforces 
the repetition of its aberration.”26 In our understanding, irony (and also in our 
understanding of irony), the trope of the rhetorical vortex displays the dizziness 
of figurativity, as “it dissolves in the narrowing spiral of a linguistic sign that 
becomes more and more remote from its meaning, and it can find no escape 
from this spiral.”27 We can think that opposed to the obsession of New Criticism 
with order and the autonomy of the work, in deconstructive readings something 
is lost. Nevertheless, de Man – like the other deconstructors – often claims that 
the autonomy of a text is given by its own rhetoricity (cf. rhetorical nature) and 
deconstructive potentialities.  
The other important element of the New Critical ‘vaulted’ (arch)metaphor is 
its possible moral implications. Now comes the most important question: what 
happened to the covert moral implication of the New Criticism in de Man’s 
reading? I should claim that in the rhetorical deconstructive reading it has 
become overt; what’s more, it has become evident. In his rhetorical 
deconstructive (close) readings de Man speaks about the “practical ethical 
dimension of allegory”. He says that “allegories are always ethical,” though the 
ethical here is not related to the subject’s will or the relations between subjects. 
The famous quotation reads as follows:  
Allegories are always ethical, the term ethical designating the 
structural interference of two distinct value systems. In this 
sense, ethics has nothing to do with the will (thwarted or free) of 
a subject, nor a fortiori, with a relationship between subjects. 
The ethical category is imperative (i.e. a category rather than a 
value) to the extent that it is linguistic and not subjective. 
Morality is a version of the same language aporia that gave rise 
to such concepts as ‘man’ or ‘love’ or ‘self,’ and not the cause or 
the consequence of such concepts. The passage to an ethical 
tonality does not result from a transcendental imperative but it is 
referential (and therefore unreliable) version of a linguistic 
confusion. Ethics (or, one should say, ethicity) is a discursive 
mode among others.28  
First, in this luminous paragraph, before going into details, we can find three 
different words related to our chosen topic: morality, ethics and ethicity. I think, 
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de Man does not simply want to play on words, since the more ancient – or 
modern – word, morality, and its science, ethics, are differentiated from the 
postmodern term, ethicity.29 Although in their original meaning the words seem 
to refer to the same realm of the question of good versus wrong behaviour, from 
the common foundation the postmodern theory of ethics, named ethicity, gives 
rise to multiplicity. That is to say, in the word ‘ethicity’ we can see the 
deconstruction of ethics with preserving and questioning its aporetic roots.  
However, despite the usual attack on deconstruction claiming that 
deconstruction turns from ethical problems in complete indifference, it rather 
turns to and regards such questions in their differences. The ethicity of 
deconstruction can be named ‘ethics-in-difference’ because it is sensitive to 
variety; it pays more attention to differences and consciously accepts them. In de 
Man’s theory, the new term of ethicity is strongly connected with the practice of 
reading, more exactly, the allegorical reading practice. In Allegories of Readings 
his analyses are about the universality and the impossibility of Reading (written 
with capital ‘r’) as he says “any narrative (that is, story-telling) is primarily the 
allegory of his own reading […] the allegory of reading narrates the 
impossibility of reading.”30 However good we are as readers, we inevitably fail 
to read allegories due to the fact that a rhetorical trope says one thing and always 
means another, and its final reading thus becomes impossible. For de Man, 
“Reading” (written in quotation marks and capitalised) – also as an allegory – 
“includes not just […] the act of reading works of literature, but sensation, 
perception, and therefore every human act whatsoever.”31 It gives “the ground 
and foundation of human life”32 and consequently, in a given text, event or 
experience, we cannot reach a totality of understanding; that is, we cannot have a 
single, definitive interpretation. 
De Man’s ‘rhetor-ethics’ can certainly be applied to his reading of his own 
text or my understanding of his reading. The other Yale-deconstructor, Joseph 
Hillis Miller, undertakes the task of defining ‘the ethics of reading’ in several of 
his works, though he himself refers to the term as an “oxymoron.”33 In his book 
The Ethics of Reading he tries to understand this oxymoron, or, as Scholes labels 
it: this “perverse notion of reading.”34 However, Miller’s writings are ‘only’ 
concerned with the understanding of reading and for him the ethics of reading 
marks the “necessary ethical moment in that act of reading as such, a moment 
neither cognitive, nor political, nor social, not interpersonal, but properly and 
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independently ethical.”35 In The Ethics of Reading Miller as a good 
deconstructive reader tries to understand and read de Man’s ideas on ethicity in 
one of his chapters “Reading Unreadability: de Man.” Analysing the famous 
quotation, Miller calls attention to the way de Man rejects the traditional, 
basically Kantian theory of ethics. Though de Man still uses the words, 
‘category’ and ‘imperative’ alluding to the Kantian ‘categorical imperative,’ the 
ethical category is neither subjective, nor transcendental for him – but linguistic. 
Being taken as a linguistic phenomenon, the ethical refers to a necessary element 
in language and life, namely that “we cannot help making judgments of right or 
wrong or commanding others to act according to those judgments (or) 
condemning them for not doing so” – says Miller.36 
In his chapter on de Man’s ethicity, Miller also emphasises the existential 
importance of reading and the ‘fictional’ (cf. imagined sequence of allegories) 
nature of the (never-ending) process of understanding that “mix[es] tropological, 
allegorical, referential, ethical, political, and historical dimensions.”37 De Man 
claims that the ethical, just like the allegorical, is only one of the possible 
‘discursive modes’; not a primary, but a secondary or a tertiary category, that is, 
they do not and cannot come first in textual understanding. Then what comes 
first? Referring again to the quotation, it clearly says that the reading process 
starts from “a figure (or a system of figures) and its deconstruction,” then due to 
its deconstruction it is followed (endlessly) by a sequence of “supplementary 
figural superposition” which tells “the unreadability of the prior narration.” 
These narratives – actually generated by the primary one are called allegorical 
narratives, or allegories telling “the story of the failure to read.”38 Thus, right at 
the beginning of understanding we have rhetorical figures; more exactly, 
language with its determining laws. And – following de Man’s ideas – I can say 
this is the very first and the very last moment when the word ‘right’ can be truly 
used, as starting our reading of a text with its rhetorical figures, we must (truly) 
enter its false world. Although we are in the realm of falsehood, being good 
readers we try to read it right; and, what’s more, the ethical appears in this 
contextualised falsehood. For de Man “the term ethical designates the structural 
interference of two distinct value systems” referring to the epistemological true-
false and the ethical right-wrong value-pairs. In an allegorical reading a 
statement cannot be both true and right at once, as “it is impossible to respond 
simultaneously to those two demands.”39  
Therefore instead of using the expression ‘ethical value,’ de Man speaks 
about ‘the ethical category’ regarding it as an imperative: as an obligation it is 
                                                     
35 Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 1. 
36 Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 46.  
37 Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 44. 
38 de Man, Allegories of Reading, 205.  
39 Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 49. 
25 
taken absolute and unconditional. Both Miller and de Man (and I myself) 
struggle with the real meaning of de Man’s ethicity – as can be expected in a text 
claiming the unreadability of reading. Miller quotes another interesting passage, 
where de Man clearly names his ‘true’ categorical imperative: “in the case of 
reading of a text, what takes place is a necessary understanding […] an 
understanding is an epistemological event prior to being an ethical or aesthetic 
value.”40 It becomes obvious that de Man knows only one imperative: the 
imperative of language with its – quite hermeneutical – ‘read!’ or ‘understand!’ 
Returning to the central de Manian principle, Miller concludes that “to live is to 
read, or rather to commit again and again the failure to read which is the human 
lot […] each reading is strictly speaking, ethical, in the sense that it has to take 
place, by an implacable necessity, as a response to a categorical demand.”41 Our 
world is full of texts and systems of signs which we are bound to understand: we 
cannot help reading; but we should accept that we cannot go beyond the borders 
of language. And we also have to accept that the ethical is only one of the 
possible but necessary referential modes of our reading. While interpreting de 
Man’s theory of the ‘rhetorical close-reading’ from an ethical point of view, 
Miller himself cannot escape from falling into the traps of the rhetorical, of 
language. At the end of his reading on de Man’s ethicity, Miller answers his own 
question using the tricky affirmative of double negation. He says that in de 
Man’s case “[the] ethics of reading […] imposes on the reader the ‘impossible’ 
task of reading unreadability, but that does not by any means mean that reading, 
even ‘good’ reading, cannot take place and does not have a necessary ethical 
dimension.”42 
On the whole, Miller’s effort, aimed at showing the ethics of reading in de 
Man’s ethicity, cannot be seen as really convincing. Miller constantly apologises 
that he is only a reader (and cannot be anybody else), which also means that he 
must be mistaken if he thinks of his own reading as a definitive one. Despite it 
being a ‘mission impossible,’ he still insists on the necessity of the ethical in 
understanding, and works out his ethics of reading, relying on de Man’s ethical-
linguistic imperative expressed in the allegorical reading. After interpreting de 
Man’s ethicity, he explores passages from three novelists’ – George Eliot, 
Anthony Trollope and Henry James – with greater success. Although in his 
introductory “Reading Doing Reading” Miller confesses that his selection of 
texts and their ordering is not ‘innocent,’ he claims that he chose his examples at 
random. Let us believe him in the case of the literary works, but I strongly doubt 
that the second chapter, written on the famous de Manian passage, resulted from 
an arbitrary choice. Since the very first chapter is concerned with Kant’s 
categorical imperative, the same is true of the other topic dealt with in the 
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previous chapter,. Maybe, the undoing of a metaphor, that is, the allegorical 
reading, could have been more fruitful in the chapter on de Man’s ethicity; and 
in fact it is fruitful in the chapter on Kant’s categorical imperative.  
Beforehand, among other passages, Miller quotes a footnote from Foundations 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, in which Kant tries to give what he means by the 
expression, ‘to act from respect (Achtung) for law,’ claiming that “respect can be 
regarded as the effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of the law […] 
All respect for a person is only respect for the law of which the person provides an 
example.”43 This footnote reveals the Kantian reading of ethics, as he finds that the 
author reads himself or re-reads his own text. As Miller says “at such moments an 
author turns back on himself, so to speak, turns back on a text he or she has 
written, re-reads it, and, it may be, performs an act which can be called an example 
of the ethics of reading.”44 This sentence reveals that this moment is not a 
necessity in every text. But for Miller, or me, the deconstructive reader, who pays 
attention exactly to those moments, it means a necessity, a must, and the self-
reading blindness of the chosen texts becomes the insight of the ethics of reading 
in his/my understanding. Throughout he suggests keeping in mind that his 
“interest is not in ethics as such but in the ethics of reading and in the relation of 
the ethical moment in reading to relation in the sense of giving account, telling a 
story, narrating.”45 On the other hand, he expresses that in our life we are related to 
the ethical through finding analogies and reading stories. We can judge a person or 
an act as ethical, because we find him or it analogous to the incomprehensible law: 
as if human beings and their life events or narrated stories were used as rhetorical 
figures of speech (signs or tropes) referring to the moral imperative. In his 
Versions of Pygmalion Miller also emphasises the reader’s and/or the critic’s 
responsibility demanding “respect for the text” and asserts that ethics has a 
peculiar relation to narrative as “narrative examples are especially appropriate for 
an investigation of the ethics of reading.”46  
In a chapter titled “Reading Telling: Kant,” Miller tries to understand and 
deconstruct the Kantian categorical imperative to show an example of his 
(mysterious) ethics of reading. Deconstructing the Kantian categorical 
imperative, Miller calls our attention to the usage of ‘as if’ (als so) together with 
the mode of past subjunctive (cf. Konjunktiv 2 in German).47 The English 
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translation of the well-known apodictic formula reads “I always should act as if 
my private maxim were to be universal legislation for all mankind” or in other 
words “I should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim 
should be a universal law.”48 That is, with this als so we must enter the world of 
fiction, and having created a fictitious context, a little novel, we shall be able to 
tell whether or not the action is moral. Miller again emphasises that narrative or 
story-making gives the basic activity of the human mind together with the ability 
of telling stories to each other and understanding them; that is, (again) we cannot 
help reading. He finds that “narrative serves for Kant as the absolutely necessary 
bridge without which there would be no connecting between law as such and 
any particular ethical rule of behaviour.”49  
Reading this bridging conclusion of the Kantian ethics, we could take it as a 
regressive arch metaphor, but Miller, as a ‘good’ deconstructor, gives it a twist, 
or rather a turn (cf. trope). In the last pages he discusses the performative act of 
promising offered by the Kantian categorical imperative. Unfortunately, the 
example Kant gives is one of false promise, which “does not exemplify that of 
which it is meant to be an example.”50 Miller displays Kant’s blindness or slip of 
the tongue, with great pleasure, concluding that in the end the good reader is to 
be confronted not by the moral law, not even a good example of it, but by the 
unreadability of the text. The false promise is such a bridge (or non-bridge), 
where the two halves start off from the two ends but they do not meet in the 
middle. The promise – here of the example, the bridge, the system, the author or 
of my own text – is made in language, and it cannot promise anything but itself 
with its own unfathomed abyss. To quote Miller’s judgment: 
The example, he [Kant] assures us, will serve as the safe bridge 
between the one [cf. the universal law] and the other [cf. the 
particular case]. Instead of that, the example divides itself within 
itself between two possible but incompatible readings and so 
becomes unreadable. The bridge which was to vault over the 
abyss between universal and particular law opens another chasm 
within itself.51  
                                                     
48 Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 26. See also Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 
1978), 21.  
49 Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 28. Miller also says that Kant’s Critique of Judgment, his work 
on art, can be regarded as a bridge between his work on epistemology, Critique of Pure Reason 
and his work on ethics, Critique of Practical Reason. This is followed up in the next chapter, 
“The Rhetor(eth)ical Reading of the Material and Romantic Sublime”.  
50 Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 36. 
51 Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 35. 
28 
The picture of the opening chasms – just like de Man’s vertiginous allegories – 
makes us feel dizzy and uncomfortable. This insight is exactly what the 
rhetorical close reading can provide. Thinking of the bridge-metaphor, we can 
remember the vault of New Criticism and it can be concluded that both of them, 
the modernist and postmodernist metaphors of reading, remain in the realm of 
figurative ‘falsehood’.  
Thus, in texts the ethical can be said to basically mean the introduction of a 
universal ‘must’. As Miller summarises:  
In what I call ‘the ethical moment’ there is a claim made on the 
author writing the work, on the narrator telling the story within 
the fiction of the novel, on the characters within the story at their 
decisive moments of their lives, and on the reader, teacher, or 
critic responding to the work. This ethical ‘I must’ cannot […] 
be accounted for by the social and historical forces that impinge 
upon it. In fact the ethical moment contests these forces or is 
subversive of them.52  
Now, we can ask the question: why is it so important for the deconstructors to 
insist on the existence of such discursive modes, namely, the ethical, the social, 
the political or the historical, which sound quite odd in their rhetorical analyses? 
In his introduction, Miller says that his provocative choosing of the title and 
topic, ‘ethics of reading’ can be explained by the attacks on deconstruction, as it 
is often labelled as ‘nihilistic,’ ‘ahistorical,’ ‘relativist,’ ‘immoral’ or 
‘negative’.53 In spite of these mistaken, or at least awkward, polemics being 
aimed at calling against the rhetorical-deconstructive reading practice, they 
obviously appear as a necessity in the course of the history of literary criticism 
and theory. 
On the whole, as Jonathan Loesberg remarks “the most virulent charge 
against deconstruction [is] its aestheticism [which] stands as a vague synonym 
for imagining a realm of art entirely separate from social or historical effects and 
then advocating an escape into that ‘unreal,’ aesthetic universe.”54 On the one 
hand, the Yale-critics would answer that there is no escape beyond language and 
textual understanding. They would also say that they really do work hard as 
reading needs continuous efforts, and they should follow a must: a linguistic 
necessity, which can be called a hermeneutical or ethical imperative. On the 
other hand, deconstruction as a new mode of criticism (cf. new New Criticism) 
appeared in the last few decades of the 20th century, and the end of the previous 
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centuries were similarly marked by the atmosphere of decadence: with the signs 
of nihilism, hedonism, pessimism and escapist fantasies. As Miller says in his 
response to Jonathan Loesberg, who criticised his rhetorical ‘ethics of reading’: 
“Rhetoric is a region of language where […] tropes assert that a thing is one 
thing and the same time another thing. It is the realm of irony and of 
undecidability.”55 Then he names it the realm of not the cognitive but 
performative language and, consequently, in his writings he tries to demonstrate 
that “each act of reading or writing, like ethical acts in general, is a performative 
new start.”56  
But there is a crucial difference between deconstruction and other decadent 
theories of art: it is its strong sense of responsibility. In The Ethics of Reading – 
following de Man’s idea on the necessity of reading – Miller claims that every 
reading is ethical since it has to happen “by an implacable necessity, as a 
response to a categorical demand, and in the sense that the reader must take 
responsibility for it and for its consequences.”57 And here the word ‘reader’ can 
not only refer to the writer and his invented figures, but also critics, teachers and 
students, since all of us are involved, must be involved, in the process of 
Reading. And in his later works Miller emphatically connects the problem of 
responsibility expressed in the ethics of reading with the obligation of teachers. 
Being a reader, the teacher is also obliged to submit himself or herself to “the 
truth of the linguistic imperative” of reading, that is, to “the power of the words 
of the text over the mind.”58 In this sense the teacher is taken as a revealer, not a 
creator, and the way Miller describes the teacher’s ethical reading is similar to 
the Socratic method of maieutika:  
The obligation of the reader, the teacher, and the critic would 
seem to be exclusively epistemological. The reader must see 
clearly what the work in question says and repeat that meaning 
in his commentary or teaching. He functions thereby, modestly 
as an intermediary, as a midwife or catalyst. He transmits 
meanings which are objectively there but which might not 
otherwise have reached readers or students. He brings the 
meaning to birth again as illumination and insight in their 
minds, making the interaction take place without himself 
entering into it or altering it. It would seem that the field covered 
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by reading involves exclusively the epistemological categories 
of truth and falsehood, insight and blindness.59 
Surely the tone of this description can be felt as quite ironic, and we must 
remember that the Socratic method itself was based on irony. We can wonder if 
the deconstructors think it is impossible to Read what is happening in the 
seminars – that is, to give a definitive reading of a text. The answer is obvious: 
reading is happening as it is bound to take place. It sounds strange after all these 
theoretical analyses, but as a teacher of English literature,60 I agree with the 
Yale-critics, who work or worked as teachers, that the questioning Socratic way 
is useful in teaching. Certainly, all of us are aware of the fact that – like in the 
Socratic dialogues – the questions are directed. Yet in the ethics of reading they 
are directed not by the teacher, but by the text: its rhetoric and linguistic 
imperative. This makes it possible for every student to read the text in his or her 
own way, while the teacher acts as mediator and moderator at the same time. 
The ethics of reading in class must be based on not the ethical, but ethicity as it 
would rather equal not the ethics, but morality, which is closer to the universal 
basis of all the different ethic-s. And I should mention another important factor, 
that even in morality and deconstructed ethics, ethicity, just like in a good 
reading, we are to use our imagination (see the Kantian als so), as if we were 
reading little novels or stories.  
I think that besides acting like a ‘midwife’ and encouraging the imaginative 
reading skill of the students, a good teacher needs something else: a sense of 
irony. Irony is needed to accept the students’ different views on the texts, and so 
keep the varied lines of thought together. But this deconstructive irony means 
more than simply referring to a trope: it is an attitude, an openness towards 
reality, ethicity, reading, and teaching that is based on the ability of shifting 
points of view. It marks the ability of avoiding to claim this or that interpretation 
as the final one, while giving the experience of reading to each and every 
student. And I am sure it cannot be done without accepting that the final reading, 
Reading, is unattainable, which we should admit cannot be done without irony.  
In Theory Now and Then, somehow still obsessed with the bridge-metaphor, 
Miller again speaks about a bridge referring to the ‘edgy’ situation of present 
day criticism: “the new developments in literary study have important 
implications not only for the [Kantian] bridge but for those realms the bridge is 
supposed to join. So we may be not so much at a frontier or at a crossroads as 
standing on a bridge – a bridge, moreover, that has received in recent years a 
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new testing, shaking, or solicitation.”61 He then writes about the ‘new’ ethics of 
reading, which basically means the ethics of teaching and the teaching of 
reading. Returning to the overt pedagogical aim of Yale-deconstruction, he 
gives the essential features of such ethics as respect for the given/chosen text 
read in the original language with philological rigour. I hope I have fulfilled my 
– hopefully, not false – promise of discussing ‘the rhetoric and ethics of 
reading,’ and you have been ‘its’ (and also my) good readers. Taking the ethics 
or the ethicity of allegories as ‘a’ figure of speech, I have tried to read it – 
perhaps as a new, ethical start in my rhetorical criticism.  
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THE RHETOR(ETH)ICAL READINGS OF THE MATERIAL AND THE 
ROMANTIC SUBLIME* 
What do we know about the nightmares of Immanuel Kant?  
(de Man) 
 
In his reading of the Kantian passages on ethics, Miller emphasises the 
importance of ‘als so’ (as if) with the creation of human narratives, which is 
related to “the act of imagination.”1 On the whole, Miller’s ‘ethics of reading’ 
owes a lot, not only to the Kantian ethics, but also, to the romantic notion of the 
cult of imagination. In English (and also German) pre-romanticism and 
romanticism imagination, being regarded as the highest human capacity, is 
thematised. Moreover, it becomes one of the central topics together with the 
difference between the beautiful and the sublime in the theoretical ‘aesthetic’ 
pieces written in the second half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. 
We can think of Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of 
Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), Coleridge’s mistranslated 
Ein(s)bildungskraft as ‘shaping into one,’ esemplastic power, or his ideas on 
imagination vs. fancy, and also Wordsworth’s prose works, mainly his famous 
“Preface” or “The Sublime and Beautiful.”2  
The two significant issues of the imagination and the sublime are intertwined 
in a puzzling seminal work, Kant’s The Critique of Judgment (1790), which was 
well-known by the 19th century English and German poet-thinkers. For Kant 
“the imagination holds out the promise of bridging reason and sense, 
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establishing the link between world and mind, and abolishing the ‘immeasurable 
gulf’ between the true and the good.”3 At the same time, allegorically reading, in 
the Kantian oeuvre, in ‘the architecture of the Critiques’ the third Critique with 
its imaginative power seems to function like a ‘missing link’ and is used “to fill 
in the gap opened between the transcendental principles of reason and the 
empirical orientation of the senses.”4 Moreover, Miller – just like Derrida – also 
claims that in his system, Kant regarded his third critique, Critique of Judgment 
(work of art), as serving as a bridge between epistemology (the work of pure 
reason) and ethics (the work of practical reason) separated by a deep chasm.5  
This quite naive idea is undone in deconstructive readings as they are likely 
to present the failure of the Kantian (theory of) imagination and show that the 
wishful bridging over the abyss becomes the most – desperately – violent in the 
section concerned with the sublime. In three studies in his Aesthetic Ideology – 
“Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant,” “Kant’s Materialism” and “Kant and 
Schiller” – Paul de Man focuses on the theory of the Kantian imagination and he 
claims that “the articulation of a transcendental with a metaphysical discourse” 
becomes possible in the field of aesthetic.6 The marked ‘playground’ of this 
articulation can be found in the section on the sublime in the third Critique, 
where the agreement (or linkup) between pure and practical reason is 
‘articulated’. Now, following the guiding clues of de Man’s rhetorical reading, I 
try to find out what happens in the abyss of The Analytic of the Sublime while 
paying special attention to the figurality of the text.  
In The Critique of Judgment the immediate context of the sublime is given by 
the argument on the beautiful. According to Kant, we like both the beautiful and 
the sublime for their own sake, but, in the case of the former, our liking is 
connected with the presentation of quality, while in the case of the latter with the 
presentation of quantity. The other significant difference is that we find the 
beautiful charming and pleasant but the sublime simultaneously attracts and 
repels the mind. Although both of them give pleasure, the sublime goes along 
with “a negative pleasure” that is produced by “the feeling of a momentary 
inhibition of the vital forces” – or, “blockage”7 – followed immediately by their 
serious and strong outpouring. However, besides these apparent differences, 
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Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New York: Columbia UP, 1985). 
34 
there is a more profound one, to quote Kant: “the sublime, in the strict sense of 
the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of 
reason.”8 The concluding statement of the introductory paragraph of “The 
Analytic of the Sublime” is followed by a powerful insight claiming that for the 
beautiful in nature we must seek the basis outside, while for the sublime merely 
within ourselves. Here Kant also introduces the powerful language of the 
following passages, but in this, the 24th paragraph, the sublime violates or 
exercises power over imagination. Comparing it to the beautiful, de Man regards 
the sublime as ‘a monster or ghost’ of the philosophical discourse being “not a 
property of nature […] but a purely inward experience of consciousness.”9  
Then Kant introduces the distinction of the mathematically and the 
dynamically sublime; through the imagination the mathematical is referred to as 
the faculty of cognition and the dynamic to the faculty of desire. Besides the 
arbitrary names of the terms – for example, de Man suggests using the chinetic 
instead of the dynamic – we should also pay attention to the necessary 
differentiation of the two kinds. By definition the mathematically sublime is 
‘absolutely large’ with the standard in itself, that is, it is a magnitude “beyond all 
comparison” – it is infinite. When we regard St. Peter’s Basilica or the pyramids 
as sublime, the source of the sublime can be found in our own ideas. To quote 
the first definition from the end of the 25th paragraph: “The sublime is that, the 
mere capacity of [its] thinking evidences a faculty of mind transcending every 
standard of sense.” 10 Derrida, in the subchapter titled “The Colossal” of 
Parergon, sees the difference between the beautiful and the sublime in their 
relation and/vs. non-relation to limits: while limits give (a) form to the beautiful, 
the sublime is characterised by “the totality of the without-limit to be thought.” 
The word, ‘thought’ is italicised as Derrida also thinks, the sublime seems to 
present “an indeterminate concept of reason.”11 Estimating the magnitude of the 
monstrous objects involves two operations: in the apprehension the imagination 
tries to understand or grasp the greatness (that is, its own greatness), while in the 
comprehension it tries to unite and totalise the apprehended sight. The perplexity 
aroused in the spectator is caused by the ‘failure’ of imagination since the 
spectator’s imagination reaches its maximum and as it cannot expand that 
maximum, it sinks back into itself. The sublime displays “our imagination in all 
its boundless, and with it nature, as sinking into insignificance before the ideas 
of reason, once their adequate presentation is attempted.”12  
                                                     
8 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. by James Creed Meredith (Oxford: 
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9 Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology, 74. 
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12 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, 105. 
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In this section of the text – before ‘the entering’ of the dynamically sublime – 
the Kantian abyss does open up marking “the point of excess for the imagination 
(towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) […] in which it 
fears to lose itself.”13 In the same passage we can also find the metaphor of 
‘violence’ though here imagination is violent to the internal sense. Kant 
introduces the conflicting (f)actors of the following ‘dynamic’ paragraphs, 
namely, the faculties of the mind: the imagination and reason, which are 
supposed to be in harmony in the theory of the beautiful. It seems that in “The 
Analytic of the Sublime” the trope of the abyss and the trope of power/violence 
are interlinked – the seducing sublime of the abyss must be bridged over by the 
word of power (and law). On the one hand, in the next part on the dynamically 
sublime, we can read about the filling of the gap, which has been caused by the 
failed articulation of the mathematically sublime. On the other hand, the text 
comes to life rhetorically: with its ‘romantic’ storms, bold rocks, threatening 
volcanoes, hurricanes, and high waterfalls nature appears as a fearful and 
sublime might/power.  
But we cannot take the Kantian examples of the sublime as ‘romantic’ ones 
because we should realise that “nature is here called sublime merely because it 
raises the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can 
make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, 
even above nature.”14 In rather a provocative way, according to Kant, even war 
can be sublime, and the paragraph is full of the pictures of fight and battle. In his 
rhetorical reading de Man also claims the significance of the 28th paragraph 
though he misses the linking passages. To quote his summary: 
The transition from the mathematical to the dynamic sublime, a 
transition for which the justification is conspicuously lacking in 
the text (section 28 begins most abruptly with the word ‘Power’ 
[Macht]), marks the saturation of the tropological field as 
language frees itself of its constraints and discovers within itself 
a power no longer dependent on the restrictions of cognition. 
[…] The Critique of Judgment therefore has, at its centre, a 
deep, perhaps fatal, break or discontinuity. It depends on a 
linguistic structure (language as a performative as well as a 
cognitive system) that is not itself accessible to the powers of 
transcendental philosophy.15 
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In the last paragraph of “The Analytic of the Sublime,” in paragraph 29, Kant 
connects, i.e. interrelates, the abyss of the imagination and the act of violence. In 
this key section, it turns out that in the reception of the sublime, the mind has to 
be susceptible to the ideas; as with its attraction and repulsion the sublime 
represents nature’s inadequacy to the ideas. The sublime displays “the 
dominance [Gewalt] which reason exercises over imagination with a view to 
extending it to the requirements of its own realm (the practical) and letting it 
look out beyond itself into the infinite, which for it [viz. the imagination] is an 
abyss [Abgrund].”16 According to de Man, the faculty of imagination sacrifices 
itself when losing its empirical freedom, it chooses reason, but in return it 
becomes apathetic and truly free. In his reading the Kantian story is about 
personified faculties and in this “dramatized scene” or “allegorical tale” the 
imagination (die Einbildungskraft) as a tragic heroine – like Iphigenia or 
Antigone – is sacrificed and ‘violated’ by reason (die Vernunft).17 Derrida reads 
this passage similarly, calling attention to “the mutilating and sacrificial 
violence” of imagination turned against itself in the sublime, through which it 
gains by losing: “The imagination organizes the theft (Beraubung) of its own 
freedom, it lets itself be commanded by a law other than that of the empirical use 
which determines it with a view to an end. But by this violent renunciation, it 
gains in extension (Erweiterung) and in power (Macht).”18  
The last paragraph is followed by a long and illuminating comment, in which, 
with the implicit limitation of its sensible representation and its sacrifice, the 
sublime is made suitable for referring to the supersensible/transcendental. In an 
earlier (the 27th) paragraph we could read that the inadequacy of the imagination 
is aroused by an idea that is a law for us and at the same time evokes the feeling 
of respect. The comprehension of the infinite with regard to the imagination is – 
seemingly – a failure, while to the idea it is a law of reason that is forced upon 
the imagination so that it should accept its limitation. Thus, to quote the final 
definition: “[t]he sublime is what pleases immediately by reason of its own 
opposition to the interest of sense”; that is, “an object (of nature) the 
representation of which determines the mind to regard [viz. think] the elevation 
of nature beyond our reach as equivalent to a presentation of ideas (als 
Darstellung von Ideen zu denken).”19 For Kant from this definition only one step 
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–a salto mortale – is needed to reach the moral law and the realm of the practical 
reason, which is now linked with the empirical in the aesthetics of the sublime.  
In de Man’s rhetorical reading the most horrible – or most sublime – part of 
Kant’s text shows the anti-poetic images with dead, or rather cadaverous tropes 
of the self / reason controlled imagination. In the final long comment Kant 
describes the mere sight of the sky and the ocean, where the materiality of 
eyesight (Augenschein) can be opposed to the earlier presented tropological 
story. The dynamics of the apathetic sublime, the material sight of the Kantian 
“as we see [it] (wie man ihn sieht)” refers to “the moment when the infinite is 
frozen into the materiality of stone.”20 This nightmarish style is “entirely a-
referential, a-phenomenal, a-pathetic formalism,” which disrupts the aesthetics 
aimed at articulation and finally “find[s] access to the moral world of practical 
reason, practical law.”21 At this point of his analysis de Man introduces the 
opposite of the Kantian material sublime, which he names as the Wordsworthian 
or the romantic. While Kant’s description operates – indeed is forced to operate 
– without tropes, in the romantic texts the figures show the chiastic “exchange 
between faculties or between mind and nature.”22 In his essay “The Sublime and 
the Beautiful,” Wordsworth gives a ‘beautiful’ example of the romantic sublime. 
He writes about a Lady “whose imagination, endeavouring to complete whatever 
had been left imperfect in pictures & books, had feasted in representing to itself 
the forms of trees.”23 The Lady thinks about the world in terms of the pictures of 
her imagination, and when she goes out to nature, “to behold the reality, & to 
learn by experience how far its grandeur or beauty surpassed the conceptions 
which she had formed,”24 she finds the real beauties outside unsatisfactory. That 
is, in Wordsworth’s reading of the sublime, the (Lady’s) imagination triumphs 
over (her) reason – in a poetic and romantic sense.  
Opposed to the romantic sublime, in his text Kant struggles to come up – and 
he should come up – with the triumph of reason and he has to see the world as a 
part of the system. Looking at the conclusion of the drama in a ‘more 
reasonable’ way, the failure and the success of the sublime do not mean anything 
else other than the victory of the mind over sight – “the representation of the 
failure to represent.”25 Or, as de Man cynically summarises: “[p]oets, in Kant, 
do not embark on the high seas.”26 However, he also claims that “what makes 
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the sublime compatible with reason is its independence from sensory experience; 
it is beyond the senses, übersinnlich. This is what makes the junction of 
cognition with morality possible.”27 But he fails to notice that in the Kantian 
definitions the emphasis is placed on the representation of the idea and the 
conceiving (thinking) of that representation. It is not by chance that after the 
definition of the sublime in the next sentence Kant claims that “in a literal sense 
and according to their logical import, ideas cannot be presented.”28 It can be 
imagined, or can be conceived that in the Kantian conception the sublime 
becomes the trope of the moral law ‘in a forced way’. The sublime can be taken 
as the “symbolic hypotyposis” of the law, as in the 59th paragraph, where Kant 
names such metaphors that refer to ideas by not direct conception but by 
“analogy with conception (Anschauung).”29 Similarly, recalling Miller’s 
‘bridging’ mise en abyme, Derrida says that “the abyss calls for analogy – the 
active recourse of the whole Critique – but analogy plunges endlessly into the 
abyss as soon as a certain art is needed to describe analogically the play of 
analogy.”30  
Thus, in his third Critique, Kant links the moral law with the ‘law-ordained’ 
function of the imagination, “which is the genuine characteristic of human 
morality, where reason has to impose its dominion upon imagination. […] in the 
aesthetic judgment upon the sublime this dominion is represented as exercised 
through the imagination itself as an instrument of reason.”31 On the one hand, 
the ambiguity of imagination seems incongruous – its fails by being incapable of 
comprehending the infinite greatness and succeeds by functioning as the agent of 
reason for the moral law. On the other hand, in a forced way the Kantian 
imagination functions as the agent of reason here and exercises power over itself 
for the sake of morality, for the sake of linking the moral law with the human 
world. I agree with David Martyn, who thinks that it is necessary to supply (that 
is, to empower) the sublime with ethical relevance. As he summarises: “The 
sublime is reason’s failure to totalize infinity – the very failure that figures, in 
the first Critique, as the foundation of ethics. Ethics, one could say, is the 
sublimation of theory: […] in the sense of the rational sublime, of the sublime 
failure of reason vis-à-vis itself.”32 In the Kantian architectonics, ethics is given 
as an eternal task and it declares the sublimity of reason with its ‘sublimating’ 
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meaning. In this sense, de Man is right when he regards the Kantian sublime as 
un-poetic and not romantic, but mistakenly names it the material sublime: it can 
rather be named as the ethical one.  
On the whole, de Man also presents the task of reading as the sublime failure. 
He compares the movement of apprehension and comprehension with the 
process of reading, “in which […] the eye moves horizontally in succession 
whereas the mind has to combine vertically the cumulative understanding of 
what has been apprehended.”33 It is related to Weiskel’s idea of “the reader’s or 
hermeneutical sublime,”34 but de Man gives a twist to the meaning of the term – 
presenting the failure to present. He calls the reader’s attention to the materiality 
of the Kantian text: the playing on words, syllables, or “the prosaic materiality of 
the letter”35 – in such German words which are quite alike but have radically 
different meanings. De Man happily calls attention to a ‘sublime’ spelling 
mistake in the first edition of The Critique of Judgment, when the two cardinal 
Kantian terms, Sittlichkeit (morality) and Sinnlichkeit (sensibility) are 
interchanged: “This pure, elevating, merely negative presentation of morality 
[Sittlichkeit] involves, on the other hand, no fear of fanaticism, which is a 
delusion that would will some vision beyond all the bounds of sensibility 
[Sinnlichkeit]; i.e. would dream according to principles (rational raving).”36 We 
do not know what Kant felt writing down this passionate passage about the 
dreams of reason (or his nightmares?). But in the sentence a stupid spelling and 
printing mistake ‘simply’ connected the two realms of the universal and the 
particular, fulfilling the task Kant dedicated his whole life to. In the act of 
reading “the letter of the text must become my law,” to quote Miller’s 
statement.37 Starting from the wish of a relaxing – or bridging – promise of the 
Kantian sublime, we should face the desperate task of reading and also the task 
of reading about/of ethics and the ethical sublime. This way, we cannot help 
giving the term ‘ethics of reading’ a new turn and opening chasms of meaning 
with the reading of every single letter.  
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THE IRONICAL ALLEGORY OF REMEMBRANCE AND OBLIVION*  
(IN MEMORY OF PAUL DE MAN AND JACQUES DERRIDA) 
 
Of the two springs called Mnemosyne and Lethe,  





In his Allegories of Reading – in its concluding and rather ‘telling’ chapter titled 
“Excuses” – Paul de Man refers to irony as the key rhetorical and linguistic 
figure of his allegorical readings. Borrowing Friedrich Schlegel’s formulation – 
‘irony is permanent parabasis,’ it is taken as the figure that “interrupt[s] the 
expectations of rhetorical movement.” The trope of irony becomes “the undoing 
of the deconstructive allegory of all tropological cognitions” […] As such, far 
from closing off the tropological system, irony enforces the repetition of its 
aberration.”1 While the first part of the quotation badly questions the seemingly 
‘closing off’ readings of the previous chapters, in the second the proliferation of 
other possible readings is promised. It looks as if it/everything was turned upon 
by irony: the figure is shown as the trope of tropes, the essence of rhetoric. The 
surprising and effective ending can also be read as the beginning of another story 
which would be about the understanding of the relation between irony and 
allegory.  
Now it is appropriate to quote another statement: “I have never known how 
to tell a story,” says Derrida in the opening of the very first part of his lecture 
series, Mémoires, dedicated to de Man’s memory.2 This story of remembrance 
introduced by an ironical and self-reflective statement, which can be taken as the 
mirror-image of the de Manian closing, is speaking about the allegorical 
reading/unreadability of irony. Derrida also claims that he “love[s] nothing 
better than remembering and Memory itself”3; thus, his strange confession about 
his ‘inability felt as a sad infirmity’ can be connected with the possibility (or 
impossibility) of my own story-telling. In this particular story, embedded in the 
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context of allegory and irony, such flowers of rhetoric flourish as Mnemosyne, 
Lethe, Psyche or Narcissus. In my text I am trying to interpret these rhetorical 
figures in the above-mentioned two thinkers’ works, while the recurrent 
‘Narcissus’ becomes the rhetorical flower of (my) reading.  
In “The Rhetoric of Temporality” (in Blindness and Insight), de Man regards 
allegory together with irony as the key rhetorical tropes of our (textual) 
understanding. Although both show the discontinuous relationship between sign 
and meaning, and are characterised by temporality, the experience of time in the 
case of allegory means a diachronic (narrative) structure, while in irony it is a 
synchronic (momentary) structure: “Essentially the mode of the present, it 
[irony] knows neither memory nor prefigurative duration, whereas allegory 
exists entirely within an ideal time that is never here and now but always a past 
or an endless future. […] Yet the two modes, for all their profound distinctions 
in mood and structure, are the two faces of the same fundamental experience of 
time.”4 According to de Man, allegory is in charge of the individual narratives 
while irony, with its sudden interference, interrupts, then restarts the 
interpretative activity. In the essay, de Man’s famous example is William 
Wordsworth’s poem titled “A slumber did my spirit seal,”5 in which the 
persona’s previous death and life-forgetting slumber is counterbalanced by his 
wise insight about the death of the beloved. Instead of ‘being counterbalanced,’ I 
prefer to say ‘being ironised’ but de Man claims that the poem is not ironic at all, 
and he tries to write the speaker’s allegorical story referring to the phases as 
error-death-recognition-wisdom.  
It can be accepted that the poem is basically allegorical, but in the de Manian 
temporal scheme, the moment of retrospection – in the twinkling of an eye/I – is 
assured by irony. The illusion of the allegorical timeless recollection in the first 
stanza is broken by the intrusion of the momentary ironical reminiscence, which 
makes not only the present of the second stanza, but also the past of the first 
stanza, ‘real,’ emphasising temporality. Whereas de Man speaks about “a stance 
of wisdom” that “is no longer vulnerable to irony”;6 that is, he does not realise 
that the co-operation of the two figures and their infinite playing gives the 
unique temporality of the poem. Nevertheless, he remarks that “[t]he structure of 
irony, […] is the reversed mirror-image of this [allegorical] form.”7 Since the 
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mirror-reflection of a ‘thing’ is a reversed image, the reversal of the reversed can 
be thought of as re-establishing the real ‘thing’ – similarly to how the positive 
affirmative of double negation does. This scheme can be used in the poem as in 
the previous reflection of the lover’s allegorical, imagined narration, the dead 
beloved seemed immortal and now she is really dead; that is, the allegory of 
remembering is reversed by the ironical insight of temporality. However, the 
story obviously does not end here because the work of recollection can be started 
any time, so that it should be reversed by irony – recollecting the previous 
ironically reversed recollections as well. Consequently, we cannot speak about 
tautology and one single chiastic transformation, but the relation between the 
two figures is unfolded in an ‘infinite’ number of chiasms. Since both of them 
function as a swinging mirror, playing them off8 and turning against each other, 
the two mirrors will reflect each other ad infinitum. At this point we can 
remember the early romantic German critic and essayist, Friedrich Schlegel, 
whom de Man heartily and frequently quotes in his works, and his 116th 
Athenaeum-fragment, where he describes the romantic-poetic working process 
(cf. the new poesy) claiming that “on the wings of poetic reflection [one can] 
raise to higher and higher powers and multiply it, as it were, in an endless array 
of mirrors.”9 Being the motto of the so-called Jena Romantic School, this 
fragment shows/displays the progressiveness and infinity of the creative work, 
where the significance of irony is emphasised and allegory is neglected. The 
irony of the romantically poetical life-work is expressed in the artist’s reflexivity 
and in the recognition of his own reflexivity, which, accepting the rhetoricity of 
language, we can read as the presentation of textual understanding itself. 
But let me refer to a more puzzling statement taken from Walter Benjamin’s 
The Arcades Project (Das Passagen-Werk) on mirroring mirrors, which takes us 
closer to the story of allegory and irony: “Let two mirrors reflect each other; 
then Satan plays his favourite trick and opens here in his way (as his partner 
does in lovers’ gazes) the perspective on infinity.”10 In my text, several times I 
will refer to Benjamin’s images: the dull reflecting surface and the mirror of the 
eye. Right now the interpretation of these would lead us far away, but with the 
help of the quotation we can turn back to the reflection of allegory and irony. In 
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Unendliche.” In Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Frankfurt an Main: Suhrkamp, 1982, 
vol. 5), 1049.  
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the conclusion of “The Rhetoric of Temporality” showing the possible 
combination of allegory and irony, de Man also refers to a love-story in 
Stendhal’s Chartreuse de Parme as an example. The novel tells the story of two 
unfortunate lovers, who cannot be together, thus, their allegory recalls the myth 
of Eros and Psyche. In the mythical narrative, Psyche cannot see her lover and 
should not look for his identity, and when the truth comes to light only after 
rough trials, only in her death – that is, in immortality – does she ‘really’ become 
her beloved’s true partner.11 In de Man’s reading, Psyche’s story as “the myth of 
the unovercomable distance”12 thematises not only the disruption in 
understanding that separates individuals (or Stendhal’s pseudonymous and 
nominal selves), but also the breaks in our reading of a text – that is, the ironical 
reversal/twisting of the allegorical narrative/myth.  
In his lecture, “Psyche: Inventions of the Other” (“Psyche: Invention de 
l’autre”), Derrida also speaks of Amor and Psyche’s story (fable) given in 
Apuleius’s work and hints at de Man’s above mentioned interpretation of the 
myth. But beforehand, in his lecture, he dedicates the reading of Francis Ponge’s 
poem titled “Fable” to his (dead) friend. For Derrida, this short text recalls the 
memory of the three thinkers’ relationship and it also speaks of the interrelation 
between allegory and irony. So the fable reads:  
 
 By the word by commences then this text 
 Of which the first line states the truth 
 But this silvering under the one and other 
 Can it be tolerated? 
 Dear reader already you judge 
 There as to our difficulties… 
then the six italicised lines are followed by the last two put in brackets:  
 (AFTER seven years of misfortune 
 She broke her mirror.)13 
 
The ‘fable’ is telling the story of its own story-telling, that is, it ‘creates’ itself 
starting the endless mirroring of the written words. In this play, however, the 
text “presents itself ironically as an allegory ‘of which the first line states the 
                                                     
11 See in Apuleius, The Golden Ass, trans. by Robert Graves (Penguin Books, 1950).  
12 de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in BI, 228. 
13 Jacques Derrida, “Psyche: Inventions of the Other,” trans. by Catherine Porter, in Reading de 
Man Reading, ed. by Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minneso-
ta Press, 1989, 25-65), 30. In the original, the fable of “Fable” runs: “Par le mot par commence 
donc ce texte/ Dont la première ligne dit la vérité, / Mais ce tain sous l’une et l’autre/ Peut-il 
être toléré?/ Cher lecteur déjà tu juges/ Là de nos difficultés… (APRÈS sept ans de malheurs/ 
Elle brisa son miroir.)” 30. Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Psyché. Invention de l’autre,” in Psyché (Pa-
ris: Galilée, 1987, 11-61), 19. When writing my paper, I used both the original essay and the 
English translation.  
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truth’: truth of allegory and allegory of truth, truth as allegory.”14 We cannot 
overstep the relation of the two figures and words, we cannot cross over to the 
other side of the mirror as we cannot go beyond ‘ourselves’ and language, and 
‘our selves’ in language. In the last lines of the poem, there is only one possible 
way of getting outside the fable – its allegory, or rather its irony – which is an 
extremely narcissistic one. Here the self, who destroys the mirror and together 
with it the self, is introduced by the feminine personal pronoun, she (elle). This 
‘she’ appears as an allegorical figure and can be associated with the French 
feminine (la) fable/Fable, or Truth (la vérité), which is tautological regarding the 
second line of “Fable.” At this point Derrida refers to the dead female figure 
(‘she’) in de Man’s favourite Wordsworth-poem in order to lead us to the figure 
of Psyche. 
The French psyché – besides its usage as a proper name (Psyché) – as a 
common name has preserved not only the original meaning of the Greek psyche, 
but it also means a revolving mirror.15 The French psyché is a very special kind 
of mirror as it has two reflecting surfaces on both sides, which are connected and 
separated by the ‘psyche’ of the mirror, its silvering/tain. The tain is the inventio 
of the mirror as its surface blocks transparency and without the tain the mirror 
does not reflect anything. If two people are standing at each side of such a 
‘mirror,’ without the tained surface, as if a pane of glass were between them, 
they could see each other clearly; more exactly, losing their own reflection, they 
could see only the other. However, here, as in all texts, we have a mirror, in 
which we cannot see anybody other than ourselves. The exception to this is if we 
place another mirror at a right angle facing the first (at both sides) as it will 
generate the mirror-play of reflection. Similarly, now I am flashing de Man-
reflections in Derrida’s texts and Derrida-references in de Man’s works. It is not 
by chance that Rodolphe Gasché gave the title, The Tain of the Mirror to his 
work on Derrida’s reflexivity. He claims: “Derrida’s philosophy, rather than 
being a philosophy of reflection, is engaged in the systematic exploration of that 
dull surface without which no reflection and no specular and speculative activity 
would be possible, but which at the same time has no place and no part in 
reflection’s scintillating play.”16  
Turning back to the de Manian Psyche-reference, Derrida disappointedly 
states that here de Man speaks not about the mirror, but about the mythical 
character. Nevertheless, in his summary he reveals that this passage still “matters 
much [to us] since it also points up the distance between the two ‘selves’ (moi-
mêmes), the subject’s two selves, the impossibility of seeing and touching 
                                                     
14 Derrida, “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” 31. 
15 See also “Psyche: A mirror that swings in a frame; a cheval glass. In full psyche glass.” In A 
Dictionary of American English, ed. by Sir William A. Craigie and James R. Hulbert (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1942, vol. III), 1849. 
16 Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard UP, 1986), 6. 
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oneself at the same time, the ‘permanent parabasis’ and the ‘allegory of 
irony’.”17 In this blink of an eye, the mirror-play between the two thinkers’ texts 
can be traced and the con-text is brought to life by recollection. Although in 
Derrida’s “Psyche” several de Manian texts and ideas are referred to, it is not the 
allegory and irony of remembrance that are put in the centre there. Actually, 
Derrida only uses the Apuleian Psyche’s fable and Ponge’s “Fable” as pre-
text(s) in his introduction on rhetoricity and deconstruction of classical rhetoric. 
In the title of the work, “Psyche: Inventions of the Other” (Psyche: Invention de 
l’autre), the classical inventio as the first operation of the rhetorical machinery, 
tekhnē rhetorikē, alludes not to the invention, but the (re-)discovery of 
arguments.18 He claims that we cannot create new things in our invention and he 
speaks about the finding or discovering of machines. According to Derrida, 
today we work with ready made (allegorical) narrating machines, but the 
deconstructive invention aims at reaching some other outside the machinery 
because deconstruction wants “to allow the coming of the entirely other” (laisser 
venir le tout autre).19 However, ‘the other in his/her/its own otherness’ cannot be 
placed into our context, cannot be understood and read. Thus, we can do nothing 
else than undertake this ‘mission impossible’ and “get ready for this coming of 
the other” (se préparer à cette venue de l’autre).20  
This rather utopian (and quite messianic) idea and the undertaken mission 
influences those three lectures that Derrida wrote to commemorate de Man’s 
death and published together under the provocative title: Mémoires for Paul de 
Man. The first word of the title with the already-quoted opening sentence – “I 
have never known how to tell a story” – can be taken as an inventive beginning 
of an autobiographical writing. But from the introductory “A peine” it becomes 
obvious that in these texts the mourning Derrida remembers de Man – 
unfortunately, speaking about him and not to him. At the same time, the promise 
formulated in the title recalls the promise of “Psyche”: to let the other come out 
in mourning and remembrance. Thus, it is not a surprise that in the conclusion of 
the first lecture, “Mnemosyne,” we can again meet the allegorical figure of (the) 
psyche. Remembering the beloved friend and referring to the favourite 
Wordsworth poem, Derrida dis-plays the irony of the other’s inaccessibility:  
The death of the other, if we can say this, is also situated on our 
side at the very moment when it comes to us from an altogether 
other side. […] In another context, I have called this Psyche: 
                                                     
17 Derrida, “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” 39. Cf. “Psyché. Invention de l’autre,” 30.  
18 Derrida, “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” 51. Cf. “Psyché. Invention de l’autre,” 47.  
19 Derrida, “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” 55. Cf. “Psyché. Invention de l’autre,” 53. 
20 Derrida, “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” 56 and in “Psyché,” 53. Derrida also calls our 
attention to the same root of the words ‘event’, ‘advent’ and ‘invention’ – linked to the Latin 
coming (venire).  
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Psyche, the proper name of an allegory; Psyche, the common 
name for the soul; and Psyche, in French, the name of a 
revolving mirror. Today it is no longer Psyche, but apparently 
Mnemosyne. In truth, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, the 
‘naked name’ will be Paul de Man. This is what we shall call to, 
and toward which we shall again turn our thoughts.21  
In his Mémoires, Derrida deals with the nature of true ‘mourning’ and ‘true’ 
remembrance while paying attention to the most important ideas and tropes of 
the de Manian oeuvre. In the Mnemosyne lecture named after the goddess of 
memory, there are several hints about de Man’s and Derrida’s theory of 
remembrance. Here, just like in the other two lectures – “The Art of Mémoires” 
and “Acts” – two kinds of memory are distinguished, which are based on and 
recall a late essay of de Man titled “Sign and Symbol in Hegel’s Aesthetics.” 
The German Erinnerung signifies the interiorising memory, while Gedächtnis 
the mechanical memorisation, but – as Derrida says – “the relation between 
memory and interiorizing recollection is not ‘dialectical,’ as Hegelian 
interpretation and Hegel’s interpretation would have it, but one of rupture, 
heterogeneity, disjunction.”22 In order to be able to mechanically and 
automatically remember something using our memory, we should forget about 
recollection, that is to say, we should avoid being lost in reverie and meditating 
upon the past. Derrida cites de Man’s statement twice, namely: “memory effaces 
remembrance,”23 but he fails to quote the whole sentence (he may have 
misrecollected it or his memory failed him). To quote the whole statement from 
de Man’s text: “Memory effaces remembrance (or recollection) just as it effaces 
itself.”24 In this text, which is concerned with the Hegelian theory of 
signification, the activities of the symbolical recollection and allegorical 
remembrance are replaced with memorisation and writing linked to the sign. In 
the Greek tradition, Mnemosyne serves as a storehouse of all the stories and no 
kind of knowledge can be achieved without her help. Her important role is 
related with the strong verbality (‘oral fixation’) of Greek culture, where writing 
and the use of written records were thought to weaken memory and make man 
absentminded/forgetful. I do not want to dwell on the forgetfulness and 
memento of writing (which is introduced and dealt as a pharmakon in Derrida’s 
“Plato’s Pharmacy”), I would rather draw attention to the element of forgetting. 
According to Derrida, “for de Man, great thinker and theorist of memory, there 
                                                     
21 Derrida, Mémoires, 39. Italics are mine. É.A. 
22 Derrida, Mémoires, 56. 
23 Derrida, Mémoires, 62 and 72.  
24 Paul de Man, “Sign and Symbol in Hegel’s Aesthetics,” in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapo-
lis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, 91-104), 102. 
47 
is only memory but, strictly speaking, the past does not exist”25; thus, in his 
allegorical readings, de Man always writes (about) the rhetoric of remembrance 
and of temporality.  
If the source of all the allegories is memory and de Man is labelled as “the 
thinker and theorist of memory,” then Derrida is the one who writes about the art 
of remembering and forgetting. The above quoted de Manian statement about 
memorisation is elaborated in Derrida’s ‘memoirs’ – Derrida’s Mémoires written 
for de Man – where Lethe, the mythical figure of forgetting/oblivion, appears on 
the scene besides Mnemosyne. Although the two characters are not closely 
related in Greek mythology, Pausanias records that the two fountains of the 
rivers, which are named after the two goddesses, can be found in human world 
and they are close to each other.26 Derrida also refers to this locus classicus and, 
while he takes Lethe as the allegory of oblivion, sleep and death, he regards her 
opposite, Mnemosyne, as the allegory of truth, that is a-lethe-ia. What is more, 
he connects the two allegorical figures, doing it in defence of his long de Manian 
quotations in his Mémoires (without giving the exact source):  
Fidelity requires that one quote, in the desire to let the other 
speak; and fidelity requires that one not just quote, not restrict 
oneself to quoting. It is with the law of this double law that we 
are here engaged, and this is also the double law of Mnemosyne 
– unless it is the common law of the double source, 
Mnemosyne/Lethe: source of memory, source of forgetting.27  
I wonder how the (inner) remembrance, (outer) memory and (inner/outer) 
forgetting are related. In the Hegel text we have already read that the basis of 
memorising is given by the forgetting of remembrance, which the forgetting of 
memory goes with. That is, we can achieve memory and the allegorical 
remembering narratives through forgetting, the ironical act of forgetting 
recollection itself. Referring back to, and re-interpreting his opening sentence (“I 
have never known how to tell a story”), Derrida, in the conclusion of the second 
lecture, “The Art of Mémoires,” considers whether he suffers from amnesia or 
hyper-mnesia. It seems that the recalling of allegorical and mythical figures 
                                                     
25 Derrida, Mémoires, 58. 
26 In Greek theogony (unlike the bright goddess of Mnemosyne), Lethe is the daughter of Eris and 
the offspring of Night. Moreover the river in Hades that makes the souls of the dead forget their 
previous existence on earth, is named after her. If anybody is ever allowed to come back to life 
again they have to drink from the river so that they don’t remember the afterlife. The well of 
Mnemosyne makes the dead who drink from it remember their lives, as opposed to the well of 
Lethe which makes them forget. See H. J. Rose, “The Children of Kronos II,” in A Handbook 
of Greek Mythology (New York: E. Dutton & Co., 1959), 78-101.  
27 Derrida, Mémoires, 50-51. 
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springs from the lack or incapability of story-telling – whether from the spring 
of oblivion or from the spring of remembrance.  
Derrida’s text disseminates its ideas pointing towards different directions for 
discussion, but I am still trying to follow the thread of my chosen narrative about 
the interrelation between allegory and irony. That is, interpreting the de Manian 
reminiscences, I am going to pay attention to the (en)twin(ing) of the two 
allegorical figures. Derrida also tries to follow the thread of his de Manian 
recollection, which calls and takes us into an endless chiasm from Mnemosyne 
to Lethe, then from Lethe to Mnemosyne. We should not forget that allegory as 
a recollective and narrative figure in its “specular self-reflection”28 is of 
disjunctive structure: it says something, but always means something else (as 
well). The statements of remembrance cannot do without the moments of 
oblivion (either). On the basis of the chiastic relation between recollection and 
oblivion, Derrida ingeniously connects the two figures, as he thinks that the 
functioning of the two gives the rhetoric of memory, “which recalls, recounts, 
forgets, recounts, and recalls forgetting, referring to the past only to efface what 
is essential to it: anteriority.”29 In accordance with the earlier quoted de Manian 
definitions of allegory and irony, in our story the quasi-storyteller is diachronic 
allegory, while the other figure feigning amnesia is synchronic irony. That is to 
say that irony, just like allegory, is also a ‘meaning one thing, saying another’ 
type figure of self-duplicating and disjunctive structure, which, in the twinkling 
of an eye, is able to interrupt a narrative. It can interrupt a narrative, then it can 
(pretend to) cause this interruption to be forgotten in order to recall the 
allegorical functioning, to generate another break by recollecting the previous 
one(s), then pretend to efface the memory of it/them – ad infinitum. It is only 
one further step for Derrida to ‘discover’ or display Mnemosyne as the allegory 
of allegory, Lethe as the allegorical-ironical figure, and their co-operation as “a 
kind of hybrid of two memories, or of a memory and an amnesia which divide 
the same act.”30 Similarly, the moments’ questioning remembrance are 
necessarily inscribed in the Derridian flow(ers) of recollection in Mémoires. 
Actually, it seems that throughout his work, Derrida is struggling not to come 
up with his de Man image, but ‘let the other come in his otherness’. Although 
the title itself ironically alludes to the autobiographical voice of memoirs, here 
Derrida shares with us the memories about de Man, as if these were collected for 
his dead friend as well. At the same time, the work – allegorically, or with a 
double metonymy – is also about “deconstruction in America,” which would 
have been radically different without de Man. As he says: “But just as, under the 
name or in the name of Paul de Man, we cannot say everything about 
deconstruction (even in America), so I cannot, in such a short time and under the 
                                                     
28 Derrida, Mémoires, 76. 
29 Derrida, Mémoires, 82. 
30 Derrida, Mémoires, 84.  
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single title of memory, master or exhaust the immense work of Paul de Man. Let 
us call it allegory or double metonymy, this modest journey that I will undertake 
for a few hours with you.”31 In Derrida’s text, de Man’s favourite and recurrent 
metaphors or phrases are recalled or brought to light; all that Derrida attributes 
to his coming domain (cf. ‘de Man’)32. Therefore, the title is a direct hit as the 
word, mémoires, refers to the recollecting and autobiographical nature of 
writing. At the same time, the subtitle with de Man’s name transfers the previous 
statement into the world of the de Manian texts and readings, where every piece 
of writing becomes an autobiography, or an epitaph. In “Autobiography As De-
Facement” de Man analyses Wordsworth’s Essays Upon Epitaphs displaying 
that the poet like a ghost or a living dead addresses us as if his voice came from 
beyond the grave. Thus, the essay becomes a “monumental inscription” or 
epitaph, where the text of the (speaking) gravestone is (firstly) read by the 
(seeing) sun:  
We can identify the figure that completes the central metaphor 
of the sun and thus completes the tropological spectrum that the 
sun engenders: it is the figure of prosopopeia, the fiction of an 
apostrophe to an absent, deceased, or voiceless entity, which 
posits the possibility of the latter’s reply and confers upon it the 
power of speech. Voice assumes mouth, eye, and finally face, a 
chain that is manifest in the etymology of the trope’s name, 
prosopon poien, to confer a mask or a face (prosopon).33  
Relying on the chain of the main ideas in de Man’s Wordsworth reading, the 
“tropological spectrum” starts from the sun metaphor, and through the eyes it 
ranges, or curves to the tongue and the ability of speaking. Its vaulting curve, at 
the same time, refers to the movement of the sun (the trope of light) on the 
horizon and to the perceptive and reading human eyes. Thus, the de Manian 
prosopopeia, of which reading “assumes face,” becomes the trope not only of 
autobiography, but also of reading. Derrida also regards the figure as the Man’s 
“central metaphor,” which “looks back and keeps in memory, we could say, 
clarifies and recalls […] everything.”34 The figure becomes de Man’s 
commemorative, or rather “sepulchral inscription” and later/now Derrida’s 
                                                     
31 Derrida, Mémoires, 20. 
32 Both Derrida and de Man often refers to puns in which they use de Man’s name, starting from 
the obvious ‘man,’ through ‘demand’ to ‘domain’ or ‘demesne’ – moreover, as an anagram in 
‘madness’.  
33 Paul de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism 
(New York: Columbia UP, 1984), 67-81, 76. 
34 Derrida, Mémoires, 27. 
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monument as well.35 In his “White Mythology” Derrida names the heliotrope as 
the dominant metaphor of philosophy since everything turns around light, the 
natural light of truth. The trope of the central metaphor, revolving around the 
sun, that is, being a helios-tropos, signifies at the same time the movement of the 
sun and the movement of turning towards it.36 Thus, in the metaphors of a text, 
the rhetoricity of language is outspoken, or rather comes to (day)light, if we read 
the Derridian text with the help of de Man’s prosopopeia.  
Yet we should not forget about the reflective structure of reading and face-
giving. The rhetorical figures, besides being the “the solar language of 
cognition”37 and giving-face as textual tropes, are likely to assume a form, take a 
turn and deface. As de Man sums up: “[o]ur topic deals with the giving and 
taking away of faces,”38 and he, with pleasure, utilises the meanings of the words 
deriving from face and figure. The expression of defacement in the title is related 
to the word, mask, which appears in the definition of prosopopeia, and it also 
recalls the problem of fiction vs. autobiography. According to Cynthia Chase, 
though “Autobiography As De-Facement” masterfully represents the disturbing 
effects caused by the dependence on figurative language, a ‘perceptible’ 
explanation is given in another de Man text titled “Wordsworth and the 
Victorians.”39 In this text, besides the frequent usage of the terms, face and face-
making, de Man – almost compelling the reader to make a face – effaces40 the 
difference between Wordsworth’s rhetoric and his own. He quotes the passage 
from the third book of “Prelude,” where the poetic eye / I while observing the 
various forms of nature “[c]ould find no surface where its power might sleep” 
(3.164).41 Interpreting the line, de Man puns on the hidden face within surface, 
and he draws a parallel between the coming to the sur-face, the unexploited 
                                                     
35 Derrida was alive when I started to write my essay in 2004. And now, in 2008, Derrida’s 
Mémoires can also be read as his own sepulchral monument. In “Philosophy as Autobiography: 
The Confessions of Jacques Derrida,” Joseph G. Kronick claims that every autobiographical 
texts can be read as “an allegory of the writer’s death, an ‘autobiothanatography’” (MLN, Vol. 
115:5, 997-1018, 1014. Italics in the original).  
36 Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the text of Philosophy,” in Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 207-271). 
37 de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in RR, 80.  
38 de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in RR, 76. 
39 Cynthia Chase, “Giving a Face to a Name: de Man’s Figures,” in Decomposing Figures: 
Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), 82-113.  
40 I recall the verb, effaces, in a de Manian statement about the effacement of memory. See earlier 
in the present paper.  
41 Quoted in Paul de Man, “Wordsworth and the Victorians,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, 83-92), 92. The whole passage runs: “an eye/ 
Which, from a tree, a stone, a withered leaf,/ To the broad ocean and the azure heavens/ 
Spangled with kindred multitudes of stars,/Could find no surface where its power might sleep” 
(The Works of William Wordsworth, Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1994, 651).  
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figurative richness of the text and the trope of face-giving: “The face, which is 
the power to surface from the sea of infinite distinctions in which we risk to 
drown, can find no surface.”42 We are obliged to feel that there really is no 
resting place / surface for our understanding, and in a pun, in the twinkling of an 
eye, the reading of de Man’s central metaphor, the prosopopeia, becomes 
questionable.  
In another text of The Rhetoric of Romanticism, entitled “Shelley 
Disfigured,” in which de Man analyses Shelley’s last and fragmentary The 
Triumph Life, we can again meet the key figures of the above-read “defacing” 
text. Yet here the textual plasticity is given not by the gravestone, or the epitaph 
inscribed on it, but by architecture and statuary: Rousseau, who greatly 
influenced Shelley’s way of thinking, is presented as a stiffened statue with 
empty eye-sockets. De Man places the allegory of Narcissus as the focal point in 
the text while paying attention to the sun-imagery of the poem. In his analysis, 
the movement of sunrise and sunset, together with the associated human 
activities – as birth/death, waking/sleeping and remembering/forgetting – are 
shown not in their disjunctive detachment, but in their intertwining 
(inter)relation. The lines – “So sweet and deep is the oblivious spell; / And 
whether life had been before that sleep”43 – reveal, in a Platonic way, that human 
awakening is connected with the state of coming into the world (birth). 
Accordingly, they claim that our life is characterised – and sealed – by a 
slumber, in which, to quote de Man, we are in “a deeper sleep replacing a lighter 
one, a deeper forgetting being achieved by an act of memory which remembers 
one’s forgetting.”44 Meanwhile, in the poem, the trope of light does not follow 
its right path on the sky – Shelley’s sun is rather suspended as a pending 
question awaiting the answer. De Man brilliantly finds the appropriate metaphor: 
while in Wordsworth’s works the sun usually “hangs” in the air,45 in Shelley’s 
poem the sunlight glimmers from time to time as if it could be seen through a 
veil. In the reading, the play of the light with its appearance and disappearance 
refers to the uncertainty of human life and the lack of true knowledge, which de 
Man calls the “tantalizing” “play of veiling and unveiling.”  
                                                     
42 de Man, “Wordsworth and the Victorians,” 92. 
43 The quoted passage reads: “So sweet and deep is the oblivious spell; / And whether life had 
been before that sleep/ The heaven which I imagine, or a hell/ Like this harsh world in which I 
wake to weep, / I know not.” In The Works of B. Shelley (Wordsworth Poetry Library, Words-
worth Editions Ltd, 1994), 458. 
44 Paul de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia UP, 
1984), 93-123, 105.  
45 Paul de Man, “Time and History in Wordsworth,” in Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism. 
The Gauss Seminar and Other Papers (The Johns Hopkins UP, 1993, 74-94), 79. According to 
de Man, the floating instability of the earth, due to the frequent usage of the words, hung and 
hanging, becomes vertiginous in Wordsworth’s poetry. 
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Having bound and fastened the threads, de Man shows us the central knot, 
where the problems of “knowledge, oblivion and desire hang suspended.”46 In 
the lyric passage chosen and placed in the centre by de Man, “the ‘silver music’ 
of oblivion” can be heard and its scene is coloured by the brightening light of the 
sun, the crystalline mirror of the water and Iris’s “many coloured scarf,” that is, 
the rainbow or the iris.47 The metaphorical chain marks the line of the blazing 
sun – the reflective surface of the water – the rainbow/iris, and, finally, there is 
the iris of the eyes reading the lines. In the centre of the interpretation (or every 
interpretation), Narcissus’s figure, i.e. the floating image of his face 
mirrored/reflected in the water can be seen. To be precise, Narcissus’s look, the 
iris of his eyes, gives the tropological centre of prosopopeia. Looking back, de 
Man claims that “[t]he sun, in this text, is from the start the figure of this self-
contained specularity. But the double of the sun can only be the eye conceived as 
the mirror of light.”48 The sun, similarly to Narcissus, can “see” only the 
reflection of his image/light in the water, and the mirroring surface of the water 
functions as a mirror and as the seeing eye. The sun-eye with the rainbow (iris) 
becomes seeing, while the water of the fountain as a mirroring surface makes it 
visible. That is, reading prosopopeia, the text functions as the mirror of the 
interpreter, in which it can be seen that Shelley is reading Plato, Rousseau and 
himself, or that de Man is reading Shelley – who is reading Plato, Rousseau and 
himself – and himself, or as the reader is reading de Man, who is reading himself 
and Shelley – more exactly, as Shelley reading Plato, Rousseau and himself – 
and herself. In this mirror-play “the text serves as a mirror of our own 
knowledge and our knowledge mirrors in its turn the text’s signification.”49 With 
this statement, we have already started to remember and write a story that, of 
necessity, can be turned over by the insight of figurality in the twinkling of an eye. 
Now just remember, in his earlier writing de Man characterises the rhetorical 
figures by saying that they always say something other than they mean; and here 
he sums up: “[l]anguage, as trope, is always privative.”50 Nevertheless, the 
reader’s life-forgetting and floating textual reverie/musing is drastically 
interrupted by the awareness of the text’s “monumentality.” The mythical 
Narcissus pines away in his desire for self-knowledge, Rousseau is petrified, the 
poet drowns, and the text – like other masterpieces of romanticism – recalls the 
atmosphere of a cemetery. Yet the illusion breaking moments of irony are again 
forgotten, thus, the tropes are suspended, then later interpreted – in facing and 
                                                     
46 de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 106. 
47 “A shape all light, which with one hand did fling / Dew on the earth, as if it were Dawn / Whose 
invisible rain forever seemed to sing // A silver music on the mossy lawn, / And still before her 
on the dusky grass / Iris her many coloured scarf had drawn.” Quoted in de Man, “Shelley 
Disfigured,” in RR, 108.  
48 de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 109. 
49 de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 112. 
50 de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in RR, 80. 
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defacing. According to de Man’s demand, “to read is to understand, to question, 
to know, to forget, to erase, to deface, to repeat – that is to say, the endless 
prosopopeia by which the dead are made to have a face and a voice which tells 
the allegory of their demise and allows us to apostrophise them in turn. No 
degree of knowledge can ever stop this madness, for it is the madness of 
words.”51 In its mo(nu)mentalisation, reading gives a face, then listens to the 
voice-from-beyond-the-grave, from which, in our case, such characteristically de 
Manian puns can be heard as demand or demise. 
In the disjunctive allegorical readings of figuration, we should always embed 
the moments of the ironical turnings/reversal, or rather we should face the risk 
that we cannot tell when an allegorical reflective disjunction leads to facing or to 
defacing. Although Werner Hamacher regards “read!” and “understand!” as de 
Man’s imperatives, he accepts that “no allegory can grasp the incidences of 
irony by which it is disrupted, none can catch up with the positing violence of 
the imperative, but each one – for each one remains exposed to its positing – 
must undertake the attempt to translate it into a cognitive content. […] 
Ironically, the imperative – of language, of understanding – allows no decision 
whether it is to be allegorical or ironic.”52 De Man’s allegorical readings and 
Derrida’s psyche-promise about the coming of the other reveal the same: the 
possibility, or rather the impossibility of the understanding of the other. The 
undecidability of the question can be represented by a metaphor taken from 
Genette, namely, the revolving door (tourniquet), of which the vortical/whirling 
and accelerating motion borders on insanity. In his Mémoires Derrida also 
quotes the important passage from de Man’s “Autobiography As De-Facement”: 
“The specular moment that is part of all understanding reveals the tropological 
structure that underlies all cognitions, including knowledge of self. The interest 
of autobiography, then, is not that it reveals reliable self-knowledge – it does not 
– but that it demonstrates in a striking way the impossibility of closure and of 
totalization (that is, the impossibility of coming into being) of all textual systems 
made up of tropological substitutions.”53 
In other words, self-understanding in autobiographical texts (actually, all 
texts are self-understanding) heightens the swirling motion of tropes and makes 
the mirror-play more spec(tac)ular. The word tourniquet, translated as 
“whirligig” in de Man’s text, signifies not only turning around, but also rolling 
over and over – stirring and returning endlessly. The picture of the revolving 
door reminds us of psyché, the revolving mirror, while in the verb, tourniquer, 
                                                     
51 de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 122. Italics are mine. É.A. 
52 Werner Hamacher, “LECTIO: de Man’s Imperative,” trans. by Susan Bernstein, in Reading de 
Man Reading, ed. by Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minneso-
ta Press, 1989, 171- 201), 199. See also in Entferntes Verstehen. Studien zu Philosophie und 
Literatur von Kant bis Celan (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998, 151-194), 192-3.  
53 de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in RR, 71. Also quoted in Derrida, Mémoires, 25. 
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the endless reflection of mirrors is recalled.54 The vertiginous dizziness is caused 
by the endless chiasms of the allegorical disjunctions and the ironical reversals 
of the figures. The rhetorical revolving mirror is called into play by de Man’s 
“trope of tropes,” irony, which is “unrelieved vertige, dizziness to the point of 
madness.”55 In the third lecture of his Mémoires (titled “Acts”) Derrida, in a 
rather lengthy footnote, comments on the above quoted sentence:  
[we could play here on the French word ‘vertige’: as we say in 
French, it makes one’s head turn (il fait tourner la tête), and it is 
the experience of a turn – that is, of a trope which cannot stop 
turning and turning around (tourner et retourner), since we can 
only speak of a (rhetorical) turn by way of another trope, 
without any chance of achieving the stability of a metalanguage, 
a metatrope, a metarhetoric: the irony of irony of which Schlegel 
speaks and which de Man cites is still an irony; whence the 
madness of the regressus ad infinitum, and the madness of 
rhetoric, whether it be that of irony or that of allegory: madness 
because it has no reason to stop, because the reason is tropic].56  
In Derrida’s expressive “whirligig,” which spins the de Manian statement and 
recalls the motion of Genette’s revolving door, the reader has the feeling that she 
is going to swallow her own tongue – the mnemonic or amnesiac source of all 
the troubles. In Wordsworth’s short lyric poem that has been referred to several 
times in my text, the turning of the tropes is intensified to extremes. By the end 
of the work, we are forced to be “rolled round” together with the globe and the 
dead beloved in the allegorical remembrance of the mourning man, while this 
revolving is guaranteed by the ironic interrupting moments of forgetting. In the 
poem the beginning state of slumber fetters, more exactly, “seals” the 
interpretation. The word, seal, is frequently used in de Man’s texts, 
consequently, it often appears in Mémoires, where Derrida remembers de Man. 
He speaks about (sealing) wax in connection with Mnemosyne’s activity, then 
about stamps and later about a mark or signature – “as if the ironic moment were 
signed, were sealed in the body of an allegorical writing.”57 The key (and the 
lock) to Mémoires is de Man’s seal and at the same time his name, sign, or 
signature will be the trademark of the irony of allegory. Thus, Derrida is 
mistaken, or rather speaks ironically, when – assuming the irony hidden in the de 
Manian allegorical readings – he claims that irony hardly helps us tell the story. 
                                                     
54 In the French verbs, tourniquer and tourniller, and the noun, tourniquet, the root is given by the 
verb, tourner, that is, to turn or revolve.  
55 de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in BI, 215.  
56 Derrida, Mémoires, 152-153. 
57 Derrida, Mémoires, 84.  
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On the contrary, being aware of the ironic force in the power of allegory, we 
must declare: only irony can help us proceed with our story.58  
In Mémoires, however, we can also read about whether it is possible to find 
the source of the two fountains, Mnemosyne and Lethe, and to arrive at an 
anamnesis of an ancient time concept. So to say, to arrive at the slumber of 
timelessness, since the work is “sealed” by the cause of its writing: Derrida 
writes it for the dead de Man, and in his memoirs his own work of mourning is 
expressed. Therefore, the metaphor of the seal leads us to the immediate context 
of the work, namely, (Derrida’s) work of mourning; more exactly, to the 
impossibility of mourning and its allegorical-ironical narcissism. According to 
de Man, “[t]rue ‘mourning’ is less deluded [and] [t]he most it can do is to allow 
for non-comprehension.”59 In the statement, the italicised it emphasises that true 
“mourning” is only a tendency which actually denies the truth of mourning. 
Derrida also thinks that the Freudian “normal” work of mourning is unsuccessful 
as it operates with the other’s interiorisation, that is, with the abandonment of the 
other’s otherness. Whereas, true mourning is the impossible work of mourning, 
which will be successful if it fails: it is “an aborted interiorization [that] is at the 
same time a respect for the other as other, a sort of tender rejection, a movement 
of renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over there, in his death, 
outside of us.”60 In Derrida’s mourning, de Man’s texts become the prosopopeia 
of the-voice-from-beyond-the-grave and the rhetoric of the allegorical 
remembrance. 
Thus, connecting the de Manian true “mourning” with the promise of 
“Psyche,” we can understand what Derrida means by “true (work of) mourning.” 
It is not “the most deadly infidelity[,] that of a possible mourning which would 
interiorize within us the image, idol, or ideal of the other who is dead and lives 
in us,” but “that of the impossible mourning, which, leaving the other his 
alterity, respecting thus his infinite remove, either refuses to take or is incapable 
of taking the other within oneself, as in the tomb or the vault of some 
narcissism.”61 That is, in true mourning one tries to keep the dead at the other 
side of the revolving mirror/psyché, and starting the endless mirroring, he tries to 
                                                     
58 “It is the power of allegory, and its ironic force as well, to say something quite different from 
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‘allow the other to come in his otherness’ – or rather, let the other go, 
disregarding interiorisation. Nevertheless, these questions, though they help to 
proceed with the story, will return from time to time haunting; the figure of 
Narcissus is unforgettable since all the time he is (at) the other (side of the 
mirror). Even if we think that we make an effort to give the leading part to the 
other in “impossible mourning,” it again demonstrates our narcissism – just like 
in this sentence. With his promise in “Psyche” and the (promised) endless 
mirror-play, Derrida exactly attempts to move away from it/himself and, in his 
withdrawal, he tries to get closer to the other. Remembering the other, he wants 
to go beyond the mirror of speculation, over the narcissistic structure, of which 
“ruses, mimes, and strategies can only succeed in supposing the other – and thus 
in relinquishing in advance any autonomy.”62  
I do not intend to discuss the possibility and impossibility of the work of 
mourning. Now I simply accept Derrida’s summary that in normal mourning 
“Narcissus, who turns back to himself, has returned”63 – there is nothing 
extraordinary in it. However, Narcissus taken as an allegory gathering and then 
spreading the other figures, is also only a figure: only a returning (revient) ghost. 
As the artist of memoirs says: “The ghost, le re-venant, the survivor, appears 
only by means of figure or fiction, but its appearance is not nothing, nor is it a 
mere semblance.”64 That is to say, that while the true impossible mourning can 
work without rhetoric and silently accept death, in the recollecting texts we 
become living dead conversing with ghosts. I again refer to the ending of 
Wordsworth’s poem, where the ironic moment(s) of the awakening, recollecting 
the previous forgetting(s), interrupt(s) the continuity of allegorical remembrance 
and dreamlike mourning. In his earlier cited writing, Hamacher also points out 
that understanding, i.e. reading as “the allegory of the linguistic imperative is an 
endless work of mourning the traumas inflicted by irony.”65 So far nice things 
have been written about death since, as we know about writing, it is capable of 
disguising the dead as living, giving lively colours to the corpse, the mask and 
(dis)simulation.66 The remembering texts are haunted by the rhetorical figures, 
which remind us of de Man’s, Derrida’s and, in time, – actually, always already 
– of our own remembrance (and oblivion). 
“Müssen dafür Worte, wie Blumen, entstehn”; poetic words are supposed to 
bloom like flowers – paradoxically, in de Man’s reading of the Hölderlin 
passage, we can hear the true nature of language. Unlike naturally originating 
                                                     
62 Derrida, Mémoires, 32. Italics are in the original.  
63 Derrida, Mémoires, 66. 
64 Derrida, Mémoires, 64. 
65 Hamacher, “LECTIO: de Man’s Imperative,” in Reading de Man Reading, 199. I slightly altered 
the translation. See in the original Hamacher, Entferntes Verstehen, 193.  
66 See about the meanings of writing in Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination, 
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flowers, words can only originate like flowers, they are always ‘like’ something 
else. To quote de Man’s summing statement: “For it is in the essence of 
language to be capable of origination, but of never achieving the absolute 
identity with itself that exists in the natural object.”67 In the ironic reflections of 
the allegorical unfolding, it turns out about the textual flowers of rhetoric: they 
are dead. Contrasted with the (seemingly) ‘lifelike’ heliotrope recalled in 
Derrida’s “White Mythology,” in our texts we have mostly read about “the 
forgotten heliotropes that beyond all nostalgia mime death with the apotropaeic 
mask of stone and treasure whatever light they have been granted.”68 Actually, 
looking for the figurality of the Derridian “solar language,” all the time we have 
been revolving around the pseudo-heliotrope – the narcissus. Although the 
heliotropic metaphors seem to move round the sun they can only turn round 
themselves. Derrida claims that, on the one hand, a metaphor always embodies 
its own death, on the other hand, it is capable of sublation (cf. Aufhebung) and 
becoming “a dried flower in a book.”69 In our collection of (dried) flowers, in 
our anthology,70 we can only collect figure-phantoms, that is, the (dead) flowers 
of rhetoric. Reading about these figures, we enter the world of the dead, where 
like asphodels,71 (the mythical death-flowers) the sepulchral flowers are 
blooming and unfolding their stories. And even if we know about it, suspending 
our doubts, we start to remember again and again. And looking in the mirror, we 
try to see the other – always already allegorically and from one ironic moment to 
the next.  
                                                     
67 Paul de Man, “The Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image,” in The Rhetoric of 
Romanticism (New York: Columbia UP, 1984, 1-17), 6.  
68 Dirk De Schutter, “Words Like Stones,” in (Dis)continuities: Essays on Paul de Man, ed. by 
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69 Derrida, “White Mythology”, 271. 
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“White Mythology,” 272.  
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PYGMALIONS’ READING OF READING PYGMALIONS 
 
Agalmata, na ginomastan agalmata Statues, if only we were statues 
Afti tin agia ora touti ti stigmi, In the sacred hour, this moment,  
Na pethena mes ta xeria sou agapi mou I would die in your hands, my love 
Na pethenes mes ta xeria mou ki esi. You would also die in my hands.  
 (Greek song)  
 
Is the status of a text like the status of a statue? 
(Paul de Man) 
 
Reading my narcissistic text on recollection and forgetting (again and again), I 
admit that I have raised several questions about memoires, autobiography, and 
self-writing/ writing of the self.* In his “Autobiography As De-Facement” de 
Man claims that “autobiography [...] is not a genre or a mode, but a figure of 
reading or of understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts.”1 If every 
text is autobiographical, then the study of autobiography, being the figure of 
reading, cannot reveal self-knowledge, but presents “the impossibility of closure 
and of totalization (that is the impossibility of coming into being) of all textual 
systems made up of tropological substitutions.”2 In the present text I try to study 
life-writing, that is, the writing of (a) life, starting with the beginning, while in 
the previous text I preferred to concentrate on the possible – and somehow 
inevitably impossible – ending of the story. Re(g)a(r)ding the figurative 
language of my previous text, in an ethical way of self-reading, I should admit 
that two images are neglected: the stony blind statue (of Rousseau) and the 
sealing, melting wax (of identity). Here and now it is time to focus on the stony 
orbs and the stony arch in the readings of narcissistic Pygmalions and in their 
versions of prosopopoeia. Although the apropos of my reading are the blind 
Rousseau and Pygmalion,3 I cannot help also writing about Narcissus, who as a 
wax-figure, or rather ‘as a reverant ghost’ keeps reappearing in the text.  
                                                     
* The ’apropos’ of this re-reading was provided by a roundtable-discussion held at the Centre for 
Life Narratives of Kingston University and I am extremely grateful to Professor Rafey Habib for 
his stimulating remarks and to Dr Matthew Birchwood for organising the talk. I am also grateful 
to the Hungarian Scholarship Board (Magyar Ösztöndíj Bizottság) as my 3-month research in 
London was funded by a Hungarian State Eötvös Scholarship granted by the Board in 2008. 
1 Paul de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in RR, 70.  
2 Paul de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in RR, 71. 
3 See more about the “à propos of à propos” in Derrida’s “Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2)” in 
Jacques Derrida, Without Alibi, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002, 71- 160), 
76-77. As all texts are autobiographical, the present text cannot be an exception and it does not 
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Why is Rousseau presented as a blind statue in Shelley’s The Triumph of Life 
and in de Man’s “Shelley Disfigured”? We can suspect that it can be explained 
by the main concern of romanticism with architecture and statuary, as de Man 
refers to it. But we cannot forget about de Man’s phrase, namely that the 
romantic poet was deeply concerned with the “encrypted statues of Truth” of 
philosophy.4 For Shelley, Rousseau is basically the philosopher of the self-quest 
though in The Triumph of Life he is shown to fail in his quest for self-
knowledge. In the figural language of the poem, as de Man points out, 
Rousseau’s brain becomes ‘sand,’ his eyes turn to ‘stony orbs,’ that is, Rousseau 
is disfigured, defaced.5 In my narcissistic text (what else a text can be?) the self-
reflexive moment of reading is beautifully displayed with the ‘seeing’ sun-eye, 
the reflecting well and Narcissus’ rainbow-like iris. But what if we take into 
consideration that “the sun ‘sees’ its own light reflected, like Narcissus, in a well 
that is a mirror and also an eye”?6 What if in the frozen moment of self-
understanding the viewer is stoned and blind, and his iris/the rainbow becomes 
“a rigid, stony arch”? As we know in (rhetorical) reading/understanding “the text 
serves as a mirror of our own knowledge and our knowledge mirrors in its turn 
the text’s signification.”7 The romantics favoured the idea of “monumentali-
zation,” consequently, their texts can be read as their epitaphs and monumental 
graves. As de Man adds, “they [viz. the romantics] have been made into statues 
for the benefit of future archaeologist”8 – all readings are monumentalisation. 
De Man’s face-giving and face-taking monumental prosopopoeia is regarded 
by several theorists of autobiography as the primary rhetorical figure presiding 
over self-writing.9 However, if de Man’s name is not mentioned, the impact of 
deconstructive discourse can greatly be sensed in the recent theoretical writings 
on autobiography. For instance, when Louis A. Renza thematises the 
problematic status of the ‘I’ of autobiographies, he refers to Derrida’s ideas, 
namely that generally, in written discourses “the ‘I’ can never in itself signify 
the writer’s self-presence” as “it signifies his absence from being present to 
                                                                                                                                   
pretend to be something else. I composed it during my three-month stay at Kingston University 
and though a great part of my notes and the outline of the paper had been made before my travel, 
the work itself was done there and then. I would say, it was like the sculptor’s work when the 
figure is revealed, brought to light, from the solid block of stone. 
4 Paul de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 95.  
5 Paul de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 100. 
6 Paul de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 109. 
7 Paul de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 112. 
8 Paul de Man, “Shelley Disfigured,” in RR, 121. 
9 See, for instance, John Sturrock in The Language of Autobiography (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 
where in his “Introduction” he refers to de Man’s prosopopoeia (4), or Williams Huntington who 
also names de Man with Starobinski and Lejeune as his main influences in the writing of his 
great book, Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography (Oxford: OUP, 1983).  
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himself.”10 On the other hand, we can also meet such opinions as, for instance, 
that of Sturrock, who argues that the autobiographer has had a real face. Quoting 
his claim:  
We can agree that, in writing, an autobiographer does not so 
much put his name to his life-story as put his life-story to his 
name; or, should he be more drawn to self-portraiture than to 
narrative, that he provides for that name a psychological 
identity. Whether it be a story or portrait – and all auto-
biographical stories are in practice part portrait, just as all self-
portraits are in part story – autobiography wills the unity of its 
subject.11 
Here, I prefer to put emphasis on the will and the wish for the unity of the self, 
which otherwise can be the main purpose of all life-stories – written, painted, or 
performed.  
Nevertheless, the autobiographical form cannot be labelled as fictive or non-
fictive, not even a mixture of the two. Autobiography is the popular form of life-
narratives, on the other hand and it tells the story of a self-quest at its best. 
According to Renza, “we might view it [viz. autobiography] instead as a unique, 
self-defining mode of self-referential expression, one that allows, then inhibits, 
its ostensible project of self-representation, of converting oneself into the present 
promised by language.”12 In autobiographical works the writer does not only and 
truly become the author of his life-story, but he also creates his own masks, or 
faces of the self that, through writing, become another. Although in his study 
Renza refers to the other characters in the work as others, he fails to realise that 
the autobiographer’s ‘I’ is another ‘other’ in his story, or the self is to become 
another – from the perspective of the writing self of the present. Jean Starobinski 
in his article titled “The Style of Autobiography” says that in self-writing there is 
the myth of the “authentic” image of the man who “held the pen.” As every 
autobiography is a self-interpretation, the I of an autobiographical narrative 
(Starobinski awkwardly speaks about pseudo- and sincere ones) “is assumed by 
a nonentity; it is an I without a referent, an I that refers only to an arbitrary 
                                                     
10 Louis A. Renza, “The Veto of the Imagination: A Theory of Autobiography,” in Autobiography: 
Essays Theoretical and Critical, ed. by James Olney (Princeton: PUP, 1980, 268-295), 292. He 
develops his ideas quoting from Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Hus-
serl’s Theory of Signs. Renza also points out the vicious circle in the dreamlike quality of 
autobiographies, “as estranged, autobiographical referents tend to appear within a dreamlike 
setting to the writing self” (294). 
11 Sturrock, The Language of Autobiography, 5. Italics are mine. É.A. 
12 Renza, “The Veto of the Imagination,” 295.  
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image.”13 In his/her autobiography the writer creates his/her own image, face or 
mask reflecting on his/her past self. In the special reflecting structure of the life-
narrative, the distancing in time results in a distancing of the self: the past tense 
questions identity making the writing of the self the main aim of the author. 
Starobinski suggests that the figures of rhetoric should be analysed more 
thoroughly as besides grammar they also contribute to the particular auto-
biographical style.  
In theoretical writings on the form, we can compulsorily find the discussion 
of Rousseau’s Confessions though the chosen form, being a confession, 
complicates the analysis of the narrative.14 In The Forms of Autobiography 
Spengemann in his chapter on Rousseau’s work calls attention to the way “the 
narrative center moves continually, rearranging the protagonist’s life in order to 
prolong that pleasure of remembrance which has become the narrator’s primary 
motive for rehearsing the loss of happiness.”15 Rousseau as “the arch 
catastrophist among autobiographers”16 refers to at least fifteen events as the 
prime cause of his wretchedness, which makes him either a notorious liar, or a 
great entertainer – the author of the first ‘misery memoirs’. Starobinski goes 
even further in his reading of the autobiographical form in Rousseau’s 
Confessions, when he emphasises its unique quality expressed in the diversity of 
styles and “tonalities.” He says, “it is not unusual to find elegiac episodes 
intimately mixed with picaresque, the change occurring back and forth with 
great rapidity.”17 He sees it as a ‘true’ description not only of a life, but also of a 
more general theme:  
Shouldn’t we recognize, here, in this full re-creation of lived 
experience, the equivalent of an important aspect of Rousseau’s 
‘system,’ a replica of his philosophy of history? According to 
that philosophy, man originally possessed happiness and joy: in 
comparison with that first felicity, the present is a time of 
degradation and corruption. But man was originally a brute 
                                                     
13 Jean Starobinski, “The Style of Autobiography,” trans. by Seymour Chatman, in Autobiography: 
Essays Theoretical and Critical, ed. by James Olney (Princeton: PUP, 1980, 73-83), 75. 
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Ink (2)” mentions the sentimental description of the dying Mme de Vercellis, who in her last 
words actually comments about her farting on her death-bed (95). I cannot help finding it 
‘emblematic’ of the mixing of tones in Rousseau’s Confessions. See the episode of ‘work of art 
– work of fart’ (É.A.) in Rousseau, The Confessions, trans. by J. M. Cohen (Penguin Books, 
1967), 86. 
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deprived of “light,” his reason still asleep; compared to that 
initial obscurity, the present is a time of lucid reflection and 
enlarged consciousness. The past, then, is at once the object of 
nostalgia and the object of irony; the present is at once a state of 
(moral) degradation and (intellectual) superiority.18  
Thus, Rousseau is not only the philosopher of the self-quest, but also the one 
who reflects on this quest in his works. As Jean Starobinski states, “with 
reflection the man of nature ends and ‘the man of man’ begins.”19 That is, we 
have a ‘man of man’ (a philosopher, or a rhetorician?) here, and I would rather 
think that Rousseau – in his own egoistic style – shows and (dis)plays (on) that 
the rhetoric of memory works this way. Sturrock quotes Rousseau’s confessing 
statement about the relation between truth and rhetoric in his writing; namely, 
“[his] role [was] to tell the truth, but not to get it believed.”20  
In “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self” Paul de Man also highlights 
that contemporary criticism has found relevant the problem of the self and the 
problem of the ‘speaking voice’ in the romantic works. The main concentration 
on the emergence of the self in Wordsworth’s, Shelley’s, Keats’, Hölderlin’s, 
and Rousseau’s works goes together with their realisation of the problematic 
relationship between origin and totality, what’s more, the temporality of literary 
language. De Man finds that the problem of “the split, the disjunction between 
the empirical and what we have called the literary, or poetic self” is still crucial 
in the understanding of writing and reading.21 It is obvious that the abyssal or 
labyrinthine structure of self-writing invites the reader to join the writer’s self-
quest with the “presence of a double self in the terms of self-knowledge and self-
deception.”22 While reading, we fancy/imagine that we identify ourselves with 
the speaking voice and Rousseau is a test case for de Man, being claimed to be 
“a philosopher of the self.”23  
In his works Rousseau dramatises the (ironic) duplication of his empirical 
self and the one appearing in his work; the most remarkable ‘duplication’ can be 
noticed in his Dialogues, where the two conversing figures are called Rousseau 
and Jean-Jacques. According to de Man, Starobinski shows that Rousseau 
                                                     
18 Jean Starobinski, “The Style of Autobiography,” 83. Italics are mine É.A. 
19 Quoted in Sturrock, The Language of Autobiography, 155.  
20 Quoted in Sturrock, The Language of Autobiography, 151.  
21 Paul de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in Romanticism and Contemporary 
Criticism. The Gauss Seminar and Other Papers (eds. E. S. Burt, Kevin Newmark, Andrzej 
Warminski, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1993, 25-49), 25-6. 
22 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 27-8. Thus, it is not by chance 
that Rousseau’s readers had mistaken the author’s voice several times for his own, for instance, 
Mme de Staël adored the passionate voice of the Nouvelle Heloïse, while Hazlitt disliked his 
overegotistical self-centeredness. 
23 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion),” in The Allegories of Reading, 163. 
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succeeds in escaping the dangers of reflection as “he claims to be entirely 
separated from his own existence, pushing the reflexive disjunction 
(dédoublement) to the point where the reflected image would become, for the 
reflecting consciousness, an objective figure, kept at a distance and observable 
as from the outside.”24 It is true that we can observe some “oscillation between 
materialistic naturalism and transcendental intuition in Rousseau’s works” and 
that Rousseau tends to call his imaginative works fiction referring to the “fiction-
engendering faculty” of the self, but the pragmatic self uses imagination for the 
own benefit of its pragmatic purposes. De Man thinks that Rousseau’s self-
transparency is only a trick, the above mentioned “oscillation is […] a 
succession of flights from self-knowledge.”25 I would rather think that Rousseau 
thematises the face-giving and face-taking of memory, writing ‘the history of his 
soul’. Let me refer to only one section, where he discusses the problems of 
recollection and forgetting in relation to the self: “My first part has been entirely 
written from memory, and I must have made many mistakes in it. […]but I 
cannot go wrong about what I have felt, […]. The true object of my confessions 
is to reveal my inner thoughts exactly in all the situations of my life.”26 It seems 
that an autobiographical piece cannot work without the (double) irony of 
dédoublement caused by the allegorical-ironical structure of forgetting and 
recollection embedded in the ironic context of writing itself.  
This quotation is worth putting side by side with the starting of Confessions:  
I have resolved on an enterprise which has no precedent, and 
which, once complete, will have no imitator. My purpose is to 
display to my kind a portrait in every way true to nature, and the 
man I shall portray will be myself. Simply myself. I know my 
own heart and understand my fellow man. But I am made unlike 
any one I have ever met; I will even venture to say that I am like 
no one in the whole world. I may be no better, but at least I am 
different. Whether Nature did well or ill in breaking the mould 
in which she formed me, is a question which can only be 
resolved after the reading of my book.27  
                                                     
24 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 35.  
25 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 37-8. He also quotes 
Starobinski’s telling passage to show Rousseau’s double perspective about the work of 
remembering in The Confessions: “By abandoning myself simultaneously to the memory of the 
impression I received and to the present sentiment, I will paint the state of my soul in a double 
perspective, namely at the moment when the event happened to me and at the moment I 
described it” (38. Italics are mine. É.A.). 
26 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions, trans. by J. M. Cohen (Penguin Books, 1967), 262. 
27 Rousseau, The Confessions, 17.  
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Besides the striking self-assuredness of his voice, we should notice two motifs: 
the promised portrait of the self (of this ‘simply myself’) that is being formed 
and going to unfold in the act of reading. In his Memoirs of the Blind Derrida 
questions the mirroring quality of self-portrait as we cannot be sure whether in a 
self-portrait a painter is “showing himself drawing himself or something else – or 
even himself as something else, as other.”28 We can sense the parallel here 
between self-portrait and autobiography, what is more, it is also true in relation 
to every writing and reading. Derrida makes the self-portrait the ironic emblem 
of understanding and interpretation. Being his own model, the 
painter/writer/reader/critic is working “in a stupefying or a stupefied 
tranquillity” and “[his] memory open[s] like an eye, or like the hole in a bone 
socket that lets you see without showing you anything at all, anything of the all. 
This, for showing you nothing at all, nothing of the all.”29 Here with the 
mentioning of ‘stupefied tranquillity,’ we are again by Narcissus’ pool admiring 
his stupefying gaze of himself. 
Similarly, de Man says that in his prosopopoeia, behind the mask of 
Rousseau’s conceitedness, “an element of distance, of disinterestedness is 
introduced from the start, and the confessional statement is admittedly 
fictionalized, changed by an imaginative act of writing, which prevents it from 
coinciding entirely with itself.”30 To understand the Rousseauian confrontation 
between the artist and his work dramatised in the questions of selfhood, both 
Starobinski and de Man analyse two of Rousseau’s brief dramatic works: an 
early piece, Narcisse (with its “Preface”) and Pygmalion that was written 
between the philosophical-literary and the confessional parts of his life-work in 
1762. In another writing, de Man says about Pygmalion that it focuses on the 
self’s getting closer to being in artistic creation, where the work is given priority 
over the self.31 Before reading about Rousseau’s version of Pygmalion and 
reading about the others’ versions of Rousseau’s Pygmalion, it is quite fruitful to 
read and re-read the ‘original’ story in Ovid’s Metamorphoses.  
Ovid’s narrative is the storehouse of great stories of human transformations, 
while his own personal wish is to be commemorated as the writer of these 
stories. In the work on metamorphoses the lasting substance is the poet himself, 
“who gave enduring life to the dead myths and thereby made himself 
                                                     
28 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind, trans. by M. B. Naas and P.-A. Brault (Chicago: The 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993), 65. Italics in the original. 
29 Derrida: Memoirs of the Blind, 69. Italics in the original.  
30 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 39. 
31 Paul de Man, “Madame de Staël and Jean-Jacques Rousseau,” in Critical Writings, 1953-1978, 
ed. by Lindsay Waters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 178: “[…] the 
fiction, by the intermediary of artistic creation, brings the private self closer to being. The same 
movement occurs in Rousseau when Pygmalion’s self, engendering Galatea, permits her to 
become the self’s true center. The priority of the fiction is achieved in self-renunciation.”  
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immortal.”32 Although in the work most mythical transformations are related to 
love and passion, human artists and skilful artisans – for instance, the weaver 
Arachne, the poet Orpheus, and the inventor Daedalus – are punished as the 
Olympian gods cannot endure human rivals.33 The sculptor Pygmalion’s story 
about his bringing the self-made statue to life is a central and a uniquely positive 
one in the work. The myth – more exactly, the Ovidian telling of the myth – is 
placed within the song of Orpheus, who has a verbal power over death, while 
Pygmalion has a visual and tactile power over dead material; Ovid has all kinds 
of power displayed in his work, as Hardie puts it.34  
Actually, the Ovidian narrative of the ‘life-giving’ artist’s story is another 
reading of ‘Pygmalion’. In an earlier (original?) one, in Philostephanus’ version 
of the Cyprian legend, Pygmalion was a king, not an artist, who “lustfully 
infatuated with a statue of the goddess Venus, which he took from the sanctuary 
and polluted with his embrace.”35 It is important to emphasise that Ovid changed 
the original story because in his version he made the King of Cyprus (or of 
Paphos) from “the perverse agalmatophiliac [viz. statue-lover] of the traditional 
version to a pious lover.”36 Pygmalion becomes the elegiac lover and the artist 
who in his creative fantasy fulfils his desire. While in the Greek myth Pygmalion 
was a tyrant and sinner who offended Venus, in Ovid’s version he is made a shy 
sculptor who turns away from love and women. More exactly, he turns away 
from women seeing the lechery of the prostitutes in Cyprus. Temple-prostitution 
was frequently practised in Cyprus as a form of worship and was considered as 
an act of piety related closely to the cult of Aphrodite. But these prostitutes 
probably ‘worked’ outside the temple for their own profit and in this way they 
acted against the Goddess’ will. In Ovid’s poetic version of the myth the 
“loathsome Propoetides” are punished in a highly inventive way – they are 
turned to stone. To quote from Metamorphoses: “Then, as all sense of shame left 
them, the blood hardened in their cheeks, and it required only a slight alteration 
to transform them into stony flints.”37 Readers of the passage find different 
meanings of the stoniness of women here: while Gross takes it as a chiastic 
relation, Solodow remarks on the metaphoric ‘hardness’ of the prostitutes that is 
                                                     
32 G. Karl Galinsky, Ovid’s Metamorphoses. An Introduction to the Basic Aspects. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1975), 44. 
33 Elaine Fantham, Ovid’s Metamorphoses (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 51. She also highlights that besides 
the obvious parallels between Ovid and the poet Orpheus, the other artist-stories have some 
relevance in the narrative. For instance, Arachne’s web stands for the Ovidian narrative ‘telling’ 
stories of mythical rapes: while her tapestry is bordered with ivy interwoven with entwining 
flowers, the connected stories are framed and decorated with the flowers of rhetoric (54). 
34 Philip Hardie, Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion (Cambridge: CUP, 2002.), 188. 
35 Fantham, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 59. See more on it in Jane M. Miller, “Some Versions of Pygma-
lion,” in Ovid Renewed, ed. by Martindale Charles (Cambridge: CUP, 1989, 205-214), 205. 
36 Galinsky, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 89. See the ’agalmatophiliac’ Greek song of my motto. 
37 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. by Mary M. Innes (Penguin Books, 1955, repr. 1961), 231.  
66 
made literal by Ovid playing on its figurative and literal meanings.38 It is not 
difficult to see Ovid’s irony in the prostitutes’ turning to stone and, as a refusal, 
Pygmalion’s making of a perfect ivory statue to avoid the ‘stony’ ladies. As it 
goes from stone to stone:  
When Pygmalion saw these women, living such wicked lives, he 
was revolted by the many faults which nature has implanted in 
the female sex, and long lived a bachelor existence, without any 
wife to share his home. But meanwhile, with marvellous artistry, 
he skilfully carved a snowy ivory statue. He made it lovelier 
than any woman born, and fell in love with his own creation.39  
After its creation Pygmalion starts to court his ‘stony’ maiden: speaking and 
giving presents to it, dressing and embracing the statue. Then at the feast of 
Venus he prays to the goddess for a wife “one like the ivory maid,” and the 
statue is brought to life. Philip Hardie in Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion focuses on 
Pygmalion’s prayer to “golden Venus, present at her festival in person.”40 More 
exactly, Pygmalion, the agalmatophiliac, is speaking to the statue of Venus as 
the goddess is present in the form of her golden cult-statue, a statue animated 
through religious ritual. Then, in the myth, her power is displayed when she 
bestows on Pygmalion’s ivory statue her own ability to pass from the inanimate 
to the animate. 
Unfortunately, Ovid’s version of Pygmalion is only a link in a chain of 
events. Pygmalion’s story leads to the tragic tale of Myrrha, the great 
granddaughter of Pygmalion and his statue-wife, that is, the granddaughter of 
their child named Paphos. Hardie is right claiming that “Pygmalion succeeds in 
passing into the impermissible, but in so doing stores up trouble for a future 
generation, in his great-granddaughter Myrrha’s incestuous desire to cross 
another kind of impermissible boundary.”41 While we can take Pygmalion as a 
‘spiritual’ father to Galatea, Myrrha fatefully falls in love with Cinyras, her own 
father. That is to say she passionately loves her own creator/maker, which is 
rather devastating and questions the celebrated positivity of the previous story. 
                                                     
38 Kenneth Gross, The Dream of the Moving Statue (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1992), 72 and Joseph B. Solodow, The World of Ovid’s Metamorphoses (Chapel Hill & Lon-
don: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 2. 
39 Ovid, Metamorphoses, 252. Here nature is accused for the defects of the ‘stony’ women. 
Fantham calls attention to another ‘stony’ episode in Metamophoses when in Pyrrha’s story the 
stones that are cast behind soften and begin to put on a shape (forma) of humans. She says: 
“Here is the most amazing of all metamorphoses, as nature is compared to the sculptor’s art” 
(Fantham, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 30).  
40 Philip Hardie, Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion (Cambridge: CUP, 2002.), 190. See in Ovid, 
Metamorphoses, 253. 
41 Hardie, Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion, 186. 
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In fact Ovid’s Pygmalion also offends the goddess rejecting love, i.e. questioning 
her power, and he is punished for it. The coming to life of the statue seems to be a 
reward and the miracle is thanks to Pygmalion’s prayer to Venus and his worship, 
but in Metamorphoses, punishment cannot be avoided. Pygmalion’s great-
granddaughter, Myrrha is destined to love her own maker and to have a child from 
her own father. Her beautiful son, Adonis, is born from a weeping myrrh-tree as, 
escaping her shame, she is transformed to a tree by Venus. But, going full circle, 
Venus falls in love with Adonis and when he dies, she experiences the grief 
caused by the loss of a mortal lover. That is, though Venus rules over life and 
death, an artist and his creation, a maker/father and maiden/daughter; finally she is 
ruled over by passion, and her story is monumentalised, or fossilised, in a ‘stony’ 
narrative by an artist (and now by a critic).  
In some readings of Ovid’s Pygmalion-story, the (quite obvious) eroticism of 
the myth is highlighted by the reminiscence of the original story in which the King 
of Cyprus wanted to have sex with the statue of Venus, and, ultimately, he 
contaminated it. Jane M. Miller thinks that the sexuality of the original tale is 
balanced with the life-giving power of art in the Ovidian version.42 It is true that 
Pygmalion’s story becomes a metaphor for the creative process, but it is also 
revealed in the Ovidian description that Pygmalion has a sexual relationship with 
the statue using it as a substitute for a mistress “calling it his bedfellow.” 
Returning home to his statue from the sanctuary, Pygmalion leans over their bed 
and kisses it. Then he senses that it, or rather, for the first time, ‘she,’ seems warm:  
[…] he laid his lips on hers again, and touched her breast with 
his hands – at his touch the ivory lost its hardness, and grew 
soft: his fingers made an imprint on the yielding surface, just as 
wax of Hymettus melts in the sun and, worked by men’s fingers, 
is fashioned into many different shapes, and made fit for use by 
being used (fit utilis usu).43   
Practically, the statue is softened by Pygmalion’s life-giving rubbing that 
naturally produces warmth, melting stoniness, and that rubbing can be read as 
the act of love-making. The statue melts like wax in the warm hands of the 
lover/creator; where wax is the “emblem at once of the unity and changeability 
of all matter.”44 We can say that the co-operation of the seeing/heating sun and 
                                                     
42 Jane M. Miller, “Some Versions of Pygmalion,” in Ovid Renewed, ed. by Charles Martindale 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1989, 205-214), 206. Kenneth Gross even claims that Pygmalion’s courting 
of the statue does not lack the impression of fetishism and necrophilia (Gross, The Dream of the 
Moving Statue, 75). 
43 Ovid, Metamorphoses, 253. Italics are mine É.A. 
44 Leonard Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh. Metamorphosis & the Pursuit of Paganism (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), 77. 
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creative human hands results in a true, a real metamorphosis. After melting, the 
wax becomes solid again taking its final shape in the form of a real woman. I 
find Barkan’s summary really appropriate here: “And, once the wax has softened 
and changed its form, it does not stay in the shadowy realm but rather becomes 
real. […] Pygmalion is potentially narcissistic since he falls in love with his own 
creation, but metamorphoses through his art and his belief in his art makes of 
shadow a very real substance.”45  
We should agree with Barkan that Pygmalion’s treat of the statue as a living 
human recalls, (or echoes), Narcissus’ “passionate devotion that refuses to know 
the identity of its object and cannot distinguish between shadow and 
substance.”46 Pygmalion’s blind devotion to his self-made lover resembles 
Narcissus’ obsession (furor) and his tragic inability to extend beyond himself. 
But in the artist’s ‘imaginative’ story – let us imagine – there are two lovers, 
while Narcissus himself is simultaneously the lover and the beloved in his life 
and in his death. Hardie also thinks that Pygmalion’s and Narcissus’ stories are 
similar, though in the former there is a progression from death to life via the 
image, while in the latter the direction is in the opposite direction; Narcissus’ 
own image and his realisation of it being just an image of his causes his death.47 
His stupefied (viz. Greek narke numb) gaze and his motionlessness makes the 
image at which he marvels even more like a statue. In his pool he takes his 
illusionary reflection as an image of a marble statue: “[s]pellbound by his own 
self, he remained there motionless, with fixed gaze, like a statue carved from 
Parian marble.”48 Narcissus, like Pygmalion, is praying for the coming to life of 
(t)his statue, but his statue is literally his own reflected image in the virgin pool. 
The award of his statue’s coming to ‘life,’ that is, his realisation of loving his 
own image (imago), causes his death. Barkan says that Narcissus like the other 
characters/figures of the great stories of discovery ‘acts’ in the spirit of nosce te 
ipsum (to know thyself) and they are all figures of the mirror:  
[…] intus habes quem poscis ‘he whom you seek is within 
you’.[...] It stands in a credo for human experience in the world 
of metamorphosis. We contain our own identity, and we find it 
in the mirror of transformation. We contain our destinies within 
us, petrifications of ourselves into stone and image. Narcissus-
like, we often seek in love what is within us, and it is revealed 
through transformation.49 
                                                     
45 Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh, 78. 
46 Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh, 76. 
47 Hardie, Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion, 189. 
48 Ovid, Metamorphoses, 92. 
49 Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh, 92. 
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Related to Narcissus’ tragic story, there is Echo, the nymph, who, being rejected 
by the youth, is trapped in imitation and reflection. Even before Narcissus has 
seen his reflection, Echo’s love presents her struggling “with the paradox that 
being identical with your loved one is an obstacle rather than an aid to union 
with him.”50 The nymph pines away leaving behind her voice and her ‘death,’ 
her disappearance, foreshadowing Narcissus’ wasting away: “Only her voice and 
her bones were left, till finally her voice alone remained; for her bones, they say, 
were turned to stone.”51 It means something; a sign, a signal remains after her; 
likewise after the death of Narcissus, a flower grows. The original white petals 
of the narcissus turned orange-red and yellow commemorating his beauty, that 
is, a mark is left shadowing the pure whiteness of the flower. The colouring of 
the flower alludes to Narcissus’ beating his own marble-white chest when “his 
breast flushed rosily where he struck it.”52 The reddening of stone-like flesh also 
appears in Pygmalion’s story. The statue coming to life reacts to his maker’s 
caressing by blushing in embarrassment, which proves that she is a modest 
woman.53 Narcissus’ bruises bring his death, while, conversely, Pygmalion’s 
desire magically colours the statue bringing it to life. 
There is another element in Narcissus’ story that recalls the description of 
Pygmalion’s life-giving creation. Before beating his own ‘marble’ body and 
before the recognition of his own ‘tainted’ image in the pool, Narcissus is crying 
and his dropping tears make his reflection dim in the pool. The youth’s last 
moment of frenzy is described as follows:  
When Narcissus saw this [viz. the bruise on his marble chest] 
reflected in the water – for the pool had returned to its former 
calm – he could bear it no longer. As golden wax melts with 
gentle heat, as morning frosts are thawed by the warmth of the 
                                                     
50 Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh, 48. Fantham also discusses the Echo-episode drawing attention 
to the other meaning of the Latin imago as it also “denotes both an echo – or aural reflection – 
and a reflection, which we might conceive of as a visual echo”. Being misled by the echo of his 
own voice (imagine vocis), Narcissus urges the unknown to come to meet him, but he rejects 
the real woman, Echo (Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 45).  
51 Ovid, Metamorphoses, 91. Italics are mine. É.A. 
52 Ovid, Metamorphoses, 94. 
53 To collect and write about the episodes with the motive of blushing, bleeding and colouring in 
Metamorphoses is a highly exciting task, but I can only scratch the surface here. See more on 
the stains in Pygmalion’s story Gross, The Dream of the Moving Statue. In the case of the 
original story, the young agalmatophiliac even contaminates the statue of Venus leaving stains 
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some interiority in the statue, however contested or opaque, or bound to external occasions; that 
stain does not bring the statue to life, indeed it reinforces its lifelessness, yet nevertheless it 
magically transforms the statue as a testimony of a different sort of miracle, recreates it as a 
different sort of monument” (Gross, 81-2). 
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sun, so he was worn and wasted away with love, and slowly 
consumed by its hidden fire.54 
His death means his entering the realm of images expressed in the imagery of 
dissolution: like the melting wax he pines away while his tears are flowing in his 
eyes. The heat of his fiery passion is balanced by the cold surface of the water, 
his mirror. As Barkan puts it, “the boy has entered completely into the mirror 
realm,” as if through the tear-tain he had gone the other side of the mirror.55 
While Narcissus is literally reduced to an image of himself, the artist Pygmalion 
(like the other artists in Metamorphoses) creates an/the image of himself. 
Actually, the two processes seem to be different but are in chiastic relation, and, 
quoting Barkan’s statement, “all metamorphoses are in a sense transformations 
to imago, [...] the turn to imago is [...] in fact identical to the stony 
transformation.”56  
In Pygmalion’s story “Ovid creates a figure for the viewer rather than the 
artist, producing a narrative about the ‘beholder’s share’ in creating the 
impression of real presence in a work of art.”57 The opening ‘close’ reading 
gives life to the stone-like closed text so that the particular reading should melt it 
like wax so as to freeze it again into stone, into another reading. In reading, 
passionate attention and ardent vigour are needed so that the text should produce 
its meanings in different forms of interpretations. “Each critic becomes a 
Pygmalion,”58 when in his/her Narcissistic petrifaction, he/she gives life to a 
stony work of art in the chiastic structure of reading. In Narcissus’ gaze we 
should recognise a general paradigm for the beholder of a work of art and the 
narcissistic quality of the beholder’s response. I think, Philip Hardie describes 
the narcissistic features of reading very well in his Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion: 
[...] the viewer reads into the image his own phantasies, and in 
so doing transgresses the boundary between the world of the 
viewer and the world of the artwork, [...]. The surface of the 
pool is also the interface between reality and illusion for those 
outside the text. Narcissus is a figure for the desiring reader, 
caught between the intellectual understanding that texts are just 
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55 Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh, 52. Interestingly enough, in The Matrix, the opposite happens to 
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texts, words with no underlying reality, and the desire to believe 
in the reality of the textual world. Narcissus turns into a 
sophisticated reader at the moment he recognises that the 
reflection is himself.59  
Narcissus’ situation mirrors that of the engaged reader as he/she knows with 
his/her rational mind that the reflection has no reality, but cannot stop thinking 
as if it had. Metaphorically, the reader becomes one with his/her image-
reflection and in a (narcissistic) text, the voice/persona is able to become one 
with his image in the images/figures of rhetoric.  
What Philip Hardie says about the narcissistic reader is strikingly echoed in 
what Joseph Hillis Miller expresses on the Pygmalion-quality of reading in his 
Versions of Pygmalion. Miller puts personification and prosopopoeia in the 
centre of his analysis, claiming that “the act of personification (is) essential to all 
storytelling and storyreading.”60 In his “Proem: Pygmalion’s Prosopopoeia” he 
discusses the story told in Ovid’s Metamorphoses and he again emphasises that 
for him one of the characteristic features of the Ovidian narrative is that each 
metamorphosis can be seen and defined as “the literalization of a metaphor.” 
Miller straightforwardly blames the rhetorical figures of language: “[i]n the cruel 
justice of the gods we see the terrible performative power that figures of speech 
may have. [...] The Metamorphoses shows what aberrant figurative language can 
do. The power of the gods to intervene in human history is the allegorization of 
this linguistic power.”61 He also calls attention to the interrelatedness of stories 
in Book 10 emphasising that Venus seems to have overwhelming power in the 
happenings bringing the statue to life so as to be overcome by something greater 
than herself, love (or rather passion) in the Adonis-episode. Actually, 
Pygmalion, whose self-celibacy is caused by his aversion to the ‘stony’ and 
‘painted’ prostitutes, is destined to fall in love with a stony and painted statue. 
That is to say, that Miller pays attention to the textual irony of the narrative and 
concentrates on figurative language, which I have also done in my rhetorical 
reading.  
Miller sees Pygmalion’s error in “taking prosopopoeia literally,” since he 
regards metamorphosis as the literalising allegory of the face-giving 
prosopopoeia. The trope gives face, name and voice to the absent, the inanimate 
and to the dead, as it is also the trope of mourning. To quote Miller’s summary 
on the myth: 
                                                     
59 Hardie, Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion, 147-8.  
60 J. Hillis Miller, Versions of Pygmalion, “Preface,” vii. Although de Man’s ‘prosopopeia’ is 
spelled here as ‘prosopopoeia, and there is a footnote referring to de Man’s ideas, his works are 
not cited in “Proem”. 
61 Miller, Versions of Pygmalion, 1.  
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For Pygmalion, the other is not really other. Pygmalion has 
himself made Galatea. She is the mirror image of his desire. His 
relation to her is not love for another, in an attachment always 
shadowed by the certain death of the other. It is a reciprocity in 
which the same loves the same. Here Narcissus’ vain desire 
seems fulfilled [...] For Galatea, to see at all is to see Pygmalion 
and to be subject to him. It is as if Narcissus’ reflection in the 
pool had come alive and could return his love.62  
In Pygmalion’s story an inanimate object comes to life, i.e. an anthropo-
morphism takes place, while in the other stories the transformation goes into the 
other direction from human being to an animal, plant or an object. Thus, the 
story of Pygmalion is a unique one: in a Millerian phrase, it is “a prosopopoeia 
of prosopopoeia.” Pygmalion’s story can be read as a face-giving story of a face-
giving, and in this phrase (in the reading of the phrase), even this ‘of’ is to be 
taken metaphorically.63  
Miller also refers to the ‘waxing’ erotic passage in the narrative, when the 
ivory becomes flesh. Here, on the one hand, he emphasises the importance of 
male productive work on passive (female) material, taking wax as the traditional 
figure of/ trope for man’s shaping power.64 On the other hand, he clearly sees the 
possible “abuse” or “misuse” of Pygmalion’s creative “use” of wax, which is 
also related to his own self-abuse taking prosopopoeia literally.65 Not only 
Pygmalion makes the mistake of taking a figure of speech literally. According to 
Miller, in reading we are likely to take the statue as a real person, or to think of 
“black marks on the page” as stories of real persons. Readers, critics, and 
teachers personify, that is, give faces to the characters in the narrative of the 
texts: “[...] stories are all versions of Pygmalion and Galatea, that is, stories in 
which the act of prosopopoeia essential to any storytelling is overtly thematized, 
as when someone falls in love with a statue.”66  
                                                     
62 J. Hillis Miller, Versions of Pygmalion, 4-5. 
63 J. Hillis Miller, Versions of Pygmalion, 6. See more on the metaphorical ‘of’ in Paul de Man’s 
The Resistance to Theory (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1986), 16-17 and J. H. Miller’s Theory 
Now and Then, 355-356.  
64 J. Hillis Miller, Versions of Pygmalion, 7. Miller’s ‘waxing’ remarks celebrating male power 
over female passivity will be fought back by Rousseau’s Galathée and Weber’s reading of 
Rousseau’s Pygmalion. Be patient, my gentle reader. 
65 Besides the visual and tactile images of wax, I cannot help thinking its other meaning is related 
to hearing, more exactly, non-hearing (viz. ear-wax). All of my texts are accompanied by some 
music; in this case a Greek song can be heard that is commemorated in the motto. Otherwise, 
my Kingston days were spent listening (involuntarily) to the landlady, Maureen’s favourite 60’s 
songs on BBC Radio 2, while my nights were dedicated to the striking of the bell-tower. For a 
while, I even tried to use ear-plugs but I got used to the sounds later.  
66 J. Hillis Miller, Versions of Pygmalion, 14.  
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Now, it is time to return to Rousseau and his self-questi(oni)ng version of 
Pygmalion. Huntington Williams in his thorough study of the oeuvre titled 
Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography follows the steps of (t)his quest. He 
finds that Rousseau’s actual fondness of solitary walk metaphorically reveals the 
importance of ‘reveries’ in his writing, saying that “the act in which Rousseau 
discovers his identity always involves a distancing from self and even a self-
forgetting.”67 Besides its different denotations, reverie for Rousseau primarily 
means a revelation of himself, or of what he might become. Huntington also 
analyses the relationship between two important concepts in the oeuvre: amour 
and amitié, that is to say love and friendship. The understanding, or rather 
imagining, of the others’ suffering marks the transition from Nature to Culture, 
the movement from natural self-love to ‘social’ pity. Imagination mediates 
between nature and culture and though it does not belong to either ‘you’ or ‘I,’ 
Rousseau can show them as interchangeable.68 Huntington differentiates 
between amour and amitié on the basis of their relationship to imagination; 
while in amitié it is an “extrinsic catalyst,” in amour it is an intrinsic, final cause. 
On the other hand, “amitié implies a symmetrical, reciprocal, and essentially 
circular relationship, based on identity,” but “amour implies an asymmetrical, 
non-reciprocal, relationship, based on difference.”69 Rousseau is greatly 
concerned with the differences between the real and the illusory, and amour, 
intensifying these differences, makes him aware of this discrepancy. For him 
love is not a dialogue between two persons, but between the actual world and the 
third party, imagination.  
Rousseau made distinctions between self-love (amour de soi) and vanity 
(amour propre): the latter is an infectious disease and “the most corrosive of 
emotions,” while the former means the natural and “the unreflective, loving 
passion.” He also claimed “in his evolutionary story of the human heart” that 
self-love was corrupted by the later kind of love.70 De Man sees that “in contrast 
to the solitary self-concentration of self-love, amour propre is entirely directed 
towards the approval of others”: while the paraphrase of self-love can be ‘je 
                                                     
67 Huntington, Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography, 20. Rousseau claims to receive his reveries 
from the positive force of imagination, not from God, and the second stage of reverie involves 
the construction of a personal aesthetic sphere. Then he dramatizes his intuition and turns it into 
a work of art, “an imaginative vision of personal identity” – a work is a reverie (Huntington, 
Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography, 33). 
68 Huntington, Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography, 39. 
69 Huntington, Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography, 56-7. 
70 Sturrock, The Language of Autobiography, 155-7. He also associates amour de soi with the 
Freudian ‘primary narcissism’ and sees a unique combination of the two kinds of love in self-
writing: “Autobiography may be a form of writing directed to the satisfaction of the writer’s 
amour-propre, but he will use it, uniquely, for the expression of his amour de soi, or true self-
love” (155-7).  
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m’aime,’ of amour propre it is ‘on m’aime’ or ‘je suis aimable’.71 Rousseau’s 
early dramatic piece Narcisse ou l’Amant de lui-même (Narcissus, or, the Lover 
of Himself) is a comic play where Valère (with a telling male-female name) falls 
in love with his own portrait disguised as a woman. Valère is a classical comic 
figure, the type of conceited young fop, who is mystified by vanity. He is not 
like the Ovidian Narcissus, who recognises that he loves his own image, since 
Rousseau’s Narcisse remains blind in/to his self-love and fails to realise his own 
self-centredness. On his wedding day Valère is tricked and deluded by the ‘fake’ 
portrait and only with the help of the other characters can he get back to his 
senses. He is not an artist and the portrait is painted by her sister who wants to 
play on her brother’s vanity and is also tricked by the others in the play. 
Narcisse is about delusion and self-delusion in love. Through the interplay 
between self-love (amour de soi), vanity (amour propre) and the love of others, 
Valère’s misreading of the portrait mainly presents his vanity. His narcissism is 
not metaphorical, or tropical, as it only reveals his amour propre, making the 
comedy satirical and didactic. Thus, de Man’s statement, namely that “the self 
here never really becomes another, but remains all too much its own interested 
self,” is true in relation to all the characters.72 
In the rhetoric of Narcisse, there are a lot of puns and grammatical plays on 
the reflexive mode. The most frequently quoted one is in Scene XIII when 
Valère’s drunk valet Frontin reveals the secret of the portrait to his master’s 
sister, the trickster: “It is a portrait ... metamor... no, metaphor ... yes, 
metaphorized (métaphorisé). It is my master, it is a girl… you have made a 
certain mixture.”73 The portrait is associated with a metaphor but we can take it 
as a slip of tongue as the drunk valet could have wanted to say that the portrait 
has been ‘metamorphosed’. Frontin also says here that Valère has fallen in love 
not with the portrait, not himself as he failed to recognise himself in it, but with 
the “resemblance.” That is, he is suspended between self-love and the transitive 
love of the others – between the love for the self and the love for the other. 
Similarly, the portrait is not entirely fictional since it exits in the mode of 
simulacrum. De Man thinks, “[...] resemblance is ‘loved’ because it can be 
interpreted as identity as well as difference and it is therefore unseizable, forever 
in flight.”74 Valère, that is Rousseau’s Narcisse, (mis)reads his own portrait and 
the misread self-portrait stands for the beloved. According to de Man, “the 
portrait is a substitution, but it is impossible to say whether it substitutes for the 
                                                     
71 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion),” in AR, 165. 
72 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 41-2.  
73 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Narcissus, or, the Lover of Himself, in The Collected Writings of Rous-
seau, Vol. 10, ed. and trans. by Allan Bloom, Charles Butterworth and Christopher Kelly 
(Hanover and London: Univ. Press of New England, 2004, 125-160), 150. See also in French: 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Narcisse ou l’Amant de lui-même, in Oeuvres complètes, II (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1961, 959-1018), 1006. 
74 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion),” in AR, 168. 
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self or for the other; it constantly vacillates between both. [...] love, like 
perfectibility, is structured like a figure of speech. The portrait allows for a 
bizarre substitution of self for other, and of other for self, called love.”75 The 
portrait is “beloved” and partakes of amour de soi, though in the displaced 
version of an imagined other; and it becomes a figure: “the metaphor of a 
metonymy.” In the play we cannot know whether the beloved is “a person or a 
portrait, a referential meaning or a figure” – here “selfhood is not a substance but 
a figure.”76 In Narcisse Rousseau “portrayed” the action as a “painter,” and as 
the author of the text his main concern is the rhetoric of self. As a result of this 
he produces misreading in his self-quest. But not only Rousseau can be taken 
here as the rhetorician of the self since de Man’s main concern is also the 
rhetoric of self-quest. Valère’s self-love is a “representation of a rhetorical 
structure [...] that escapes the control of the self,” which shows that the rhetorical 
resources of language are incompatible with selfhood. I will quote the revealing 
passage about the ironic relation of rhetoric (language) and the self in full from 
de Man’s writing: 
Rhetoric all too easily appears as the tool of the self, hence its 
pervading association, in the everyday use of the term, with 
persuasion, eloquence, the manipulation of the self and of 
others. Hence also the naïvely pejorative sense in which the term 
is commonly used, in opposition to a literal use of language that 
would not allow the subject to conceal its desires. The attitude is 
by no means confined to the popular use of ‘rhetoric’ but is in 
fact a recurrent philosophical topos, a philosopheme that may 
well be constitutive of philosophical language itself. In all these 
instances, rhetoric functions as a key to the discovery of the self; 
and it functions with such ease that one may well begin to 
wonder whether the lock indeed shapes the key or whether it is 
not the other way round, that a lock (and a secret room or box 
behind it) had to be invented in order to give a function to the 
key.77  
                                                     
75 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion),” in AR, 169. Taking love as a rhetorical figure recalls Freud’s ideas, 
for instance, on the narcissistic partner choice. Moreover, de Man refers to Ricoeur’s statement 
on Freud showing him as “the rhetorical undoer and the hermeneutic recoverer of the self” (de 
Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, 174). The topic of parallelism between literary deconstruction and 
the psychological deconstruction of selfhood in Freud, would lead us far away, but it shows 
again that I should perhaps discuss Freud’s “On Narcissism: an Introduction” – in another 
paper  
76 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, in AR, 170. 
77 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion),” in AR, 173. Italics are mine. É.A. The passage goes on: “For what 
could be more distressing than a bunch of highly refined keys just lying around without any 
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In this allegorical passage of highly refined rhetoric, de Man does not only 
question the relation between the Self/selves shown as locked rooms or boxes 
and language with its keys to the locks, but he also suggests that some 
rooms/boxes should be kept locked. I think, in our life we should try to open as 
many boxes (books?) as we can, there will always be other (locked) ones – 
perhaps, in the form of Chinese boxes (mise en abyme). 
According to Huntington, in his Narcisse Rousseau shows the relationship 
between imagined and real objects of love, as “the literary or linguistic model 
mediating between the sentiment of the lover and the object of his love insures 
that they will never fully coincide.”78 Amour relates to its object indirectly, 
through ‘autre univers’ (Rousseau), or world of imagination and it develops 
through the confusion of an imagined model of love with an existing person, and 
on the assumption that they can be one and the same. Moreover, Huntington 
claims that the rhetorical figures of language – especially in the literary 
discourse of love – are to be blamed for the linguistic confusions, when the 
figures are taken for actual referents. In Narcisse the man, not recognising his 
own portrait, actually loves resemblance, while in Pygmalion  
If Galathée’s birth is a shared identification among two persons, 
it is also a ‘réveil’, the instant of awakening in a reverie, in 
which the primary identification is not between two persons, but 
between the illusory and the real. Galathée moves from illusion 
toward reality, Pygmalion from reality toward illusion. From 
different starting points, they meet in one ‘Moi’, at a point 
somewhere between illusion and reality, or even prior to such a 
distinction.79  
Similarly to the other critics, Paul de Man, in two of his writings, “Rousseau and 
the Transcendence of the Self” and “Self (Pygmalion),” presents Rousseau’s 
dramatic pieces as the key-texts to understand self-writing and writing of the 
self. While Narcisse (the work that he is supposed to have written at the age of 
18 but is probably lying according to de Man) marks the beginning of his 
creative period, Pygmalion rather shows the problem of the fictional versus 
empirical selves in retrospective meditation. He says, “in the figure of the 
sculptor Pygmalion contemplating his handiwork, Galathea, we thus have a clear 
                                                                                                                                   
corresponding locks worthy of being opened? Perhaps there are none, and perhaps the most 
refined key of all, the key of keys, is the one that gives access to the Pandora’s box in which 
this darkest secret is kept hidden. This would imply the existence of at least one lock worthy of 
being raped [viz. it refers to Pope’s The Rape of the Lock], the Self as the relentless undoer of 
selfhood” (ibid). See also Waterhouse’s painting, Pandora, on the cover of my book. 
78 Huntington, Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography, 53.  
79 Huntington, Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography, 62. 
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equivalence of Rousseau reflecting on the feelings that develop between the 
author of Julie and the fictional character he has invented in that work.”80 In his 
self-quest, the “scène lyrique” Pygmalion marks Rousseau’s transition from 
theoretical and fictional to autobiographical works. Correspondingly, the main 
theme here is that an author/maker is confronting his own finished work and the 
relation(ship) between the work of art and the artist is focused on. Leaving 
behind Narcissus’ lonely stone-like wax-figure, or rather melting him so as to be 
re-shaped, we move to the stony world of Pygmalion. According to de Man, 
Rousseau’s Pygmalion, similarly to his Narcissus, is mystified and does not 
show a progress from error to truth. To show it he refers to the sculptor’s last 
statement to the statue/Galatea: “Yes, dear and charming object: yes, worthy 
masterpiece of my hands, of my heart, and of the Gods ... it is you, it is you 
alone: I have given you all my being; I no longer live except through you.”81 
Nevertheless, we can see some steps in Pygmalion’s progress: at first, he 
admires the statue, then examines it and finally desires it. The very first step of 
his ‘fetishism’ recalls Narcissus’ vain contemplation on his counterfeit image, 
when Pygmalion says “Vanity, human weakness! I cannot grow weary of 
admiring my work; I intoxicate myself with amour-propre; I adore myself in 
what I have made….”82 In his admiration of the statue Pygmalion’s amour 
propre is clearly presented that is quite akin to Valère’s ‘je m’aime aimant’. 
There is another similarity between the two works, namely that Pygmalion is 
also in love with resemblance saying: “It is not at all this dead marble with 
which I am infatuated, it is with a living being who resembles [ressemble] it; it is 
                                                     
80 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 40. He also comments about 
Julie that for Rousseau it is just like Pygmalion’s statue: perfect and flawless and its/her 
coming to life “symbolizes the full authenticity of the fictional figure” (42). It is interesting 
how de Man in his essays on Rousseau’s writings keeps giving hints at a Rousseau-biography, 
while Huntington even builds the biographical references into his own version of Rousseau’s 
life-work. Huntington thinks that after losing his maternal love-figure, Mme de Warens, Rous-
seau begins to establish himself as an author. He moves from this sentiment to writing activity, 
to the writing of an autobiography, and Pygmalion marks the critical stage in the move to 
autobiography. In his work, Pygmalion, despite his losing ‘Maman’, the statue comes to life, 
that is to say the work itself comes to life/existence. With Galatea’s sigh and statement “encore 
moi”, Rousseau realises that all of ‘his’ women projected as love-figures in the work(s) are in 
his memory, are his own. As Galatea moves from non-being to being, Rousseau’s actual 
women are forgotten so that he should be able to remember and reflect on them (Huntington, 
Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography, 61-62). 
81 In his “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self” de Man himself translated the quoted lines 
but here I quote from the ‘standard’ collection of the English translation of Rousseau’s works. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Pygmalion, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, Vol. 10, ed. and 
trans. by Allan Bloom, Charles Butterworth and Christopher Kelly (Hanover and London: 
Univ. Press of New England, 2004, 230-236), 236. Cf. in French: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Pygmalion, in Oeuvres complètes, II (Gallimard, 1961, 1224-1231), 1231. 
82 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 232. Cf. in Oeuvres II, 1226. 
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with the face [cf. shape for de Man; figure in French] that it offers to my eyes.”83 
On the level of appearances, he is in love with something that is shaped/made 
by/in his own mind. On the one hand, it refers to Narcisse where Valère was in 
love with resemblance, on the other hand, it starts “the tropological pattern of 
substitution that makes Pygmalion into an allegory of figuration.”84 Moreover, 
de Man’s statement makes the life-giving artistic Pygmalion’s story the allegory 
of reading as in reading not the dead leaves of paper, but the rhetorical figures of 
the text will incite desire and give the illusion of life to the eyes/mind.  
In his desire Pygmalion is ashamed of himself, but the pattern of 
Pygmalion’s/Rousseau’s desire can be read as “truly aesthetic.”85 In desire the 
consciousness moves toward something that it has lost, and now wants to 
possess to be complete again. It shows Pygmalion’s desire as a lack, as a 
shortcoming, as a striving for/after a “beautiful soul.” Desire is a temporal 
experience caused by the loss of the source of being and “the text of Pygmalion 
makes clear that the source is not located in the self of the artist, but that it exists 
in the work that he has created.”86 Accordingly, as the source is outside the 
empirical self, the painfully desired union would imply the death of the self:  
Alas! it stays immobile and cold, while my heart, set ablaze by 
its charms, wants to leave my body in order to warm its body. In 
my delirium I believe that I can hurl myself out of myself; I 
believe that I can give it my life, and animate it with my soul. 
Ah! that Pygmalion might die in order to live in Galatea!87  
In this ‘apocalyptic moment’ the desired unity would result in an absolute 
negation/annihilation of the self due to the desired exchange between the self 
and other. Besides echoing Narcissus’ struggle with his own reflection, the 
confused Pygmalion is also speaking about himself in third person, not only in 
the above quoted wish, but also earlier in his worshipping of the perfection of his 
creation. Then, in his meditation, Pygmalion realises, the dead self loses not only 
his own life but the contact with the other. Here the paradoxical dialectic of 
                                                     
83 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 233 and in Oeuvres, II, 1227. Italics are mine. É.A. Also quoted and 
translated in de Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, in AR, 183. De Man translates the French figure as 
’shape’, while in the English collection the word is translated as ’face,’ which is closer to the de 
Manian prosopopeia. I would prefer to keep the original figure in the sentence, relying on the 
Pygmalion-quality of rhetoric offered to my eyes.  
84 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, in AR, 183.  
85 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” 45. Then in his other text on Pygmalion 
de Man admits that Pygmalion’s desire is not only “truly aesthetic”, as the sculptor’s sexual 
aggression is quite literal in the story. We cannot forget that, in the original Greek narrative, the 
King of Cyprus wanted to copulate with the statue of Venus. See in de Man, “Self (Pygmali-
on)”, in AR, 181.  
86 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 46. 
87 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 233. 
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selfhood and otherness is revealed: how can one truly experience the other 
without giving up one’s self? The dialectic of self and other in the act of 
reflection, and the dialectic of self-love and desire are also shown in the 
linguistic complexity of Pygmalion’s cry: “No, that my Galatea live, and that I 
not be she. Ah! that I might always be another, in order to wish always to be she, 
to see her, to love her, to be loved by her.”88  
Actually, Rousseau’s Pygmalion does not get (and cannot get) closer to the 
self in his quest for the experience of the other. I agree with de Man that in this 
“ironic epiphany”  
the [real] progression has taken place, not in Pygmalion, but in 
the figure of Galathea, who, at the end of the scene, has not only 
come to life but has been able to define the nature of her own 
selfhood in relation to herself, to Pygmalion, and to the natural 
world. And a similar progression has taken place in us as 
readers, who are now able to understand the entire complex 
relationship that exists between the three entities (the artist, the 
live sculpture, and the piece of marble); this progression is a 
correlative of a progression that has taken place in Rousseau 
himself as the author of the play, who controls the patterns of 
truth and error, of insight and blindness, that organize the 
action.89  
In the end, following an ironic reciprocity, Galatea’s coming to life freezes 
Pygmalion and astonishes him – he is petrified with astonishment. Now Galatea 
exists as a self claiming to be (her)self, uttering “Me” [Moi],” and pointing at the 
marble, she says: “This is me no more [Ce n’est plus moi].”90 She becomes self-
conscious and, as a work of art, she is still flawless. Although art can achieve the 
ultimate triumph of consciousness by an act of imagination, it cannot recapture 
the fullness of Being. At the end of the play Galatea puts her hand on Pygmalion 
and says sighing: “Ah, still me [encore moi].”91 It shows Rousseau’s efforts to 
transcend his actual self into a language, a work that now exists outside himself. 
                                                     
88 Ibid. In French: “Non, que ma Galathée vive, et que je ne sois pas elle. Ah! que je sois toujours 
un autre, pour vouloir toujours être elle, pour la voir, pour l’aimer, pour en être aimé…” 
(Oeuvres II, 1228). 
89 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 43. 
90 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 235 and in Oeuvres, II, 1230. Hardie records in Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion 
that in the 1778 edition of Rousseau’s Pygmalion there was an illustration made by Jean-
Michel Moreau showing that “the statue, Galathée, has just stepped down from her pedestal, 
and touches another of Pygmalion’s sculptures, whose tensed posture and raised hands, in 
context, turn him into a figure of the astounded and frozen viewer of the statue newly brought 
to life, himself a ‘Statue of Surprize’.” (183) 
91 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 236 and in Oeuvres, II, 1231. 
80 
But his writings only record his failure to transcend his own selfhood. As de 
Man concludes: “The work is ‘encore moi,’ the half-resigned, ironic mood of 
self-reflection that predominates in Rousseau and in the readers who recognise 
themselves in him. The romantic artist is still Narcissus, though a Narcissus who 
has come back alive from his trip to the other side of the mirror – perhaps what 
Rilke will call later, in one of his French poems, le Narcisse exaucé – the 
demystified Narcissus.”92  
However, there is a great difference between Valère’s deluded self-love and 
Pygmalion’s worship of his self-made creation, namely that the sculptor sees a 
goddess in the statue. As an artist, he used to make statues of gods and 
goddesses, that is, he was/is capable of giving shape to the divine. Although we 
can read it as the sign of extreme self-adoration, in his allegorical reading of 
Pygmalion, de Man takes it as Pygmalion’s experience of the sublime. He says, 
in the story, the artist “is paralyzed by the feeling of awe that is characteristic, to 
use Kantian terminology, of the sublime.”93 As we know, the Kantian sublime is 
not an exterior power but it has rather much more to do with imagination 
reflecting on that power. Pygmalion regards his work of art as godlike/divine 
and “the goddess metaphor is an aptly monstrous concatenation of self and 
other.”94 Without realising it, with these remarks, de Man alludes to the original 
Ovidian, or perhaps to the origin of the Ovidian narrative, where the 
confrontation – either spiritual, or physical – with the divine is more emphatic. 
Right from the beginning, in accordance with the dichotomy of human vs. 
divine, in the dynamism of the text, as readers, we are to face several antinomies 
that are engendered by the arch-antinomy of the two polarities: the self vs. the 
other. Besides the most obvious cold vs. hot – expressed in the coldness of the 
marble statue and the figurative coldness of Pygmalion’s ‘virginal’ condition 
that is opposed with his melting passion and his fire of creation – de Man lists 
several other antinomies, such as inside/outside, art/nature, life/death, 
male/female, heart/senses, hiding/revealing, eye/ear, lyric/dramatic etc.95 
With the introduction of the sublime, de Man seems to move away from the 
rhetorical reading of the ending and he tries to interpret it with reference to the 
generality implicit in the sublime itself. However, he still shows the ending of 
Pygmalion aporetic but he gets to this conclusion in a different argument. 
Pygmalion wishes for their union, but “instead of merging into a higher, general 
                                                     
92 de Man, “Rousseau and the Transcendence of the Self,” in RCC, 49. 
93 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, in AR, 177. 
94 Ibid. 
95 “The hot-cold dichotomy comes [...] from a transference from the figural to the literal that stems 
from the ambivalent relationship between the work as an extension of the self and as a quasi-
divine otherness” (de Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, in AR, 177-180.). This argument recalls 
Brooks’ analysis of Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn” where the ‘cold’ immortality of the urn is 
balanced with the vivid scenes of mortal human life depicted on it. 
81 
Self, two selves remain confronted in a paralyzing inequality”96, as Galatea’s 
‘moi’ is more self-assured than Pygmalion’s amorous ‘moi’. And when 
Pygmalion starts kissing the woman’s hand, she utters “encore moi” with a sigh. 
She has just previously stated that she is no longer the stone, and now she 
accepts that she is one with Pygmalion. Their union hardly be labelled as an 
ecstatic one as Galatea, leaving her stone-prison, is just about to enter 
Pygmalion’s ‘love-prison’. De Man thinks (or rather presupposes) that Galatea 
should be taken here as ‘the Self’, that is, she has to contain all individual selves 
including Pygmalion. Galatea’s disappointment can also mean “a persisting, 
repeated distinction between the general Self and the self as other.”97 Thus, de 
Man reaches to the same aporetic conclusion, although via another route: 
Galathea’s coming alive rewards the access to his advanced 
level of understanding. The point of the text however is that 
even this mode of discourse fails to achieve a concluding 
exchange that would resolve the tension of the original 
dejection. The part of the action that follows Galathea’s 
epiphany disrupts the dialectical progression that leads up to it 
and merely repeats its aberrant pattern. The discourse by which 
the figural structure of the self is asserted fails to escape from 
the categories it claims to deconstruct, and this remains true, of 
course, of any discourse which pretends to re-inscribe in its turn 
the figure of this aporia. There can be no escape from the 
dialectical movement that produces the text.98  
To find a way out of the self in a text about the Self, I will be assisted by Shierry 
M. Weber’s article “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion.”99 In the article 
Weber places Rousseau in the context of 18th and 19th aesthetics, questioning and 
defining the status of the work of art and its relation to reality. But Rousseau – 
somehow close to Kant’s critical ideas – does not give primacy to the artist’s 
consciousness or to the absolute expressed in their work: “he shows how artist 
and work can both be characterised in terms of selfness and yet be different, and 
he tries to relate that difference to the physical existence of the work of art, its 
presence within ‘earthly life’.”100 According to Weber, in the work, the main 
                                                     
96 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, in AR, 185. 
97 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, in AR, 186. 
98 de Man, “Self (Pygmalion)”, in AR, 187. 
99 Shierry M. Weber, “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion,” (Comparative Literature, Dec., 
1968: 900-918). My final, less aporetic, conclusions are thanks to her article that I found and 
read just at the right moment in the British Library in April 2008. Otherwise, I should admit 
that a paper is to be finished in a convincing rhetoric – the promise of a less aporetic ending 
will do.  
100 Weber, “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion,” 902. 
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concern for Rousseau is Pygmalion’s desire for Galatea, and in the end, after 
Pygmalion has given (his) being to Galatea, Rousseau seems to give priority to 
the work over the artist. By that I mean that Rousseau/Pygmalion gives priority 
to his Pygmalion/Galatea. Weber’s main focus is on Rousseau’s notion of the 
reflective, discontinuous nature of the self that is thematised in the work 
culminating in the final utterances of the two characters: “Ah, still me. – Yes, 
dear and charming object: yes, worthy masterpiece of my hands, of my heart, 
and of the Gods ... it is you, it is you alone: I have given you all my being; I no 
longer live except through you.”101  
Weber also refers to different misreadings of the work, for instance, to 
Goethe’s attack on Pygmalion accusing Rousseau of degrading the spiritual 
work of art to a sensuous object, or, to Starobinski’s misinterpretation of 
Pygmalion’s desire as a narcissistic one longing for a complete union of self and 
other – and she could also have mentioned de Man’s aporetic rhetorical reading. 
Both/All err since Rousseau’s ideas are akin to Kant’s, emphasising the negative 
or paradoxical presence of the absolute in the work of art. Opposed to the 
previous readings, and somehow recalling de Man’s sublime re-reading of the 
work, Weber sees that in Pygmalion “the sensuous artistic representation thus 
points beyond itself to the infinitude of the supersensuous realm.”102 The 
aesthetic image for Rousseau leads not to but away from the natural. From 
Pygmalion’s point of view, priority is given to the work of art as Galatea can be 
taken as his “externalized better or past self and thus seems free from the 
negativity of reflective consciousness.”103 Going beyond Rousseau’s ideas, we 
can think that the work with its non-reflexivity is given priority over 
consciousness. Ironically, Rousseau’s Pygmalion shows the differences between 
the result of the reflected artistic activity and the unreflected status of the work, 
while both can be reflected upon in other artistic or critical pieces.  
In Rousseau’s work the negation of the self happens earlier (not only in the 
‘work’), when Pygmalion makes the statue, his masterpiece. He feels that he 
gives away his genius to give ‘life’ to the work of art, uttering: “I have lost my 
genius” [J’ai perdu mon génie].”104 His genius becomes – later? – Galatea’s 
animating spirit, as if it/she had been imprisoned in stone, in a ‘stony’ 
slumber.105 Pygmalion dies in some sense (similarly, love-making is little death) 
                                                     
101 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 236. In French in Oeuvres, II, 1231. 
102 Weber, “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion, 903. But Rousseau moves beyond the Kan-
tian aesthetics, because “he unites the productive and receptive aspects of the aesthetic subject 
(genius and taste) in the figure of the artist as spectator, and he moves beyond the artist-
spectator to consider the nature of the work of art itself more fully than Kant will do. Pygmali-
on can thus be considered a further step in the development of a critical aesthetics” (904).  
103 Weber, “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion,” 916. 
104 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 231. In French in Oeuvres, II, 1225. 
105 I cannot help remembering Wordsworth’s “A Slumber did my spirit seal”, where the life-
forgetting slumber makes the persona forget about the mortality of the beloved so that he 
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creating Galatea, but he survives to experience the consciousness of the “scène 
lyrique.” Weber calls our attention to a crucial thing, namely that Rousseau 
presents us not the action, not the creation of the statue, but the artist’s reflection 
on it. Quoting her ideas:  
Pygmalion is a phenomenon of reflective consciousness; in 
Kantian terms, it is ideal rather than real. The recapitulation of 
Galathée’s creation is an internal reliving of it, and the scene is 
Pygmalion’s mind. Rousseau shows us the aesthetic subject not 
as producer but as one now contemplator, having been artist. He 
shows us not Pygmalion making a statue but Pygmalion 
reflecting on the act of making it, Pygmalion interpreting 
creation as animation. [...] In that what reflection examines is 
not only action but the transition from action to reflection – for 
the act of making the statue is itself the transition, the transfer of 
being – it is a movement inward toward the self, as reflective 
consciousness.106  
Thus, Pygmalion has finished his (act of) creation, and now he is reflecting upon 
the completed action. I can accept this version of Pygmalion, but I still wonder 
what we mean by creation. Weber admits that Rousseau’s Pygmalion is a 
reflection on the Greek story, not a nostalgic one but it moves to a further stage 
in aesthetic thought. In a footnote Weber refers to the third meaning of 
Rousseau’s reflective Pygmalion: a Reflexion in sich (to use a Hegelian term), 
which reflects on the ‘ideal’ reading of the making of the statue.107 I would 
rather take the third one as ‘the reflection of reflection,’ in which one’s own 
reflection is reflected on. Weber does not realise what (always-already) happens 
here is the deconstruction of the dichotomy of action – reflection. Actually, the 
reflecting on an action is another acting that can be reflected on so that the other 
reflected action should be reflected on again (and again) etc. Similarly, 
Rousseau’s version of Pygmalion’s reflecting on his creation, i.e. his Pygmalion, 
is read (reflected on, or, acted on) by Weber here, and now I will re-act/reflect 
upon her reading of Rousseau’s Pygmalion, that is, her version of Pygmalion, in 
my text with Pygmalion duplicated in its title.  
                                                                                                                                   
should realise/remember that the girl is ‘stony’ dead. Pygmalion’s story definitely moves 
backwards from the beloved’s motionless stony thing-like ‘existence’ to her coming to life. 
But, on the whole, both girls are imprisoned in the lover’s text telling their story.  
106 Weber, “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion,” 905. Weber keeps the ’original’ French 
Galathée, de Man names ‘his’ statue-work Galathea and I stick to ’my’ Galatea of the Greek 
myth (also used in the English collection).  
107 Ibid. 
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Pygmalion’s desire is ideal, not real; it is aesthetic rather than sensual, simply 
because if his were a real desire then it would display a subject having desire and 
an object being desired. But, as Weber points out, in Pygmalion “the self 
encompasses the polarities subject and object, self and other. The ideal moment 
of desire, as opposed to its real or sensuous moment, is desire for something 
which is self and other at once.”108 In the end, ‘the lovers’ turn out to share the 
same self, and Pygmalion should recognise that his desire is ideal, not real. First, 
he moves towards the object, longing to be united with it, then, realising the 
impossibility of love, he has to move back away from the object, “because the 
love relationship is possible only when lover and beloved are separate. In order 
to love Galathée, Pygmalion must be other than she.”109 Weber, though 
analysing the dynamism of desire well, reads the ending as self-alienation since 
Pygmalion seems to have given up his selfhood to the other. I do not approach it 
so radically. I think, the self goes a full circle here, or rather makes his journey 
along a spiral-line: through the momentary union with the other the self becomes 
another (self). In fact, when the artist utters in the end that he has given his 
being/self to Galatea, he is affirming that he has become another. What Weber 
says about the Rousseauian notion of desire, namely that it “does not have the 
assimilation or destruction of the object as its goal but rather preserves the object 
in negating, momentarily, the subject,” recalls Derrida’s impossible claim about 
‘allowing the other to come in its otherness’.110 Weber calls attention to 
Rousseau’s irony, reflecting upon the paradoxical structure of desire, since at the 
end of Pygmalion the work and the artist have once again become separate. As 
she sums up: “desire involves the other becoming self and the self becoming 
other. The ‘real,’ authentic self is separated from the experiencing self, and the 
experiencing self seems to be merely the negation of that other, real self.”111  
If we accept that in the ideal the real is negated/annihilated, what could we 
claim about the status of the work of art? The statue has a physical reality and 
Pygmalion is struggling to define the source of (its) beauty. Having realised that 
he has sexual desire for the statue, he speaks about the spiritual beauty of it 
referring to the beauty of (its) soul: “How beautiful the soul made [l’âme faite] 
to animate such a body must be!”112 Actually, we must see that in his reflection, 
Pygmalion is speaking about the making of a soul, that is, he is speaking about 
the beauty of his soul in his ‘spiritual’ narcissism. He tries to go beyond the 
                                                     
108 Weber, “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion,” 907. 
109 Weber, “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion,” 908. 
110 Ibid. See more about Derrida’s coming of the other and the impossibility of ‘true’ morning in 
my previous writing. In our discussion with Professor Habib, following Derrida’s ideas, he 
asked me whether ‘true’ love is (also) impossible. In this sense, the answer should be 
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love, we should still try to reach the other in all of our life.  
111 Weber, “The Aesthetics of Rousseau’s Pygmalion,” 909. 
112 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 232 and in French in Oeuvres, II, 1227.  
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polarities of body and soul giving the source of the beauty an aesthetic form. He 
is still praying to find a model that resembles the statue as it surpasses all the 
models in beauty. But he knows that the only model is an imaginary one, or an 
absent one as Galatea is a perfect work. Pygmalion says that “such a perfect 
model is the image of that which it is not [qu’un si parfait modele soit l’image de 
ce qui n’est pas]” – that is, the statue is image in itself, the statue is the image of 
an image. Pygmalion’s prayer is heard by Venus, and in the culmination of his 
error, the animation of Galatea fulfils his false desire. As Weber sums up: 
“Pygmalion prayed for the original of the statue, and the result was the 
animation of the statue. The statue thus has no model other than itself; it is its 
own original. But it remains an image as well as its original; it is not real as a 
natural object or a living person is real.”113 Galatea’s first movement is 
reflective, “the work of art is selfness as it has been constituted by reflective 
consciousness. The statue derives not from nature but from Pygmalion’s 
consciousness [...] it is the image of his negativity. [...] Consciousness 
constitutes itself through its negativity as negativity, as lacking the continuity of 
the organic.”114 The animation of the statue means its realisation as an image but 
it also has a negative aspect, being the image of a reflective self and the negation 
of the real. In Pygmalion, reflection shows the act of the petrified consciousness.  
In the scene when the artist sees Galatea come to life he remarks that “it is 
too funny for the lover of a stone to become a man of visions.”115 On the one 
hand, this statement can be read as if in his ecstasy (recalling his ecstatic love-
making that gives life to the statue in the the Ovidian story) the ‘mad’ 
Pygmalion imagined that the stony beloved was brought to life. On the other 
hand, in the moment of his insight into the blindness of his passion Pygmalion 
becomes not only the man of visions but also a man of rhetoric, because for 
Rousseau, figural language is the playground of love. Huntington shows that 
Pygmalion also marks the point when in Rousseau’s works “the tension between 
fiction and reality begins to take the rhetorical forms.” In several loci, the 
figurality of language is discussed together the passion of amour. Huntington 
explains: “Like amour, Rousseau’s linguistic world will be open-ended and 
valuable because his use of language can never attain a reciprocal, one-to-one 
correspondence with its referent. Any final referent, if we must name one 
ourselves, must result from the process of taking an illusory passion for an actual 
referent.”116  
Weber also refers to the second preface written to Nouvelle Hèloise, where 
Rousseau speaks about the relation between love and the aesthetic, claiming that 
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love is an illusion – it is ideal. Moreover, in the language of love the figures of 
speech used are “ideals constituted by consciousness”117 – as de Man sums up, 
“‘love’ is a figure that disfigures.”118  
Similarly, a passion – perhaps, the passion of the ‘mad’ Pygmalion – that 
figures and disfigures works in reading. According to de Man, for readers “the 
critical insight seems to occur at the moment when the consciousness of the 
reader and that of the writer merge to become a single Self that transcends the 
two empirical selves that confront each other. This encounter forces the reader to 
leave behind his own everyday self, as it exists at this particular moment of his 
history, to re-establish contact with the forgotten origin of this self, and to gauge 
the degree of conformity he has maintained with his origin.”119 It can describe 
the process of reading an autobiographical text and the process of reading in 
general. It is highly philosophical alluding to a universal Dasein and at the same 
time it leads us to the interrelatedness of amitié, amour and pity in the forming 
of human relationships – reading is a bond-creating activity.  
Nevertheless, Weber also thinks that Rousseau, like Kant, sees the irony of 
human existence, showing reflection and desire as the “manifestations of an 
ironic negativity of the self, a discontinuity within the self.”120 This negativity 
simply means that the self is finite and mortal, which makes Pygmalion’s ideal 
desire for Galatea ironic. Huntington also ends his Rousseau-book with the 
discussion of irony; to be precise he ends it with the discussion of the lack of 
irony in Rousseau’s character. Although I can find ironic traits in Rousseau’s 
works, I do not intend to disagree with him – I cannot simply do it per 
definitionem. Moreover, I cannot help quoting his flattering description of the 
ironist: 
[…] the ironist never claims to understand, and actively refuses 
to identify with any form of textual world. He remains instead in 
a virtual position of withdrawal, the better to proclaim fiction as 
no more than fiction, and to deflate the claim for understanding 
that anyone so ‘mistaken’ as an autobiographer might make. [...] 
the ironist, [...] remains [...] sceptical about everything, and most 
of all about himself. This response aptly characterises the critical 
spirit. Some critics, giving close attention to texts, have come to 
see irony as the limiting rhetorical category, not just as one 
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among several possible character traits. When this position is 
taken to its logical conclusion, misunderstanding and the 
impossibility of reading are the norms for the author and the 
critic. They become trapped in the alluring mirror-play of the 
textual worlds that they or other writers create.121  
The mirroring surfaces that make all these reflections possible are in the 
receptive minds and in the works. The very first mirror, in this case the mirror of 
mirrors, is Galatea, the work of art, who serves as the tain of the mirror. The 
other mirroring surfaces (sur-faces) are the texts and their readings. In the 
reflection and in the works of reflections through endless ‘ironic’ mirror-play, 
the self – of the maker, the writer, the reader, or the critic – in the act of 
confronting with the Other/other, or each other, can/will become another. The 
act of confronting means the passionate ‘wax-melting’ efforts made in reading, 
writing, interpreting, and understanding. In this way, my text, reflecting on 
Pygmalion-reflections, will be(come) another ‘petrified’ mirror that tells the 
story of Pygmalions’ reading of reading Pygmalions.  
 
                                                     








THE ‘THING’ BETWIXT AND BETWEEN –  
IRONY AND ALLEGORY IN WORDSWORTH’S “A SLUMBER DID 
MY SPIRIT SEAL”  
 
And already you are in memory of your own death. 
(Derrida) 
 
A slumber did my spirit seal;  No motion has she now, no force; 
I had no human fears;  She neither hears nor sees; 
She seemed a thing that could not feel Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course, 
The touch of earthly years.  With rocks, and stones, and trees. 
 (W. Wordsworth) 
 
The rhetorical figures haunt our discourses and narratives communicating about 
the experience of time. In de Man’s “The Rhetoric of Temporality” allegory and 
irony are shown as two modes of representing a ‘paradoxical’ (authentic?) 
experience of time: “Irony divides the flow of temporal experience into a past 
that is pure mystification and a future that remains harassed forever by a relapse 
within the inauthentic. […] The temporal void that it reveals is the same void we 
encountered when we found allegory always implying an unreachable 
anteriority”1. In several points I agree with de Man but I find stronger 
connections between the two tropes in their relation to recollection. I would 
prefer to accept Derrida’s suggestion that allegory can be presented 
(rhetorically) by the classical goddess of memory, Mnemosyne, and irony 
operates as the goddess (and also the river) of forgetting, Lethe, which – 
according to Derrida quoting de Man – “knows neither memory nor 
prefigurative duration.”2 The chosen textual playground in my further analysis 
of the problematic relationship (and also the relationship of the relationship) 
between the two tropes is William Wordsworth’s romantic poem, “A slumber 
did my spirit seal.” The choice is not arbitrary as besides so many great critical 
readings of the poem, there are two radically different rhetorical interpretations – 
an ironic and an allegorical – also dis-played.  
                                                     
1 de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in Blindness and Insight, 222. Abbreviated as BI.  
2 de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in BI, 226 and Derrida, Mémoires, 84. See more about it 
in the chapter titled “The Ironical Allegory of Remembrance and Oblivion”. 
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In “Irony as a Principle of Structure”, Cleanth Brooks, the New Critic, 
analyzes the poem paying attention to its irony expressed in the tension of the 
opposing themes. In the first stanza the lover thinks that his beloved is an 
eternally unchangeable ‘thing’ and in his trance-like worship of love he is 
without (mortal) feelings and worry. Brooks feels ‘an ironical effect’ even here; 
to be precise, he writes about its precipitation which – according to him – 
becomes overt in the second part. In his reading the death of the loved one and 
its description are connected with the lover’s initial sealed slumber, as “[it] is 
evident that it is her unnatural slumber that has waked him out of his.”3 This 
remark about the ‘unnatural’ slumber becomes ironic as in the second stanza the 
image of death is presented as something natural: the dead body of the beloved 
revolves with the natural things. But it is this unnatural recognition that gives the 
lover’s insight, namely now the lifeless body that cannot hear and see moves 
around “in a violent, but imposed motion” together with the earthly things. 
Although Brooks admits that he would not necessarily call the poem ‘ironic,’ in 
his summary he claims that “the statement of the first stanza has been literally 
realised in the second, but its meaning has been ironically reversed.”4 The irony 
of the poem is given by the contrast between the past, the girl’s apparent 
‘insulation’ against ‘the touch of earthly years’ actually still affecting her life, 
and the present being dead when she really becomes insensible – that is to say, 
all the time she is subjected to (earthly) time. While in her life she seemed 
unchangeable and immortal, now with her death she truly becomes immortal: as 
a lifeless thing she is a(n embedded) part of eternal nature or natural eternity.  
In “The Rhetoric of Temporality” de Man refers to the allegorical as the 
“overcoming of irony” and tries to give examples of the non-ironic “pure 
poetry.”5 About the selected poem he states that “[it] clearly is not ironic, either 
in its tonality or in its meaning.”6 Paying attention to the temporal structure, he 
finds a contrast between the past stage of consciousness, the stage of the 
mistaken ‘slumber’ expressed in the first four lines and the present state, the now 
in the last four lines describing the speaker’s recovery from his past error. The 
change in time grammatically shown by verbs in past and present tenses refers to 
the alteration in the speaker’s mind as well as to the (quite radical) change in the 
beloved’s life. In the first stanza the girl ‘seemed’ like something that could not 
show the changes of time, ‘now’ she is dead. De Man calls the attention to the 
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absent as from the soul of the Sage’?” (de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in BI, 223). 
6 Ibid. 
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word, ‘thing,’ that can be a playful hint at the lady’s youthful charms so that in 
the second stanza it is to become a deadly true ‘thing’:  
She now has become a thing in the full sense of the word, […] 
and, indeed, she exists beyond the touch of earthly years. But the 
light-hearted compliment has turned into a grim awareness of 
the de-mystifying power of death, which makes all the past 
appear as a flight into the inauthenticity of a forgetting.7  
Though it could be ironic – and Brooks has found it ironic in a similar way –, de 
Man refuses this possibility despite the fact that he himself refers to that 
“ominous” ‘seemed’ preceding the thing in the first stanza. In de Man’s reading, 
the realisation of death makes the lover wise and he painfully has to admit that 
“things [seem] as they actually are.”8 As opposed to its Brooksian ironic reading 
the allegorical de Manian shows the temporal scheme of error-death-recognition-
wisdom, in which the ironic moment can be built.  
In his reading of the poem de Man also questions “whether Wordsworth 
could have written in the same manner about his own death … [being] one of the 
few poets who can write proleptically about their own death and speak, as it 
were, from beyond their own graves.”9 The first two, introductory, lines make it 
obvious that from the very beginning the speaker’s consciousness and his (initial 
or original) unconsciousness are in the centre; to be precise, the focus is on the 
speaker’s confrontation with death, time and its/his passing. Wordsworth’s keen 
interest in the problem of the voice-from-beyond-the-grave constitutes the central 
theme in his prose work, Essays upon Epitaphs. These texts are inspired by the 
poet’s personal belief in immortality as it is needed to annihilate or neutralise the 
fear of death- (his voice-from-beyond-the-grave says):  
I confess, with me the conviction is absolute, that if the 
impression and sense of Death were not thus counterbalanced, 
such a hollowness would pervade the whole system of things, 
such a want of correspondence and consistency, a disproportion 
so astounding betwixt means and ends, that there could be no 
repose, no joy.10  
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According to Wordsworth, the belief in the immortality of the soul naturally 
belongs to a human being and also leads to the respect of the ‘corporeal frame of 
Man’ being the soul’s ‘habitation’. Therefore, he considers it important to 
protect the bodily remains of the deceased by erecting sepulchral monuments, 
preferably in nature, and likewise to preserve their memory by writing 
commemorative epitaphs “that it should speak, in […] the general language of 
humanity as connected with the subject of Death – the source from which an 
Epitaph proceeds; of death and of life.”11 
As it is expressed in the poet’s argument, the blending of the gravestone into 
a natural landscape together with the lifelike death-language of its inscription are 
supposed to strengthen the connection between death and life. In his 
“Autobiography As De-Facement” de Man analyses Wordsworth’s essays 
stating that here “one moves, without compromise, from death or life to life and 
death.”12 I would say that it is more accurate to make a slight alteration, stating 
that it is about death and life: as if reading the commemorating text of the 
deceased, the mortal-survivors were thinking back from death to life. Above all 
Wordsworth also suggests that the simple language of the epitaph should not 
personify the dead, i.e. the departed should not be allowed to speak from his own 
tombstone, instead it must be about the survivors’ memory. However, he accepts 
that the voice coming from beyond the grave and “[its] shadowy interposition 
also harmoniously unites the two worlds of the Living and the Dead […].”13  
So why this palinodic remark? According to de Man, the cause of the 
confusion in the text is that Wordsworth himself realises the danger of the 
fictitious voice-from-beyond-the-grave – to use a de Manian term, prosopopeia 
(prosopon poein). This rhetorical figure is used to to give figuration or 
disfiguration of a mask or a face and means the tropological centre (spectrum) to 
de Man in the understanding of autobiographical texts, memory and writing. 
Here de Man interprets Wordsworth’s writing (and also the author’s 
autobiography) as an epitaph and with its prosopopeia it becomes possible for 
the inscription to speak to us: in Wordsworth’s essay the text of the (speaking) 
gravestone is read by the (watching) sun. And what is so dangerous in it? In de 
Man’s reading while the dead are given face and voice, the living have their 
smile – and words – frozen on their lips: 
[...] by making the death speak, the symmetrical structure of the 
trope implies, by the same token, that the living are stuck dumb, 
frozen in their own death. The surmise of the ‘Pause, Traveller!’ 
thus acquires a sinister connotation that is not only the 
                                                     
11 Wordsworth, Essays Upon Epitaphs, in The Prose Works. Volume II, 612. 
12 de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, 74. Abbreviated as RR. 
13 Wordsworth, Essays Upon Epitaphs, in The Prose Works. Volume II, 616 . 
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prefiguration of one’s own mortality but our actual entry into the 
frozen world of the dead. 14 
It is time to return to Wordsworth’s spirit sealing slumber, which can now be 
interpreted using the key ideas of the previous readings, that is to say, playing 
with the (problematic) allegories of ‘the thing,’ ‘(earthly) time,’ death and the 
epitaph. If the first line is given proper attention, in the initial slumber besides 
the lover’s daze – that Hartman calls “ecstatic consciousness”15 – death is also 
proleptically evoked though in a hallucinatory, dozing way. Since in the essays 
Wordsworth displays his belief in the soul’s life after death, the ‘seal,’ (the seal 
of the spirit) can refer to the body and the ecstatic death-forgetting caused by 
bodily pleasures. Accordingly, the ‘thing’ can be understood as the girl’s body 
(or in Hartman’s reading: her hymen) being the object of male desire; what’s 
more, before her death she only exists as a thing and actually not much is said 
about her spirit.16 In his “Grammar and Rhetoric in Wordsworth’s ‘A slumber 
did my spirit seal’: Heidegger, de Man, Deconstruction”, John Baker interprets 
the word, thing, reading Heidegger’s “Das Ding,” where the beloved’s presence 
is taken as a gift, thus, in the self-delusive amorous daze “the speaker […] 
forgets not only her mortality, he forgets his own as well.”17  
But in the poem this strange ‘thing’ is capable of changing as it is revealed in 
the verb ‘seemed,’ and in my reading I find its temporality more emphatic. In 
accordance with Baker (but only to some extent, as reading the poem he 
concentrates more on the poem’s grammar than its rhetoric) and getting closer to 
the Brooksian irony, I do not think there is such a big gap between the then of 
the first and the now of the second stanza, as de Man claims. In the analysis of 
the allegorical structure of the poem, it is necessary to emphasise the distance 
between past and present, but if the line, ‘she seemed a thing,’ and the present 
‘now’ are studied more thoroughly, then its allegory can also be understood on 
another level. The verb, ‘seemed,’ can have positive or negative connotations 
                                                     
14 de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in RR, 78. And later in Derrida’s lectures dedicated 
to his friend’s memory, in his Memoires for Paul de Man, the quoted study of prosopopeia 
itself also becomes a prosopepeia: de Man’s own epitaph. See the chapter titled “The Ironical 
Allegory of Remembrance and Oblivion (In Memory of Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida)” in 
the book. 
15 Geoffrey H. Hartman, The Unremarkable Wordsworth (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1987), 27. 
16 Similarly to Hartman’s reading, Joseph Hillis Miller in his analysis of the poem also pays 
attention to the opposition sealed vs. unsealed, giving a highly sexual reading of Lucy’s ‘thing’ 
and showing “death as penetrator” (Theory Now and Then, 181-2).  
17 John Baker, “Grammar and Rhetoric in Wordsworth’s ‘A slumber did my spirit seal’: Heideg-
ger, de Man, Deconstruction,” in Studies in Romanticism, 1997/1: 103-123. Baker quotes the 
section from Heidegger’s treatise when Meister Eckhart adopts a saying from Dionysius the 
Areopagite, namely: “love is of such a nature that it changes man into the things he loves” (Ba-
ker 113). In fact, the ‘thing’ in the poem can be an ironic reading of Heidegger’s “Das Ding”.  
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concerning the quality of a thing, and in the second stanza it becomes obvious 
that she (Lucy) is not who/what she looks like; that is, she is not like she seemed 
to be. With this verb the girl becomes an allegory that stands for her own entity, 
which is confirmed looking back from the ‘now’ of the second stanza. 
Nevertheless, this ‘now’ in the present is only momentary: in the speaker’s 
recollection the allegorical image of the beloved flashes but together with the 
loss, the shadow of (her) death. Baker cites Heidegger about the authenticity of 
the moment in human existence stating that the Augenblick (moment of vision) 
of the poem gives “the temporalizing of time” which is death itself.18 And with 
death, Derrida says “it is the moment when there is no longer any choice – could 
we even think of any other – except that between memory and hallucination.”19  
Susan Eilenberg considers the poem – together with other mourning 
Wordsworth-poems – a bad and “abortive elegy” because instead of the pain-
soothing pathos of the elegy (and also its normal work of mourning) it shows the 
impossibility of detachment from death; as a result in its (poetic and figurative) 
language, the loss makes the deceased a ghost and the poet a living dead. The 
girl “allegorizes the problems of allegory”: as an unnamed phantom she lives in 
the figures of speech and in the rhetorical tropes, while nomination can kill her. 
Accordingly, this ‘she’ can be read as the allegory of poetic language and 
imagination, which can be made lifeless by paraphrasing and translating. The ‘she’ 
of the speaking ‘I’ dis-plays the paradoxical nature of the (romantic) poetic self-
consciousness/awareness showing the split of the poetic and the linguistic ‘I’: 
The ambiguities of Lucy’s otherness engender anxieties about 
the poet’s identity: she symbolizes both his integrity and his 
division, his comforting wholeness and his possible 
fragmentation. Her existence both confirms and undermines 
what it doubles, hence the effect of simultaneous splitting and 
convergence.20 
In this way, the poem can be read as the deconstruction of romantic 
allegorical elements: on the one hand, the deconstruction of the unnamed ‘she’ 
and the speaker’s figurative ‘I’; on the other hand, that of the belief in 
immortality. Deprivation and negation prevail in the text. For example, the 
                                                     
18 Baker, “Grammar and Rhetoric in Wordsworth’s ‘A slumber did my spirit seal’,”109. 
19 Derrida, Memoires, 28. 
20 Susan Eilenberg, “The Haunted Language of the Lucy Poems,” in Strange Power of Speech 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1992), 133. Similarly, using Walter Benjamin’s idea on the 
temporality of allegory – “allegory goes away empty [‘Leer aus geht die Allegorie’]” – Baker 
says that in the second stanza the process of “the hollowing out of the loved one’s seeming” 
happens, and this process works as “the agency of death within allegory” (Baker, “Grammar 
and Rhetoric in Wordsworth’s ‘A slumber did my spirit seal’,” 112).  
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negative particle appears five times in different forms – as if the poem justified 
the fear expressed in Wordsworth’s essays, namely: what if there is no thing 
after death, what if there is only nothing after death?  
De Man in “Time and History in Wordsworth” says that “the relationship 
with time is, however, always a negative one for us, for the relationship between 
the self and time is necessarily mediated by death; it is the experience of 
mortality that awakens within us a consciousness of time (that is more than 
merely natural).”21 And now, reading the poem, de Man asserts that “the ‘now’ 
of the poem is not [and cannot be É.A.] an actual now, which is that of the 
moment of death, lies hidden in the blank space between the two stanzas”22 – 
and the moment of remembrance calls it into life. In the poem the hollowing out 
of allegory is done by irony as the agent of death – day by day, from minute to 
minute; while immortality is only referred to in the second stanza by the eternal 
revolving of the globe, which is already ironic in Brooks’s reading. Thus the 
poem’s irony connects the moments of the speaker’s remembering in the 
eternally cyclic course of time. The ‘deadly’ moments of memory roll together 
with the earth and the girl’s dead body, so as to, from time to time, return in the 
speaker’s thought “insofar as he cannot exempt himself from the instantaneous 
relapse that is the temporal feature of irony.”23 Repetition – taken in the 
Kierkegaardian sense of the term as “recollection forward” – is impossible; more 
exactly, to cite Constantin Constantinus “the only thing that is repeated, can 
happen is the impossibility of repetition.”24 Only ‘recollection backwards (or 
negatively)’ of the deceased, that is the negation of repetition, is made possible 
as if it were the irony of Kierkegaard’s concept on repetition. 
Although even Brooks pays attention to the nature of the earth’s whirl shown 
as a meaningless motion that “mechanically repeats itself,” he does not 
emphasise its adjective, ‘diurnal’.25 Being a cold, scientific and technical term 
meaning of ‘daily’ and used in relation to the movement of the orbits, the word 
creates a clear connection between the discourse of human time and cosmic 
time,26 between the limited linearity of man’s life and the eternal cycles of 
nature. However, besides this repetition of daily movement four other words are 
                                                     
21 de Man, “Time and History in Wordsworth,” Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism, 93. 
Abbrev. as RCC. 
22 de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in BI, 225. 
23 Baker, “Grammar and Rhetoric in Wordsworth’s ‘A slumber did my spirit seal’,” 108. 
24 Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition, in Kierkegaard’s Writings, trans. by H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton UP), III/173. He also claims here: “Repetition and recollection are the 
same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated 
backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward” (ibid). 
25 Brooks, “Irony as a Principle of Structure,” in Critical Theory since Plato, 1046. 
26 Michael Riffaterre quotes Norman E. Holland’s statements on the word in “Undecidability as 
Hermeneutic Constraint,” in Literary Theory Today, ed. by Collier and H. Geyer-Ryan (NY: 
Cornell UP, 1990, 109-124), 119.  
98 
hidden in diurnal: ‘die,’ ‘eye’/’I’ and ‘urn,’ as if in the speaker’s imagination – 
in the twinkling of an eye – the whole globe has become the “funeral vessel” 
(Holland) of the beloved. It is also worth mentioning that the line of the poem 
where the word ‘diurnal’ appears is full of the trilling ‘r’ sound expressing the 
dynamism of the earth’s revolving and also its whirl imposed upon both the dead 
and the living. The rotation of the earth-urn with its iteration measures time in 
human life and the thing, the girl’s body, is finally and definitely “touched by 
and held by earthly time in its most powerful and horrible image.”27 In the poem 
the things in the world that are ‘rolled round’ together with ‘she’ and ‘I’ in the 
con-text of earthly time allegorise death and nothingness. The dizziness caused 
by the earth’s rolling (and ‘suspension’28) implies its rhetorical vertigo (vertige), 
which now seems to whirl my reading along. Now the poem is an (ironic) 
epitaph on the (t)urn of the poetic ‘she’/’I’ and the readers. Hence we are to 
revolve together with the lifeless things and the dead beloved in the negative 
moments of recollection.  
The momentary insight shown in Wordsworth’s poem is to be repeated, or 
should I say recollected again and again. Its rhetoric of temporality does not 
display linearity; instead, a vortex can be envisaged, as the vortex is usually 
associated with the textual (parabasis-like) appearances of irony. De Man 
describes the rhetoric phenomenon (I prefer calling irony a rhetoric phenomenon 
or the trope of tropes): “it relates to its source only in terms of distance and 
difference and allows for no end, for no totality […] it dissolves in the narrowing 
spiral […] that becomes more and more remote from its meaning, and it can find 
no escape from this spiral.”29 But in itself irony cannot operate, it needs the 
allegorical efforts: Lethe cannot exist and work without Mnemosyne. If we 
accept de Man’s statement, namely that “the structure of irony is the reversed 
mirror-image of allegory”,30 then we should admit their chiastic relationship. 
Their relationship “could be unfolded in the form of an infinite number of 
chiasm” due to the endless transformation irony together with allegory can 
produce.31 One can remember the ‘endless series of mirrors’ described in 
Friedrich Schlegel’s 116th Athenaeum-fragment, or evoke the image of Walter 
Benjamin’s mirroring mirrors.32 We can take the opening up of the perspective 
                                                     
27 Brooks, “Irony as a Principle of Structure,” in Critical Theory since Plato, 1046. 
28 According to de Man, in Wordsworth’s poetry the frequent usage of the word ‘hanging, hung’ 
referring to the earth’s instability evokes the feeling of dizziness. See in “Time and History in 
Wordsworth,” in RCC, 79.  
29 de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in BI, 222. 
30 de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in BI, 225.  
31 Jacob Bøggild, “An Inquiry into a Couple of Examples in Kierkegaard and Paul de Man,” in 
Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook 1997, ed. by N. J. Cappelörn and H. Deuser (Berlin – NY: Wal-
ter de Gruyter, 1997, 253-269), 267.  
32 See more about the mirroring mirrors in my paper “The Ironical Allegory of Remembrance and 
Oblivion”.  
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into infinity either as a trick of rhetoric or the sign of true love (faith), in the end 
the irony of prosopopeia shows a face, a reflection in a mirror that is faced by 
death – perhaps.33  
                                                     
33 M. C. Escher has a drawing, Eye, showing a human eye with a skull in its pupil; that is – as 
Escher himself comments on it – “with the reflection of the (One) Thing waiting for all”. See in 
M. C. Escher, Grafikák és rajzok (Köln: Benedikt Taschen, 1992), 13. In the conclusion of my 
paper I refer to the (de Manian) irony of the Kierkegaardian concept of irony: without the belief 
in (true, transcendental) repetition we can only get the ironic-rhetorical moments of 
recollection.  
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“LABOUR OF LOVE” – OVIDIAN FLOWER-FIGURES IN WILLIAM 
BLAKE’S SONGS 
Dixit et ignotas animum dimittit  
in artes naturamque novat. 
(Met. 8.188-9) 
 
To create a little flower is the labour of ages. 
(A Proverb of Hell in MHH) 
 
 
In de Man’s and Miller’s writings we can often meet references to Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses as they both see that the Ovidian work presents the 
anthropomorphic process of prosopopoetic naming in its narratives. However, 
while de Man thinks that in the stories “anthropomorphism freezes the infinite 
chain of tropological transformations […] into one single assertion,” Miller 
emphasises the power of “aberrant figurative language” exercised by the gods 
(via Ovid).1 Actually, in the literary allusions to Metamorphoses, we can see ‘the 
allegorisation of linguistic power’ revealed by the Ovidian (not only 
deconstructive) readers. In her collection of essays, The Metamorphosis of Ovid, 
Sarah Annes Brown, tracing the so-called ‘Ovidian’ line in English works, 
discusses the different levels of Ovidianism emphasising that such a research is 
definitely fruitful:  
Identifying a relationship between two poets, pinpointing verbal 
echoes or the provenance of a plot motif, does not necessarily 
enhance our appreciation of a text, or affect the way we interpret 
it. We have to perceive a dynamic interplay of some kind 
between the two works if source hunting is to become an 
interpretative tool not just a footnote opportunity. […] So an 
understanding of the way one text lies behind another text (or 
image) may radically alter our perception of that later text, 
offering new interpretative possibilities.2  
                                                     
1 de Man, “Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New 
York: Columbia UP, 1984, 239-262), 241 and Miller, Versions of Pygmalion, 5. 
2 Sarah Annes Brown, The Metamorphosis of Ovid (New York: St. Martin Press, 1999), 14-16. 
Italics are mine. É.A. It can happen that Metamorphoses transforms our reading of Blake. 
Actually, Brown’s ideas echo Charles Martindale’s on hermeneutics quoting T. S. Eliot’s 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent” ("Introduction” in Ovid Renewed, ed. by Charles 
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Echoing Brown’s ideas, in the present paper I intend to map connections 
between Ovid’s Metamorphoses and William Blake’s Songs, concentrating on 
their transformed anthropomorphic flower-figures. I will analyse the Ovidian 
reminiscences in the Blakean “unmediated visions,” reflecting on “the inherent 
tension that resides in the metaphorical language” of the mythological stories 
and the lyrics.3 
William Blake (1757-1827), being the one of the forerunners of the 
Romantics, started to write poems in the last fading decades of the Augustan 
period of neoclassicism. In fact, he was less influenced by the greatest satirists’ – 
Pope’s, Swift’s, Gay’s, and Dr Johnson’s – works than by the new trends of 
nature, Graveyard and Gothic poetry. Moreover, in his works, the classical 
English and ancient sources and readings were re-contextualised by his greatest 
inspiration, the Bible. Apostrophising the Bible as the Great Code of Art, “he 
warmly declared that all knew was in the Bible.”4 Although Blake knew and 
read the great classics of literature, he displayed an ambiguous relationship to 
the dominant neoclassical trend of his own age, namely, the imitation of the 
style, patterns and forms of the classical Greek and Roman literary works. On 
the one hand, in several of his writings, the deeply Christian poet ardently 
attacks neoclassicism and the copying of the great classical authors. In “Preface” 
written to Milton, he claims that “we do not want either Greek or Roman Models 
if we are but just & true to our own Imaginations.” Here he also names the 
‘spiritless’ ancient authors: “[t]he Stolen and Perverted Writings of Homer & 
Ovid, of Plato & Cicero, which all Men ought to contemn, are set up by artifice 
against the Sublime of the Bible.”5 According to S. Foster Damon, Blake 
thought that the original source of the Greek and Latin accounts of the Creation 
and the Flood could only be in the Bible, therefore the classical writers not only 
‘robbed’ the text, contextualising it in Greek or Roman culture, but also deprived 
it from its spiritual sublimity.6 Writing about Virgil’s poetry (“On Virgil”), 
Blake also expresses that the ancient cultures seemed to support and foster arts 
                                                                                                                                   
Martindale, Cambridge and New York: CUP, 1989, 2). In her work she tries to show the 
indebtedness of English literature to the classical work. Here we can find an impressive list of 
English authors starting from the greatest ones, such as Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Mil-
ton through Marvell, Keats, and Beddoes to Browning, Joyce, and Woolf. 
3 Paul de Man, “Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, 7. 
In my text on the flower-figures, I was greatly inspired not only by the proximity to ‘divine 
nature’ expressed in the Greek stories and Blake’s works, but also by de Man’s writings on the 
‘nature’ of the rhetorical tropes in romantic poetry.  
4 Henry Crabb Robinson, one of Blake’s friends, recorded this statement in his diary. Quoted in 
Leslie Tannenbaum, Biblical Tradition in Blake’s Early Prophecies: The Great Code of Art 
(Princeton: PUP, 1982), 3. 
5 William Blake, Complete Writings, ed. by Geoffrey Keynes (London: OUP, 1969, repr. 1976), 
480. Subsequently referred to as Blake.  
6 S. Foster Damon, A Blake Dictionary. The Ideas and Symbols of William Blake (rev. edn., 
Hanover and London: UP of New England, 1988), 313.  
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and sciences, however, being a “War-like State,” they were destroyers rather 
than producers (Blake 778). 
On the other hand, in his poetic works (and also in his paintings) Blake the 
visionary frequently alludes to the fantastic stories of Greek and Roman 
mythology. In A Vision of the Last Judgment, he says:  
Vision or imagination is a Representation of what Eternally 
Exists, Really & Unchangeably. Fable or Allegory is Form’d by 
the daughters of Memory. Imagination is surrounded by the 
daughters of Inspiration, […] Let it here be Noted that the Greek 
Fables originated in Spiritual Mystery & Real Visions, which 
are lost & clouded in Fable & Allegory, […]The Nature of my 
Work is Visionary or Imaginative ; it is an Endeavour to Restore 
what the Ancients call’d the Golden Age. (Blake 605.) 
While Blake attacks the simple work of memory and imitation, he defends the 
original power of Greek imagination, which is related to the only true source of 
inspiration, and finds its expression in the visionary transformations.  
For Blake, the storehouse of these sublime though pagan visions was Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, which he probably read in Sandys’ translation in the early 
1780s then in the original in 1800s, and he was fascinated by the imaginative 
figurality of Ovid’s work. It is recorded in Bentley’s Blake Records that the poet 
was very fond of Ovid and in his youth, besides Shakespeare’s works, his 
favourite readings were Ovid’s writings.7 Furthermore, above his desk, next to 
Dürer’s Melancholy, there was a painting about an Ovidian figure as it is 
recorded in Gilchrist’s biography:  
Samuel Palmer, in a letter to Gilchrist of 23 August 1855, wrote 
that Blake delighted in Ovid, and, as a labour of Love, had 
executed a finished picture from the Metamorphoses, after 
Giulio Romano. This design hung in his room, and close by his 
engraving table, Albert Dürer’s Melancholy the Mother of 
Invention, […]. 8 
Giulio Romano (1492-1546), the Italian mannerist painter and Raphael’s pupil, 
was rather famous for his highly sexual works, such as the scandalous drawings, 
I modi: Positions illustrating Aretino’s erotic sonnets. Although the importance 
of sexuality is also emphasised in Blake’s works, a stronger connection between 
their oeuvre should be revealed, namely that Romano, like Blake, dedicated 
                                                     
7 G. E. Bentley, Blake Records (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 428 and 527.  
8 Quoted in Bentley, Blake Records, 565. n. 3. See also Alexander Gilchrist’s Life of William Blake 
Pictor Ignotus, ed. by Richard Holmes (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), 324. 
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several of his works to Greek mythological love-stories. As Janet Cox-Rearick 
comments, the eroticism of the earlier drawings also pervades Romano’s later 
Mantuan paintings and frescoes in Palazzo Te, when the “greatest inspiration 
[…] was Ovid’s Metamorphoses, specifically the stories of the amorous 
adventures of the gods (particularly Jupiter), known as the Loves of the Gods.”9  
Thus, it can be imagined that the painting above Blake’s desk, showing an 
Ovidian episode designed in Romano’s style, might show a passionate love 
scene of Metamorphoses emphasising virility. Nevertheless, if we consider the 
title of the other picture, Melancholy, and the placing of these two together, we 
should assume that a more spiritual drawing hung in Blake’s working-room, 
which was related to the idea of human transformation as it had a central role in 
his way of thinking.10 In his Songs of Innocence and Experience (1789-1794) 
Blake tries to show “the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul” relying on the 
Biblical description of the alterations, or rather transformations, in human 
conditions before and after the Fall (Blake, 210). However, embedded in his 
Christian universe, we can find several references to Ovid’s mythical 
transformations – mainly, in his flower-poems.  
In Ovid’s Metamorphoses we come across lots of references to flowers: the 
word itself, either in singular or plural, appears more than 40 times in the 15 
books. In several cases flowers are taken as natural beauties, which the “the soft 
breeze of tender zephyrs wafted and caressed” (Met. 1:108), or, as springtime 
flowers “bloomed” in the pastoral landscape (Met. 2.27; 7.284; 15.204).11 In 
other passages flowers are used as decorations in garlands (Met. 10.123; 13.928) 
and at commemorating feasts (e.g. Met. 9.87; 15.688). In the text, besides their 
natural and occasional usage, flowers are taken metaphorically as flowers of 
                                                     
9 Janet Cox-Rearick (ed.), Giulio Romano – Master Designer (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1999), 76. In the Camera di Ovidio The Rape of Europe is accompanied by the depictions 
of the rape of Proserpina by Pluto and of Amymone by Neptune. The expressive drawings 
illustrate the Ovidian episodes when Jupiter transformed himself into different animal guises in 
order to seduce the chosen mortal maidens. While the above mentioned works are very erotic, in 
the pornographic Jupiter and Olympias the God disguised as a half-serpent, half-eagle beast is 
just about to rape the woman, which is indicated by his erection (Cox-Rearick, Giulio Romano, 
84-85). 
10 Although I have already started to do some research on the relationship between Romano and 
Blake (via Ovid) and I have some results concerning the topic of the lost drawing, I do not 
intend to publish my speculation about it in this paper.  
11 The Metamorphoses of Ovid, trans. by Allen Mandelbaum (New York and London: Harcourt, Inc., 
1993). Subsequently abbreviated to Met. Besides the Latin text, I read and used different English 
translations of Ovid’s Metamorphoses: Mary M. Innes popular prose translation (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, The Penguin Classics, 1955, repr. 1961), the seventeenth-century verse translation 
made by Sandys (1626) and the eighteenth-century version published by Garth (1717) as Blake 
was supposed to read the former one (<http://etext.virginia.edu/latin/ovid/sandys>; 
<http.//classics.mit.edu/ovid/metam.html> (20.05.2006)). In the paper, the direct quotations are 
from Mandelbaum’s poetic translation while the numbering of the lines follows the original Latin 
text.  
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rhetoric, referring to someone’s youth (Met. 7.216 and 9.436), beauty and 
virginity (e.g. Met. 10.85 and 14.764). In addition to general references, several 
flower-types appear; most frequently violets, lilies, and roses. These flowers are 
associated with specific colours – white, crimson, purple, and yellow – and their 
colours can fade, mingle, or change. Moreover, tragic stories are started with the 
heroine’s picking of flowers, usually lilies and violets. We can consider 
Europa’s garlands, with which she decorated the white bull’s horns (Met. 2.867-
8); Proserpina’s favourite flowery meadow where she is ravished (Met. 5.390-
401); Salmacis’ flower gathering by her pool before her passionate attack on 
Hermaphroditus (Met. 4.315), or Dryope’s unfortunate lotus-plucking (Met. 
9.340-5). On the whole, to quote Charles Paul Segal’s statement, in the Ovidian 
landscape flowers “are traditionally associated with virginal purity and also with 
its vulnerability […] the flower-motif reflects the loss of innocence.”12 To 
expand on these general remarks, I will concentrate on the Ovidian episodes of 
miraculous transformations where a flower-type is put in the centre. In 
Metamorphoses these are the lily, the rose, the narcissus, the lotus, the hyacinth, 
and the heliotrope in the episodes of Proserpina, Adonis, Narcissus, Dryope (and 
Lotis), Hyacinthus (and Aiax), and Clytie, respectively.  
Similarly, in Blake’s textual and visual works, flowers also gain importance. 
His Flowers, dignified with a capital, are shown as individuals and Blake is 
concerned “with the hidden causes of [their] wondrous achievements.”13 In his 
Songs, as with the settings of Ovid’s work, the flower-figures are placed in 
pastoral landscapes recalling the Eden like world of innocence.14 In the very first 
poem titled “Introduction,” it is revealed that these Songs are requested by an 
angelic child, who wants every child to understand the poems: “And I wrote my 
happy songs / Every child may joy to hear” (Blake, 111). In Songs of Innocence 
we cannot read about specific and special flowers, only happy blossoms and 
joyful buds (e.g. in “The Blossom” and “Night”). In the poems, blossoms and 
buds, being the signs of spring, are also taken metaphorically: in “The School 
Boy” the dreary classes threaten the boy depriving him of his “youthful spring” 
“if buds are nip’d / And blossoms blown away” (Blake, 124). Although the 
                                                     
12 Charles Paul Segal, Landscape in Ovid’s Metamorphoses – A Study in the Transformations of a 
Literary Symbol (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1969), 33-4.  
13 Michael J. Tolley, “Blake’s Songs of Spring,” in William Blake. Essays in Honour of Sir 
Geoffrey Keynes, ed. by Morton D. Paley and Michael Phillips (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973, 
96-128), 125. 
14 We can meet the atmosphere of the sensual Ovidian pastoral, not only in Blake’s Songs, but also 
in his prophecies, for instance, in the introduction of Europe, A Prophecy, a Fairy sitting on a 
tulip promises a book written on petals of eternal flowers (Blake, 237). It is also worth 
mentioning that the description of the vales of Har in The Book of Thel, of Beulah in Milton and 
Jerusalem, or, of the highly seductive landscapes in Vala, or the Four Zoas. In order to find and 
analyse the connections of these works and Metamorphoses it would require me to write a 
further paper. 
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vernal and peaceful atmosphere recalls the Ovidian, in Metamorphoses the 
pastoral landscape evokes desire and heightens the dangers innocent maidens 
have to face in the “sensual paradise.”15 In Blake’s Songs the happy spring days 
are associated with childhood and the innocence man had before the Fall in the 
Garden. In the ironically innocent “Holy Thursday,” the phrase “flowers of 
London town” refers to the colourfully dressed children marching from their 
Charity Schools to the St. Paul’s Cathedral, which, even in an ironic context, can 
express the naïvety and purity of the cheerful poor children (Blake, 122). In 
contrast, in Songs of Experience the tragic stories of individual flower-figures 
are told. That is to say that Blake’s two series display the complexity of the 
Ovidian flower-symbolism: the flowering and de-flowering of innocence. The 
loss of innocence here is contextualised in love relationships since in Songs of 
Experience the individual flowers represent different aspects of love.16  
In Blake’s ‘flowery’ imagination, the symbolically over-burdened lilies and 
roses are put in the centre. In his Dictionary Damon several times remarks about 
Blake’s late prophecies that the rose, the traditional symbol of love, is associated 
with the lily, which is regarded as the ideal state for man.17 Before his Songs in 
one of his juvenilia titled “How sweet I roam’d,” a story of seduction is told and 
the two flowers appear together:  
 
He shew’d me lilies for my hair,  
And blushing roses for my brow;  
He led me through his garden fair,  
Where all his golden pleasures grow. (Blake 6)  
 
The female winged creature in the poem is trapped and imprisoned by “the 
prince of love” in “his golden cage” (Ibid). The poem recalls the suffering and 
escaping Ovidian heroines and reminds us that while the rose, especially the red 
rose, is regarded as the traditional symbol of passion, in Greek culture the lilies 
are related to death. Besides the pagan symbolism of the flowers, we cannot 
forget about their Christian iconography, where the red rose either stands for 
Mary’s, or Christ’s suffering, and the white lily refers to the Blessed Virgin’s 
angelic purity. In his Songs of Experience Blake relies on the rich symbolism of 
the rose and the lily in order to find his central flower-figure in the ‘spiritual’ 
sunflower.  
                                                     
15 Segal, Landscape in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 9. In his work Segal emphasises the sexual 
symbolism of the Ovidian landscape, analysing the motifs of caves, water and flowers in 
Metamorphoses.  
16 John E. Grant, “Two Flowers in the Garden of Experience,” in William Blake – Essays for S. 
Foster Damon, ed. by Alvin H. Rosenfeld (Providence: Brown University Press, 1969, 333-
367), 334.  
17 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, 240 and 351.  
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In one of his rose-poems, “The SICK ROSE,” a red coloured flower-figure is 
suffering – according to the speaker. The beautiful rose-like maiden’s love is 
corrupted by an invisible winged creature who “[h]as found out thy bed / Of 
crimson joy: / And his dark secret love / Does thy life destroy” (Blake, 213). The 
voice describing her misery seems to speculate about the rose’s sickness, which 
may be caused by her desire, one-sided love, or pregnancy. The poem titled 
“The Angel” can be read as the explanation of the previous poem, where the 
“maiden Queen” is speaking about her secret angel-like lover. Searching for the 
roots of the imagery used in the poems, we are likely to think of Venus and 
Adonis’ tragic love-story. Venus accidentally, but fatefully, falls in love with 
Adonis, Myrrha’s son, and when the hunting boy is killed by a boar she creates 
the red anemone from his immortalised blood-drops18:  
 
[…]she sprinkled scented nectar on 
his blood, which then fermented, even as 
bright bubbles from when raindrops fall on mud. 
One hour had yet to pass when, from that gore,  
 
A bloodred flower sprang, […] 
And yet Adonis’ blossoms have brief life: 
His flower is light and delicate; […] 
Anemone – ‘born of the wind’ – because 
Winds shake its fragile petals, and they fall. (Met. 10.731-39)  
 
The anemone, also referred to as ‘the short-lived lily,’ is “an enduring reminder 
of the fate of the short-lived Adonis.”19 Nevertheless, we should admit that 
Venus cannot be referred to as ‘the maiden Queen’ and the delicate anemone (cf. 
Greek anemonos as ‘wind’) hardly resembles Blake’s superb red rose. The two 
poems more convincingly recall a story told in ‘another’ Metamorphoses known 
as The Golden Ass by Apuleius; namely, Psyche’s story. Psyche, the beautiful 
‘maiden Queen,’ is frequently visited at nights by her secret invisible husband, 
Amor, in a mysterious castle. Due to Psyche’s curiosity, the lover’s identity is 
revealed, and, as a consequence, the lovers lose each other. Following several 
trials and only after Psyche’s death, when Amor wakes her up with an 
immortalising kiss, can they be happy together.20  
                                                     
18 Although in this paper I do not intend to collect all of the Biblical references to flowers, I cannot 
help highlighting some of the – rather exciting – parallels and coincidences. For instance, in the 
Bible the anemone is frequently identified with the “lily of the fields” (e.g. Matthew 6:28-29), 
or, the “lily of the valleys” (e.g. Canticles 2:1-2, 16) standing for the transient beauty of human 
life.  
19 Hardie, Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion, 69. 
20 See more on it in Apuleius, The Golden Ass (trans. by Robert Graves, Penguin Books, 1950). 
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In contrast with the Ovidian and Apuleian love of gods, different aspects of 
human love are discussed in the other rose-poem titled “My pretty ROSE 
TREE,”. The poem is mostly read as a depiction of a married couple’s feelings 
toward each other. The man is tempted by a wonderful inspiring flower “such a 
flower as May never bore,” but, rejecting the offer, he remains faithful to his 
“rose tree” that reacts ungratefully to his ‘sacrifice’. Although the topical 
connection with Ovid’s work is obvious in ars amatoria, Blake’s poem 
discusses the moral issues of love, which Ovid neglects in Metamorphoses. In 
the flowery description of the “conflict between desire and duty, impulse and 
rules,”21 the possessive and selfish characteristics of human love are emphasised 
by the repetitive usage of the possessive pronoun ‘my’:  
 
Then I went to my Pretty Rose-tree,  
To tend her by day and by night;  
But my Rose turn’d away with jealousy,  
And her thorns were my only delight. (Blake 215. Italics are mine. É.A.)  
 
The man actually imprisons his partner who reacts accordingly to ownership 
with distrust. Moreover, the girl also has something torturous of her own: her 
‘thorns’.22 E. D. Hirsch asserts that the poem depicts “a double crime against the 
divine – the speaker’s for not following instinct, and the rose tree’s for not 
advocating.”23 On the whole, in the poem, selfish love recalls Ovidian 
reminiscences as well, when contextualised in the human world,.  
The rose-tree, like a rose bush, hints at the possibility of childbearing. In 
Metamorphoses the flower related to maternal love is the lotus in the Dryope-
episode. In fact, the lotus does not appear in Blake’s Songs, but it is mentioned 
in an early prophecy, The Book of Thel. In the prophecy, the main character, 
Thel, who lives in a luxurious pastoral of eternal spring, wants to know the 
meaning of life. In the valley of the river Adona, “the lotus of the water” flowers 
and later “the Lilly of the valley,” one of Thel’s alter-egos, is questioned in her 
self-quest. Here Dryope’s story is echoed as Thel’s troubles are caused by her 
innocence, i.e. her ignorance of sexuality and motherhood. In Metamorphoses, 
nursing her son, from the purple water-lotus “Dryope had plucked / some 
blossoms to delight her infant son” when “drops of blood […] dripped / down 
from the blossoms” and she was punished by being transformed into a lotus-tree 
                                                     
21 Grant, “Two Flowers in the Garden of Experience”, 336. 
22 The symbolism of thorns is rather complex: we can think of Christ’s suffering, or the thornless 
roses of Eden. In Greek mythology, the first red rose was said to appear on the earth when Ve-
nus, running to the wounded Adonis’ help, stepped into the thorns of a white rose and her blood 
coloured it. See more on it in Jean Chevalier and Alain Gheerbrant, Dictionary of Symbols, 
trans. by John Buchanan-Brown (Penguin Books, 1996), 813-15. 
23 E. D. Hirsch, Innocence and Experience: An Introduction to Blake (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1964), 253-254. 
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(Met. 9.342-5). Actually, Dryope’s tragedy is caused by her ignorance of other 
women’s suffering as the assaulted nymph Lotis’ transformed body is hidden in 
the lotus-flower. Besides her physical transformation, Dryope also experiences a 
mental one because in her last warning she asks her son not to pluck flowers, 
that is, she tries to defend innocent maidens from being deflowered. Although in 
Thel the motherlike figure is the Clod of Clay with her baby-worm, the 
appearance of the lotus, quite a rare flower in eighteenth-century poetry, calls 
the attention to the common lot of women: the loss of virginity and having 
children.  
In Thel the lily basically stands for innocence and in its illustration the flower 
is shown as a miniature version of Thel, the unborn spirit. Similarly to the 
prophecy, in the song, “THE LILLY,” the flower stands for sincere purity:  
 
The modest Rose puts forth a thorn,  
The humble Sheep a threat’ning horn ;  
While the Lilly white shall in Love delight,  
Nor a thorn, nor a threat, stain her beauty bright. (Blake 215)  
 
The lily here represents purity and not innocence as she is honestly capable of 
giving herself in love, which is not without sexual fulfilment. Consequently, 
together with its Christian and pagan connotations, the lily becomes the emblem 
of “the purity of gratified desire.”24 It is placed last on the floral plate because 
for Blake this flower represents the ideal love: Love that is described in the 
flower-imagery of another song, in the Song of Solomon. As in the Biblical song 
the female speaker confesses: “I am the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the 
valleys. As the lily among thorns, so is my love among the daughters” (Canticles 
2:1-2).25 In addition to its spiritual contents, the song is highly erotic and sexual, 
and its atmosphere echoes with the tone of the Blakean songs and the desire of 
the Ovidian heroines.  
However, the most complex poem displaying strong Ovidian influence, is the 
middle one of the three songs, “AH! SUN-FLOWER.” In this song several of the 
above mentioned amorous figures and their flowers are haunting: Clytie, 
Narcissus, Hyacinthus, Proserpina, and Venus. I agree with William J. Keith, 
who claims that “an Ovidian metamorphosis-theory lies at the very core of the 
poem.”26 To be more precise, we cannot speak about a theory, but rather a vision 
with flower-figures and images. The most obvious Ovidian episode is the one 
                                                     
24 Mary Lynn Johnson, “Emblem and Symbol in Blake,” Huntington Library Quarterly 37 
(1974):151-70), 169. 
25 The Holy Bible, King James Version (Glasgow: Collins’ Clear-Type Press, 1971).  
26 William J. Keith, “The Complexities of Blake’s ‘Sunflower’: An Archetypal Speculation,” in 
Blake — A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Northrop Frye (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1966, 56-64), 59. 
109 
related to the flower of heliotrope that gives the central figure of the poem. In 
Metamorphoses Clytie fatefully falls in love with the Sungod, Apollo, and in her 
maniacal longing she wastes away. After causing the death of Apollo’s other 
beloved, Leucothoe, in her jealous fixation, she keeps following the path of the 
sun in the sky day by day: 
 
And now the nymph begins to waste away: 
[…] she touched no food, no drink; her only fare 
was dew and tears; she never left that spot; 
and all she did was stare – she watched the god, 
keeping his face in view, his path across the sky.  
[…] and weirdly pale, she changed in part 
into a bloodless plant: another part 
was reddish; and just where her face had been, 
a flower, much like a violet, was seen. 
Though held by roots that grip, forever she  
Turns towards the Sun; she’s changed, and yet she keeps 
Her love intact. (Met. 4.259-70)27  
 
This way the sunflower becomes the emblem of desire and in the first stanza of 
Blake’s song it also symbolises longing though a more spiritual one. At the same 
time the second stanza hints at the transformed and transforming figures of 
Metamorphoses, who are destined to die and suffer in their tragic love:  
 
Ah, Sun-flower, weary of time,  
Who countest the steps of the Sun,  
Seeking after that sweet golden clime  
Where the traveller’s journey is done.  
 
Where the Youth pined away with desire, 
And the pale Virgin shrouded in snow 
Arise from their graves, and aspire  
Where my Sun-flower wishes to go. (Blake 215) 
                                                     
27 The flower Clytie is transformed into is not the sunflower, the golden yellow helianthus (viz. 
Helianthus annuus), but the violet-typed lilac-blue or purplish heliotrope, or marigold (viz. 
Heliotropium europaeum), whose leaves always turn towards the sun. As Keith also notes, “the 
sunflower derives its name from its appearance, not from any habit of turning its face toward 
the sun. […] In earlier centuries, however, a number of sun-like flowers were called 
heliotropes” (“The Complexities of Blake’s ‘Sunflower’,” 57). The English ‘sun-flower’ refers 
to the helianthus (‘sun flower,’ helios anthus) and not the heliotrope, yet the latter one is 
associated with the special movement of ‘sun turn,’ that is helios tropein. In Blake’s song, the 
above mentioned botanical differences are not thematised, though, with its golden yellow 
colour, the helianthus is visualised.  
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Where the colour-symbolism of the poem is concerned, the sun imagery of the 
first stanza is mainly characterised with golden yellow, while the second with 
white gives the images of death – ‘shrouded’ and ‘graves’. The dying youth and 
the corpse-like virgin as spirits seem to leave their graves longing for the ‘golden 
clime’. They can be taken as spirits but, I think, they are rather flower(figure)s 
growing on graves and watching the sun-path together with the heliotrope. 
Although in “THE LILLY” Blake relies on the Christian iconography of the 
flower (viz. it stands for purity and the Blessed Virgin), here he mainly uses its 
Greek connotations, namely, the lily – that is, the asphodelus – is associated 
with death and afterlife. The Greeks believed that there was a large meadow 
overgrown with asphodel in Hades (mentioned in Homer’s Odyssey, XI.539, XI. 
573 and XXIV.13). Furthermore, they planted white asphodels near tombs, 
regarding them as the form of food preferred by the dead. Actually, the flower 
itself belongs to the family of the liliaceae – together with the narcissus, the 
hyacinth (also named as martagon lily), and the anemone.28  
In the story of the virginal Narcissus, the prototype of ‘the Youth [who] pined 
away with desire’, the same type of flower (a lily) appears. He falls in love with 
his own beautiful reflection and in his stupefied (viz. the Greek narke as numb) 
gaze he becomes the emblem of selfish homoeroticism and unfulfilled desire in 
Metamorphoses:  
 
Yes, Yes, I’m he! I’ve seen through that deceit: 
My image cannot trick me anymore. 
I burn with love for my own self: it’s I 
Who light the flames – the flames that scorch me then. 
 
[…] 
If I could just split from my own body! 
The strangest longing in a lover: I 
want that which I desire to stand apart  
from my own self. (Met. 3. 463-70) 
 
Having realised that his beloved is his own self, he accepts his fate and his body 
mysteriously fades away: “They had prepared the pyre, the bier, the torches; / 
but nowhere could they find Narcissus’ body: / where it had been, they found 
instead a flower, / its yellow center circled by white petals” (Met. 3.507-10). The 
narcissus known today is yellow centred – like the daffodil29 – but they were 
                                                     
28 H. J. Rose, “The Children of Kronos II,” in A Handbook of Greek Mythology (New York: E. 
Dutton & Co., 1959), 78-101 and 88-90.  
29 The English name of the flower, daffodil, or affodil, is etymologically related to the Greek 
asphodelus because the original Greek word was taken into Latin as asphodilus which later was 
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originally lily-white, and Narcissus’ death coloured the heart of the flower 
commemorating his beauty. In accordance with this, Narcissus’ figure is only a 
shadow, a reflection and his disappearing body leaves a mark, a tint on an 
existent flower, the lily-typed asphodel.  
Similarly, in Hyacinth’s story, after Apollo’s beloved had died in an accident, 
his blood stained the earth leaving an imprint:  
 
[…] the blood that had 
been spilled upon the ground and stained the grass 
is blood no more; instead – more brilliant than 
the purple dye of Tyre – a flower sprang; 
though lily-shaped, it was not silver-white; 
this flower was purple. Then, not yet content, 
Phoebus […] inscribed upon the petals his lament: 
With his own hand, he wrote these letters – AI, 
AI – signs of sad outcry. (Met. 10.209-17)  
 
The newly sprung flower with its mourning sounds is recalled in another episode 
of Metamorphoses, when the great hero, Aiax kills himself. From his blood “a 
purple flower sprang, the very same / that had – long since – sprung up when 
Hyacinth / was wounded. On the petals one can read / these letters, ‘AI-AI,’ 
asking us to think / of Ajax’ name and Hyacinth’s lament” (Met. 13.394-8). 
Although the same flower is referred to, the latter heroic one is associated with 
the larkspur (Delphinium Ajacis), while the former flower of love with the 
hyacinth proper. Barkan remarks, “the flower to which he gives his name is a 
sign both of his immortality and […] his suffering is literally imprinted on the 
flower in the aiai (or ‘alas’) that shows on the petals.”30 The hyacinth speaks in 
the language of mourning and tragic love, while Ai-ax/Ai-as is remembered as a 
‘man of woe,’ and the fateful ‘Ai Ai’ is echoed by the Blakean ‘Ah!’ in the title 
of the poem. Contrasted with the imprinted and blood-stained fatal lilies, the 
white lily in the song “THE LILLY” remains spotless and purely bright.31  
The ‘pale Virgin’ cannot only be associated with Clytie, but also with all the 
suffering amorous maidens and nymphs of Metamorphoses. In the line, “the pale 
Virgin shrouded in snow,” Keith clearly sees a reference to the virginal figure of 
Proserpina,32 who “was playing, gathering / violets and white lilies” (Met. 5.391-
                                                                                                                                   
distorted into affodilus in Medieval Latin. See more on it in Keith, “The Complexities of 
Blake’s ‘Sunflower’,” 60-1.  
30 Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh, 80. 
31 Regarding its origin, the anemone is another lily-flower that is created from the dead Adonis’ 
blood staining the ground (Met. 10.731-9). Furthermore, at the very beginning of Book 4 the 
metamorphosis of the crocus is mentioned (Met. 4. 283-4). Both of them belong to the family of 
the bulbous liliaceae – the Greek humanised flowers.  
32 Keith, “The Complexities of Blake’s ‘Sunflower’,” 59. 
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2). That is to say that she was picking snow-white asphodels in the fields of 
death visualised as her shroud (viz. winding sheet), when Pluto ravished her. 
Afterwards, she was destined to live partly in the underworld with her husband, 
a period which is marked by the dying of nature in autumn and winter, then she 
spent the other two seasons happily with her mother, Ceres on the earth: “he 
[Jupiter] divides / the turning year into two equal portions. / Proserpina is shared 
by the two kingdoms / the goddess [Proserpina] is to spend six months beside / 
her husband [viz. Pluto], and six months beside her mother” (Met. 5.564-568).  
Obviously, besides the Ovidian references, the poem has strong spiritual 
connotations. The expressions of “golden clime” and the end of “the traveller’s 
journey” clearly refer to the end of human life hinting at the possibility of 
afterlife. Regarding the heliotrope and its philosophical implications, in Book 15 
of Metamorphoses Pythagoras asserts the immortality and the reincarnation of 
the soul claiming “but over our soul – be sure – death has no sway: / each soul, 
once it has left one body, takes / another body as its home” (Met. 15.157-9). He 
also speaks about the true nature of transformations:  
 
‘There is no thing that keeps its shape; for nature, 
the innovator, would forever draw 
forms out of other forms. In all this world –  
you can believe me – no thing ever dies. 
By birth we mean beginning to re-form, 
A thing’s becoming other than it was;  
And death is but the end of the old state; […]. (Met. 15.252-8)  
 
With Pythagoras’ statements, the idea of metamorphosis is altered, and the 
‘miraculous transformations’ of bodies into flowers, animals, rivers, or winds, 
are said to be related to nature. Accordingly, if the soul is immortal, the dead 
lovers’ alterations can be taken as an “untragic alternative to death.”33 The 
Blakean meaning of the sunflower given by Damon is also true with regards to 
the other flower-figures of Metamorphoses: “The sunflower, rooted in the earth 
yet keeping its blossom turned towards the sun, is a symbol of man’s spiritual 
aspirations, which cannot be attained while he is still rooted in the flesh.”34 In 
Blake’s song, the personified flower-figures are imprisoned by their unsatisfiable 
longing: Narcissus cannot fulfil his self-love, Proserpina cannot escape her sexual 
abuse – in their mortal form. Nevertheless, there is great power in human 
aspiration, which is emphasised by five expressions in the poem: ‘seeking after,’ 
‘desire,’ ‘arise,’ ‘aspire,’ and ‘wishes’.  
                                                     
33 Galinsky, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 61.  
34 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, 390. 
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John E. Grant draws attention to the placing of the three floral poems on the 
same plate, and he claims that “as a group the poems evidently present a 
threefold vision of love […]’earthly love, poetic love, and Human love’.”35 The 
last poem, “The Lilly,” is the most spiritual in this context, showing that 
“however subject the natural body might be to force and threats, man’s spiritual 
body, like the Lilly, could never be essentially debased.”36 For Blake, flowers, 
being transient creatures, do not only stand for man’s short earthly life but, due 
to creative imagination expressed in the Ovidian fables or Blake’s Songs, they 
can also speak about man’s spirituality. The different kinds of lilies – narcissi, 
martagons, hyacinths, and loti – do not only symbolise death and afterlife, but 
also the spiritual connection between life and death. This is the main point where 
Blake departs the Ovidian flower-symbolism. In Metamorphoses the source of 
the transformed figures is always an outside divinity while Blake internalises it, 
emphasising that the source of spiritual transformation should be looked and 
found inside man.  
In the last ‘flowery’ poem, “The Garden of Love,” Blake provides a rather 
ironic reading of the Ovidian tragic love-stories:  
 
So I turn’d to the Garden of Love  
That so many sweet flowers bore;  
And I saw it was filled with graves,  
And tomb-stones where flowers should be; (Blake 215).  
 
In the world of experience, where true love fails and lovers are fated, creative 
imagination is destined to be “lost & clouded in Fable & Allegory” (Blake, 
605.). According to Blake, though the idea of transformation is divinely inspired, 
in the heart of Metamorphoses the main drive of the events is selfish love and 
the desire for possession, i.e. “amor sceleratus habendi [the cursed love of 
having] (Met. 1.537-38).”37 In the fables we cannot read about true visions and 
spiritual mysteries but about allegorical commemorations over tomb-stones of 
lovers. In this sense the mythical narratives tell the stories of the repetition 
compulsion, commemorative repetitions of the dead beloved – practised in 
yearly festivals.38 I agree with Harold Bloom that the flower-figures “have not 
                                                     
35 Grant, “Two Flowers in the Garden of Experience”, 333.  
36 Grant, “Two Flowers in the Garden of Experience”, 345. 
37 Quoted in Enterline Lynn, The Rhetoric of the Body from Ovid to Shakespeare (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2000), 32. 
38 In Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion Hardie puts emphasis on the festivals and celebrations held yearly 
that were related to the myths: “Metamorphosis as a process that closes the narrative of a hu-
man life takes the place of death. But metamorphosis as product is structured according to the 
logic of funerary commemoration and memorialisation. The dead person himself ceases to 
exist, but enjoys survival of a kind, through modes of both continuity and transformation: 
continuity, through the memory-images stored in the minds of those who knew him in life; 
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escaped nature, by seeking to deny it; they have become monuments to its 
limitations.”39 The sunflower-song can also be read ironically, as all of the 
flowers/figures are imprisoned in vegetation, in their natural cycles – even the 
goddess Proserpina is forced to follow the order of the seasons.  
Furthermore, the Ovidian gods and goddesses cannot escape their fate as 
“fatum, the agent of death” is their superior.40 In the above mentioned episodes, 
they cannot save their beloved ordained by Fate to die by being victimised by 
passion. Solodow remarks, “there are plenty of gods, but no divinities,” no 
almighty omnipotent agents.41 Nevertheless, being immortal, they cannot accept 
death, and try to conquer it transforming their dead lovers into living natural 
entities. Venus, after his tragic death, transforms Adonis into the transient flower 
of love; Apollo creates a hyacinth from the dead body of his lover; Narcissus’ 
beauty is preserved in a flower named after him; while in the sunflower Clytie’s 
mortal love is immortalised. The latter episode with its love-preserving 
transformation, “mutata servat might almost serve as a motto for the 
Metamorphoses.”42  
According to Solodow, the Ovidian metamorphosis is a process marked by 
continuity between the person and the transformed entity. It is a process of 
clarification  
by which characteristics of a person, essential or incidental, are 
given physical embodiments and so are rendered visible and 
manifest. […] a change which preserves, an alteration which 
maintains identity, a change of form by which content becomes 
represented in form.43  
It seems rather difficult to provide a general definition of the specific 
transformations and, though this definition is applicable, it fails to emphasise 
one element: creativity. In the stories creative fantasy works and the 
                                                                                                                                   
transformation, in the surrogate existence of funeral memorial and funeral inscription” (81). 
Nowadays the Greek ‘celebrate’ the day of death of the deceased relative every year and the 
commemoration is named ‘mnemosyno’ (cf. Mnemosyne).  
39 Harold Bloom, Blake’s Apocalypse – A Study in Poetic Argument (New York: Doubleday, 
1963), 140.  
40 Iiro Kajanto, Ovid’s Conception of Fate (Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1961), 18. 
41 Solodow, The World of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 93. 
42 Solodow, The World of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 183. 
43 Solodow, The World of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 174. Galinsky expresses a similar view: “Most 
metamorphoses deal with the changing of a person into something else, such as, for instance, a 
tree, a stone, or an animal. Regardless of the way they are brought about, such transformations 
often are not capricious but turn out to be very meaningful because they set in relief the true 
and lasting character of the persons involved. The physical characteristics of the personages are 
subject to change, but their quintessential substance lives on” (Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 45). 
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transformators are artists, or creators, while – to some extent – the transformed 
creatures become works of art.  
Although the ideas of creative transformation, the connection between the 
mortal and eternal, and the victory of love over fate come from Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, the pagan author cannot escape Blake’s Christian judgment. As 
he explains in A Vision of the Last Judgment:  
In Eternity one Thing never changes into another Thing. Each 
identity is Eternal: consequently Apuleius’s Golden Ass & 
Ovid’s Metamorphosis & others of the like kind are Fable; yet 
they contain Vision in a sublime degree, being derived from real 
Vision in More ancient Writings. […] A Man can never become 
Ass nor Horse; some are born with shapes of Men, who may be 
both [sic!], but Eternal Identity is one thing & Corporeal 
Vegetation is another thing. (Blake 607) 
In fact, the tragic stories reveal “the impossibility of true metamorphosis: the 
outward form may change but not the eternal identity.”44 According to Wittreich, 
Blake, following the Renaissance commentators, distinguishes the allegories of 
the ancients and of the apostles as “they observed a fundamental difference 
between the classical habit of perverting truth through allegory and the Christian 
habit of concealing eternal truths in allegory […].”45 But we should admit that, 
Blake, as the first ‘true’ critic of Ovid concentrating on the Roman poet’s visual 
imagination and artistic freedom, emphasises the connection between the poetic 
and divine creation. Imagination is claimed to be the only power that makes a 
true poet as it is the divine vision (Blake, 782). In his Songs, Blake calls 
attention not only to the striking visual imagery of Ovid’s work, but also to the 
power of the transforming gods’ creativity. In the floral language of the 
introduction of his prophecy, Europe, Blake describes him confronting the fairy-
like inspiration: “[…] as we went along / Wild flowers I gather’d, & he shew’d 
me each eternal flower […]” (Blake, 238). That is to say, the imaginative eye 
can see that the vegetative universe hides the secret of eternity, it can see that 
“[t]he Vegetative Universe opens like a flower from the Earth’s center / In which 
is Eternity” (Blake, 633).  
Accordingly, my rhetorical reading ‘opens up’ the allegorical and ironical 
potentialities (and make them flourish) that are hidden in Ovid’s and Blake’s 
flower-symbolism. What’s more, the Ovidian allusions are transformed and built 
up in the Blakean oeuvre. Here in his Songs, sexual desire is shown as being 
sinful, but only experience can lead man to insight, only through experience is 
                                                     
44 Leopold Damrosch, Jr., Symbol and Truth in Blake’s Myth (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980), 149. 
45 Joseph Anthony Wittreich, Angel of Apocalypse – Blake’s Idea of Milton (Madison: The Univer-
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man able to reach a higher state of innocence. The Ovidian flowers cannot 
escape cyclical changes, yet they at least display the possibilities of some 
transformation/alteration. Later Blake realises the importance of cycles and 
speaks about the spiral of changes, the vortex, where spiritual development is 
possible. Mitchell asserts, “Blake uses the word ‘vortex’ […] because he wants 
an image that suggests both convergence toward a center or apex (the ‘inner 
being’ of the object) and doubleness, the interaction of contrary forces” as for 
him “vision does not travel in a straight line, but oscillates between contrary 
forces, converging on a moment of illumination.”46 In his Songs Blake expresses 
that love and desire, from the viewpoint of innocence is fatefully tragic, but it is 
inescapable. In Milton he says, “[m]en are sick with Love” (Blake, 521), which 
echoes the sexual love-sickness of the Song of Solomon (Canticles 2:5; 5:8).47 In 
his later prophetic works Blake elaborates on the importance of passion and 
sexuality that is fatefully human but, also divine in origin. Thus, in human love 
and sexual desire the source of divine love can be traced with the help of 
imagination:  
This world of Imagination is the world of Eternity ; it is the 
divine bosom into which we shall all go after the death of the 
Vegetated body. This World of Imagination is Infinite & 
Eternal, whereas the world of Generation, or Vegetation, is 
Finite & [for a small moment del.] Temporal. (Blake, 605.).  
While in the transformations of the Ovidian narrative love tries to conquer the 
fate that even the anthropomorphic gods and goddesses cannot escape, the 
Blakean love/passion is doomed to die in order to be ‘resurrected’ in its altered 
version in the later works. In the name of Love, ‘flowery’ human life is shown 
by Blake as the labour of love; thus, he transforms the meaning of the maxim: 
AMOR FORTIOR MORTE.  
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“(T)HE (DEVIL) WHO DWELLS IN FLAMING FIRE” – BLAKE’S 
APOCALYPTIC VISION AND ANIRONIC SATIRE IN THE MARRIAGE 
OF HEAVEN AND HELL 
 
All Genius varies Thus. 
Devils are various. 
Angels are all alike. 
(Blake) 
 
The mind is its own place, and in itself 
Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n. 
(Milton, Paradise Lost I. 254-5)  
 
 
The title of this chapter comes from Blake’s early prophecy, The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell (1790-1793), and it refers to a ‘correction’ in the text. 
According to Geoffrey Keynes, Blake changed the expression because in its own 
context he had “found it redundant to name him again, the description, ‘he who 
dwells in flaming fire,’ being all that was needed.”1 What’s more – as Keynes 
goes on – (t)his (whose?) error could easily be corrected on the copperplate by 
deleting the letter ‘t’ of the article, ‘the,’ and the word, ‘Devil’. And later the gap 
is “filled with a flame touched with gold.”2 With this deletion Blake eliminated 
half of the striking alliteration-complex destroying the sounds of ‘the devil who 
dwells’ while leaving (him) ‘in flaming fire’. Otherwise, due to this alteration 
His/his living-space is emphatically damned to be on fire and now the 
expression can be compared with the Biblical phrase when the Lord, our God, is 
named “consuming fire” (Deuteronomy 4:24 and Hebrews 12:29). 
The broader context of the expression gives one of the most complicated in 
the ironical-satirical work as it contrasts Blake’s ideas on the Devil and Christ 
with the Miltonic conception – in particular, with Blake’s interpretation on the 
Miltonic conception – of Satan and the Son (Messiah). In these short paragraphs 
the points of view are suddenly shifted producing such difficult sentences as the 
one containing the corrected phrase (lines 3-6 on Plate 6) and the one before 
(starting at the bottom of Plate 5 and going on in the first two lines on the next 
Plate): 
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2 Ibid. 
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It indeed appear’d to Reason as if Desire was cast out; but the 
Devil’s account is, that the Messiah fell, & formed a heaven of 
what he stole from the Abyss.  
This is shewn in the Gospel, where he prays to the Father to 
send the comforter, or Desire, that Reason may have Ideas to 
build on; the Jehovah of the Bible being no other than [the Devil 
del.] he who dwells in flaming fire.3  
I cannot promise that by the end of my paper the Blakean-Miltonic conception 
will be totally understood but at least we can learn more about him ‘dwelling in 
flaming fire’ – toned with the Blakean irony. I suppose that being the only and 
quite spectacular correction in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell it reveals (cf. 
apokalupsis) the truth of the tone of the work, the artist’s way of thinking and 
also of his working process. This correction can be regarded as a visible – or, 
being engraved, a tactile – expression of Blake’s irony, an ironic undercut 
expressis verbis. This paper is concerned with the possible interpretations of the 
ironical-satirical context of the apocalyptic work and, while paying attention to 
the figures of the text, it will focus on three facets of the tone – which I call the 
apocalyptic, the ironic and the satirical.  
Apocalypse Here and Now 
Derrida thematises the problem of the textual complexity of the apocalyptic tone 
relying on the original meaning of the Greek word apokalupsis as “disclosure, 
uncovering, unveiling.”4 Consequently, he basically tries to reveal the meaning, 
the truth of the tone, accepting the definition of the Greek tonos (viz. ‘pitch,’ 
‘tension’) as “[it] first signified the tight ligament, cord, rope when it is woven 
or braided, cable, strap – briefly, the privileged figure of everything subject to 
strict-ure.”5 Moving away from the obvious musical associations of strict 
tonality, Derrida claims that the analysis of the tone in writing should be done 
“in terms of contents, manners of speaking, connotations, rhetorical staging, and 
pose taken, in semantic, pragmatic, scenographic terms.”6 In the complex truth-
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revealing tone, the writer makes the voice of the other (in us) audible – and in 
Blake’s case also visible – which inevitably results in delirium, that is 
derangement, or rather out-of-tune-ness (désaccordement).7  
Although the Blakean vision operates with a disturbing multiplicity of voices 
– namely, Rintrah, the Devil, the I persona, Ezekiel, Isaiah, the Angel, and the 
illustrator – the first striking impression is the assured clear-sightedness that 
characterises all of them. On the one hand, while an apocalyptic writing always 
keeps some mystery in the core, the clear tone desired for revelation 
deconstructs the speculative and visionary discourse itself. Edward J. Ahearn in 
his Visionary Fictions also draws the attention to the rhetorical confidence of 
such writings displayed “to make us experience what we think to be 
impossible.”8 On the other hand, this polytonality and the sudden change of tone 
seem to reveal “the disorder or the delirium of destination.”9 In an apocalyptic 
discourse the destination, the end is (its) truth itself, and the text becomes – and 
actually every text is always already – apocalyptic: 
And the genre of writings called ‘apocalyptic’ in the strict sense, 
then, would be only an example, an exemplary revelation of this 
transcendental structure. In that case, if the apocalypse reveals, it 
is first of all the revelation of the apocalypse, the self-
presentation of the apocalyptic structure of language, of writing, 
of the experience of presence, in other words, of the text or the 
mark in general: that is, of the divisible envoi for which there is 
no self-presentation nor assured destination.10  
In his essay Derrida mainly discusses the characteristics of the ‘apocalyptic 
discourse,’ not dealing with the problems of the genre, and he refers to such a 
work as a conservative and apocryphally coded mixed form of writing. He also 
claims that “among the numerous traits characterizing an apocalyptic type of 
writing, let us provisionally isolate prediction and eschatological preaching, the 
fact of telling, foretelling, or preaching the end, the extreme limit, the 
imminence of the last.”11 Tracing the sources of apocalyptic literature, attention 
is paid to its links with eschatology, millennium and with a possible holy utopia, 
or the utopian myths of the lost Golden Age and Atlantis; moreover, with some 
gnostic, hermetic or esoteric ideas. Certainly, the prototype – and also the name 
giver – of the genre is John’s Book of Revelation, but in the New Testament 
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other descriptions of the so-called little apocalypse of Matthew, Peter, Daniel 
and Isaiah should also be mentioned.12  
In his book, Apocalypse and Millennium in English Romantic Poetry, Paley 
collects and analyses the possible apocalyptic writings in English literature 
elaborating on their political, scientific and social connections. At the end of the 
18th century the radical thinkers of the age were greatly influenced by the ideas 
of the Swedish visionary, Emanuel Swedenborg, and joined the Swedenborgian 
New Jerusalem Church. The Church was “a gathering-ground for a miscellany 
of seekers after mystic experiences” from Behmenists and Rosicrucians, through 
masons to enthusiasts for mesmerism and magnetism.13 Blake and his wife were 
sympathisers of the New Church in 1790 when he started to compose The 
Marriage and Swedenborg’s figure, or rather ‘Swedenborgianism,’ is presented 
in the work (on Plates 3 and 21-22). Blake did not only read but also annotated 
the English translations of Swedenborg’s apocalyptic and millennial prophecies 
entitled “Wisdom of Angels concerning Divine Love and Divine Wisdom,” “The 
Wisdom of Angels concerning Divine Providence” and “Heaven and Hell”, in 
which the mystic published his conversations with angels. In his remarks Blake 
welcomed the visionary’s expressive language and his way of differentiating 
between man’s natural, or rational understanding and spiritual understanding, or 
wisdom, which were originally joined by Love, or the Will.14  
It is recorded, in 1790 the master first taught the doctrine of concubinage, 
namely that the Swedenborgian married man could engage in adulterous 
relationships in case of the wife’s disease, insanity, or difference of faith. It 
cannot exactly be said that Blake rejected the idea of free love and sexual 
liberation but in his eyes such disputable doctrines made Swedenborg the figure 
“barring the way to the millennium by blocking the improvement of sensual 
enjoyment.”15 As Foster Damon summarises, Blake was inspired by his “divine 
teacher” but he found that “Swedenborg’s greatest error lay in his not 
understanding the real nature of ‘evil,’ and therefore accepting conventional 
morality.”16 Thus, opposed to Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell prophesying the 
start of the New Heaven in 1757, Blake in his Marriage of Heaven and Hell, due 
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13 E. Thompson, Witness Against the Beast – William Blake and the Moral Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 135. 
14 See Blake, Collected Works, 89-96, 131-133 and 929.  
15 Paley, Apocalypse and Millenium in English Romantic Poetry, 37. See also Thompson about the 
doctrine in the chapter titled “The New Jerusalem Church,” Witness Against the Beast, 129-
145. 
16 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, 392-394. Damon’s conclusion is also not without irony. In The 
Marriage with Blake’s re-interpretation of good and evil, he says, “the dreadful dichotomy of 
official Christianity, which Swedenborg had accepted, was healed; the universe was one again; 
and a new period of human thought was inaugurated” (394). 
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to his birth in the same year and now reaching the age of thirty-three, claims that 
new Hell has arrived pronouncing Swedenborg’s heaven to be his own hell (see 
Plate 3).  
After this shockingly and negatively positive – let us say, ironic – 
introduction it becomes obvious that Blake represents the true (Christian) 
wisdom contrasted with the “old falshoods” (MHH 157) of Swedenborg’s New 
Church. Here referring to the apocalyptic prophecy of Isaiah about the fall of 
Babylon (Isaiah: 34-35), Blake – like John in ‘his’ Book of Revelation – 
reverses the pattern of the prophecy as The Marriage starts with the 
announcement of Swedenborg’s false new heaven and ends with the portrayal of 
Nebuchadnezzar displaying the logical consequence of false reasoning.17 The 
chosen ironic title of the work criticises not only Swedenborg’s vision inabilities 
but also attacks his ideas on marriage as Blake’s Marriage displays a sexually 
active spiritual union. Moreover, he does it engraving and illustrating his work 
on his own, i.e. protesting against the ‘mass produced,’ printed doctrines of 
Swedenborgianism by refusing to have his work printed.18 
In the work the apocalyptic tone is introduced by Rintrah’s voice who “roars 
& shakes his fires in the burden’d air” (MHH 148). The very first voice 
introduces his apocalyptic vision of the topsy-turvy world where the true 
prophet, is “the just man [who] rages in the wilds” while the false prophet is “the 
sneaking serpent [who] walks in mild humility” (MHH 149). “The Argument” 
can be taken as “a miniature emblem of human history” showing up the 
continuous fight between the villain and the just; right in the introduction the 
primary rhetorical force of the work is displayed in the dialectic of opposites.19 
Here the villain as a mild Angel usurps the just man’s place, so,20 Rintrah, “the 
wrathful spirit of prophecy” is forced to become the Devil.21 Thus, the narrator 
uncovers the truth (of apocalypse) in an ironic mock-argument referring to the 
danger of reasoning, which also becomes a characteristic feature of The 
Marriage.  
Consequently, the first voice, after introducing the irony of mock-reasoning, 
logically goes on to herald the ironic Eternal Hell instead of the promised New 
Heaven on Plate 3, where Swedenborg is the ‘mild villainous’ Angel and the 
speaker – together with Isaiah – takes the role of the ‘devilish’ just man. In his 
Angel of Apocalypse, Wittreich, who reads the work as a true prophecy and the 
formation of the prophetic character, claims that the real dialectic of The 
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Marriage can be found “in the antagonism Blake establishes between it and its 
prospective audience.”22 It is true that the text wants to inspire its readers and 
wants their active response – whether its writer is a prophet or not. Reading the 
text, its dialectic is “figured by Rintrah and the I persona, who identifies so 
closely with the voice of the Devil”;23 that is, in “The Argument” besides the 
roaring true prophet, the devilish I persona is introduced – ‘he who dwells’ in 
irony.  
The Infernal Ironist 
The introduction of the prophetic voice opens up its whirlwind and its 
“overlordly tone detones.”24 Wittreich remarks: “The voice of indignation 
(Rintrah’s voice) is a complement, a prologue, to the voice of the Devil, critical 
of Milton, and to the I persona, derisive of Swedenborg.”25 However, the first 
person singular speaker is really close to the Devil in his ideas, the two voices 
have different butts: the Devil’s voice ironises Milton while the I persona 
satirises Swedenborg – and later the Devil’s voice. According to Bloom, who is 
opposed to this, the overwhelming tone of The Marriage is ‘devilishly’ ironic 
because right from the very beginning, the Devil’s voice can be heard.26 
Although the Devil’s voice is put in the centre, not much is known about his 
figure. In the work the names of the Devil and Satan are used together and 
regarded as synonymous on Plate 5 (cf. “call’d the Devil or Satan”), but they are 
not identified. The word devil comes from the Greek diabolos (indirect 
derivation) meaning ‘accuser’ or ‘slanderer,’ while the word satan is of Hebrew 
origin meaning ‘adversary’.27 In Blake’s later prophetic works instead of the 
word, devil (or devils), Satan is used to name the selfish “Evil One” (Milton) and 
he is also called the God of Men, Jehovah, who arrives with flaming fire.28 
But in this early prophecy it is emphasised that the two words, Devil and 
Satan, with their close meanings both signify that they differ, criticise or rebel 
against something. As negative power they cannot exist in themselves: their 
contrary force is needed. For Blake the devils – often in plural – present a more 
universal force, a principle of creative energy, which is related not only to the 
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soul/spirit but also to the body: “Energy is […] from the Body; and Reason is the 
bound or outward circumference of Energy” (MHH 149). It is usually 
understood that the Devil stands for bodily and sexual energy, or the id, while 
the Angel represents the reasonable soul, or the superego. But, provocatively, it 
also means that the devil stands for the union of the body and the soul; more 
exactly, questioning and criticising the usual categories, the Devil wants the 
reader to re-define these contraries. That is to say, the Devil, re-valuating the 
conventionally accepted assumptions, deconstructs the apparent contradictions 
and reveals “their primordial unity of the mind.”29 Consequently, opposed to the 
usual meaning of the body, for the visionary “it is a portion of Soul discern’d by 
the five senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this age” (MHH 149). It is not by 
chance that the Devil is introduced as a great rhetorician using the argumentative 
tone of his voice here and relying on the reader’s common sense. As on Plate 3 it 
is stated: 
Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, 
Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human 
existence. 
From these contraries spring what the religious call Good & 
Evil. Good is the passive that obeys Reason. Evil is the active 
springing from Energy.  
Good is Heaven. Evil is Hell. (MHH 149) 
Although here the opposition of good and evil is given religious denotation, their 
sign(ification) is not obvious. In his Annotations to Lavater’s “Aphorisms on 
Man” Blake remarks on aphorism 409 that “Active Evil is better than Passive 
Good.”30 On the basis of the Blakean conception, hypothetically, the angelic 
restraining minus can be corrected by the devilish revolutionary minus – so, the 
double negation results in positivity.  
Actually, such a ‘reasonable’ reading of the Devil’s logic shows the Angel’s 
viewpoint. However, in the work the Devil’s voice is fully developed through 
his own statements, in his antinomian proverbs and with the I persona having 
been converted to his party, whereas the Angel who stands for the reader’s ideas 
is less described. Blake putting on the Devil’s mask, aims at the devaluation of 
reason, where the reader is offered to “apprehend truth discursively, reasonably, 
like the Angel,” or “intuitively, energetically, like the Devil.”31 In fact the 
concepts of heaven vs. hell and angels vs. devils only exist separately from the 
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angelic point of view. Let me mention a great example of the ‘black or white’ 
typed angelic thinking. In the fourth ‘apocalyptic’ “Memorable Fancy” the angel 
wants to show Blake his “eternal lot” saying that it is “between the black & 
white spiders” (MHH 156). It can refer to Blake’s and the Devil’s obsession 
with contraries and to the fact that the ‘normal’ way of thinking in black or white 
terms can obstruct the understanding of the work. This fancy ends in quite a 
postmodern fashion stating that all of us (readers, critics, angels or devils) 
impose upon each other our own ‘phantasy’ “owing to our metaphysics” (MHH 
156-7). But the devils at least can reflect on it: they represent an intellectually 
higher level as they are able to see things in broader contexts and in more 
universal connections – due to their ironic ability to shift points of view. Derrida 
says the apocalyptic tone “leaps and rises when the voice of the oracle, 
uncovering your ear, jumbling, covering, or parasitizing the voice of reason 
equally speaking in each and using the same language with everyone, takes you 
aside, speaks to you in a private code, and whispers secrets to you.”32 
Nevertheless, I would like to emphasise that in The Marriage the devilish needs 
the angelic in order to function, and the truth is being formed in their (ironic) 
‘mental fight’.  
In the work, as Wittreich points out, the devilish-angelic contraries are 
historically represented by Milton, the true, and Swedenborg, the false prophet. 
Accordingly, in the argument the work operates with a double strategy in order 
“to expose the false prophets, eliminating the negation they represent; and to 
accomplish through prophecy the struggle of contraries by which the organs of 
perception are cleansed and the apocalypse finally achieved.”33 We should admit 
that Blake’s work was greatly influenced and liberated by Milton’s radical ideas. 
Searching for Miltonic sources, in his “The Reason of Church-Government” we 
can come across the idea of contraries, marriage and excess – the latter is one of 
the main topics in the “Proverbs of Hell.” On the whole, the direction of 
Milton’s and Swedenborg’s thinking and oeuvre can be contrasted since in his 
writings Milton moved away from orthodoxy whereas Swedenborg starting from 
a radical view, reached orthodoxy.34 To be more accurate when referring to 
Bloom’s remark, in The Marriage, Swedenborg is shown as the ex-prophet, a 
priest, but he was originally a reasoner (a scientist) who could become a 
visionary and sect-founder; that is, in his career Swedenborg displays the rise 
and the fall of the visionary.35  
While the I persona mainly mocks Swedenborg’s ideas, the Devil ironises 
Milton since Blake puts his Milton-criticism into the Devil’s mouth. The Devil’s 
voice does not only aesthetically criticise Paradise Lost but it also ironically 
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attacks Milton’s theology. In The Marriage the Miltonic Satan, the unironic 
“hero of Romantic rebellion,”36 is put in the centre and ironised by/in Blake’s 
Devil. However, as Wittreich emphasises, the Devil being a ‘partisan 
spokesman’ “who never exhibits the same largeness of mind as the figure with 
whom he is identified [viz. Blake’s I persona, Blake, or Milton’s Satan, or 
Milton],” misreads Milton.37 Likewise, the Devil’s idea that in Milton “the 
Father is Destiny, the Son a Ration [cf. Reason] of the five senses, & the Holy-
ghost Vacuum” (MHH 150) is true only in an ironic sense. We cannot forget that 
besides criticising Milton, the Devil’s main task is to ironise reasoning by 
expressing distorted views and presenting the sudden changes of perspectives. 
The illustration of Plate 5 depicts a naked male figure and his horse falling into 
the flames of fire but turning the page upside down (as the Devil wants us to see 
the world) the figure is seen to be in exaltation with his stretched arms.38 The 
ironic shifting of viewpoints culminates in the complicated sentence already 
quoted in my introduction, where the Devil’s name is deleted, which shows that in 
the work his absence presents the evasive tone itself. Opening up the vortex of 
contraries, he would rather let the reader find out that the devilish Jehovah of 
imagination, or the Biblical creator “dwells in flaming fire” (MHH 150). Finally, 
the Devil, or the ‘converted’ I persona in his ironic awareness notes on Plate 5 that 
The reason Milton wrote fetters when he wrote of Angels & 
God, and at liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because he was a 
true Poet and of the Devil’s party without knowing it. (MHH 
150. Italics are mine. É.A.)  
In this statement we should pay attention to the opening word of ‘reason’ 
associated with the angelic principle which is opposed to the energy of the 
devilish irony expressed here; due to the ironic tone, reason is put in antinomy 
with freedom and truth in the rhetoric.39 
On Plate 16 another “portion of being” and its (ironic) opposite is revealed: 
the Prolific and the Devouring. According to Bloom, “if ever Blake speaks 
straight, forgoing all irony, in The Marriage, it is here.”40 I think that without 
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using the ironic tone, the statement – “to the devourer it seems as if the producer 
was in chains; but it is not so, he only takes portions of existence and fancies that 
the whole” (MHH 155, italics are mine) – cannot be uttered. Only from an 
evasive (betwixt and between) viewpoint and in an atonal/atoned voice can such 
a statement be uttered. These two classes – the imaginative, creative artists and 
the Reasoners, the ones of limited knowledge – should be enemies because 
following the main principle, their opposition and fight means the essence of 
human existence. As David Erdman sees: “Blake rejects [Swedenborg’s] 
‘spiritual equilibrium’ between good and evil for a theory of spiralling 
‘Contraries’ that will account for progress.”41 Though the interaction of 
contraries regarded eternal, their unique ‘union,’ their marriage – promised and 
illustrated in the work – can be achieved.  
The interaction is figured by the dynamic vortex as in Blake’s visions it 
symbolises the essence of imaginative activity and “serves as an image of the 
gateway into a new level of perception” – to quote Professor Mitchell.42 Here 
this whirlwind is created by the devil and his attribute, his ironic attitude – his 
‘flaming fire’. In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell fire is the main, and indeed, 
the first principle: it is clearly associated with (devilish) desire, consummation 
and sexuality as “the word ‘consummation’ […] refers both to the burning world 
and the sacred marriage.”43 It is not only the means of the ‘devouring’ 
purification (apocalypse) and prohibition (the cherub’s flaming sword), but also 
of the ‘prolific’ creation and artistic imagination (see Plate 14). Moreover, fire 
symbolises inspiration, and as Northrop Frye says “imagination cannot be 
consumed by fire, for it is fire.”44 In the first “Memorable Fancy” a mighty devil 
writes the infernal “Proverbs of Hell” using “corroding fires” (MHH, 150) and 
later the ‘devilish artist’ calls his own working method infernal: 
[…] I shall do by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, 
which in Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting apparent 
surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which was hid. (MHH 
154)  
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In practical terms, Blake, with his ‘corrosive method’, invented a new technique 
of engraving which Anthony Blunt describes as below: “Blake first took an 
ordinary copper etching plate. On this he drew the outlines of his decorative 
design in a varnish resistant to acid. The effect of this was that, when the plate 
was immersed in the acid, the unprotected parts were bitten away, leaving the 
parts painted out in a varnish in relief. This is roughly an inverted form of the 
ordinary process of etching, or transference of the process of wood engraving to 
a copper plate.”45 That is to say this process does not only imply the use of the 
corrosive and purifying acid bath but also the working out of the design 
backwards while the text has to be written in black surrounded by a thin white 
line in the overall darkness of the space. It can be said that in this way Blake 
made darkness visible as the process of engraving produces such a visual 
paradox. It is another ironic game with the contrary-complementary points of 
view in our perception, meaning another challenge for our senses. As the 
apocalyptic and Platonic conclusion states on Plate 14:  
If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would 
appear to man as it is, infinite. 
For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro’ 
narrow chinks of his cavern. (MHH 154) 
Blake thinks that the divine (or diabolical) imagination is locked in the Platonic 
cave of the human skull and body which is lit by the sensory organs: nostrils, 
ears, eyes, tongue and skin, and genitals. The purifying and energetic flames of 
imagination used by Blake, metaphorically and literally, can free our perception 
and open the way towards infinity.46 In The Marriage, the other prophetic 
figures, Isaiah and Ezekiel, also want to raise men into “a perception of the 
infinite” with their strange ‘corroding’ behaviour (MHH 154). Similarly, Blake 
tries to show the power of the “Poetic Genius” in his “fire of intellect and art, 
which must begin ‘by an improvement of sensual enjoyment’.”47 According to 
Wittreich, “the true prophets must employ the devices of satire and irony”48 – 
that is, following the devilish ironic logic, they can pretend to be false prophets. 
I would rather accept the Bloomian infernal, or poetic meaning of the work, that 
the creative Devil is the artist Blake’s ironic mask and “the corroding fires refer 
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metaphorically both to his engraving technique and the satiric function of the 
Marriage.”49  
The Acid Test of Satire 
The Blakean ‘corrosive method’ with the Devil’s flaming fire as a metaphor 
works on another level referring to the “deeply acid bitten” tone of his work. As 
Northrop Frye remarks, “[s]atire is an acid that corrodes everything it touches” 
and he compares The Marriage of Heaven and Hell to the great English satirical 
works created by Swift, Fielding, Sterne or the painter, Hogarth, calling Blake’s 
work “the epilogue to the golden age of English satire.”50 In his apocalyptic 
vision the Blakean I persona, as a great satirist, uses the Devil’s infernal irony. 
Moreover, the ‘visionary satirist’ does not only verbalise and visualise the divine 
visions with the use of ‘hell’s fire’ but also promises the Bible of Hell based on 
its reading in the “diabolical sense” (MHH 158).  
In the starting point of his analysis, Wittreich states that a critic should decide 
whether to regard The Marriage as a satire or a prophecy and he obviously reads 
it as a ‘true’ prophecy showing the formation of the prophetic character, while, 
in a lengthy endnote, he mentions other critics – mainly, Bloom and Frye – who 
read it as a Menippean satire.51 However, in the ending he admits that the work 
“like Milton’s pamphlet [cf. “The Reason of Church-Government”], has all the 
hallmarks of reason and order, concepts reinforced by the theme of satire that 
pervades the work and by the strict organisation evident on its surface. Its initial 
argument is developed by the voice of the Devil, by the proverbs of hell, and by 
the amplifications of each of the memorable fancies.”52 It shows that reading the 
work, Wittreich himself has realised that though the work is a prophecy it cannot 
help using the ironic corrosives of satire. It rather means that while ironising 
logic and reasoning, Blake overcomes satire and displays its inadequacy. In my 
reading The Marriage is a satirical work where the I persona, similarly to Blake 
in his marginalia, uses not only the ironic tone of the Devil but also the satirical 
and doctrinal tone of opposition.  
The structure of the work follows the pattern of a prophecy and revelation 
with intertextual commentaries on Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell, Milton’s 
Paradise Lost and Biblical prophets’, Isaiah’s and Ezekiel’s vision. At the same 
time, it also displays the characteristic feature of the Menippean satire being a 
mixture of forms, that is, it is ‘mixed’ or a ‘medley’ – satura. Nevertheless, this 
vague definition of the Menippean, or Lucilian (or Varronian) satire is also 
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questionable and the usual discussions of Bakhtin’s not necessarily satiric 
“menippia” or Frye’s “anatomy” are rather misleading in this sense. For 
instance, in his Satire and the Transformation of Genre, Guilhamet does not 
regard this kind of satire as a form at all claiming that in a Menippean satire “the 
rhetorical structure or logical sequence of a satiric speech or discourse is 
excessively disrupted by fictive techniques, […] Such techniques include irony, 
genre mixing and the use of a persona. An abundance of such strategies causes a 
malformation or deformation of the text.”53 Following this definition which is 
not without any reminiscence of Frye’s and Bakhtin’s ideas, Blake’s Marriage 
can definitely be read as a satire – definitely, but not convincingly.  
In his brilliant book, Ancient Menippean Satire, Relihan, quoting Frye’s 
famous statement – namely, “the Menippean satire presents us with a vision of 
the world in terms of a single intellectual pattern” – makes his own quite similar 
definition that “it seems that the [Bakthinian] menippea can be viewed as an 
intellectual attitude adopted toward the value of truth and the possibility of 
meaning, a particular world view, that may show up in a number of different 
genres.”54 Besides having the most important features of the Menippean satire, 
The Marriage also displays the essence of generic satire: the freedom of 
individual fantasy in presenting a universal world view in mixed forms, tones 
and split personality. Relihan points out that “the genre is primarily a parody of 
philosophical thought and forms of writing, a parody of the habits of civilised 
discourse in general, and that it ultimately turns into the parody of the author 
who has dared to write in such an unorthodox way.”55 Reading The Marriage, 
we can feel that Blake is exactly such an author who, in his satire, satirises 
reasoning and “opposes the word-centered view of the universe” and “denies the 
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possibility of expressing the truth in words”56 – doing it not only in words, but 
also in pictures. According to Relihan, the Menippean satire is a parody of 
traditional satire having ironic overtones and its basic features are: a mixture of 
disparate elements, fantastic settings of a topsy-turvy world, intertextuality, and 
a “self-parodying author/narrator” lacking a consistent authorial point of view. 
On the whole, Blake’s Marriage is satirical, with its central idea of the mixed 
contraries, puzzling commentaries on other texts and its own visions, the figure 
of the ironic Devil, and its ‘devilish’ I persona. Thus, referring to Blake’s work, 
the name, satura, is its appropriate/proper label, of which “essence is the 
shocking juxtapositions of irreconcilable opposites” and in which “literary 
impropriety, self-parody, and the mockery of standards of judgment are all 
intertwined.”57  
The Blakean Menippean satire parodies other genres, and literature making a 
joke on authorship, unity, genre, and style; it is an antigenre, or a burlesque, a 
burlesque of literature. Relihan also emphasises that in the work “fantasy serves 
not only to undermine other forms of cultural and literary authority, but also to 
undermine the importance of the particular Menippean satire itself.”58 Moreover, 
what he adds, is particularly true with regards to The Marriage:  
It is too modern to say that Menippean satire champions the 
eternal search for truth by a refusal to be limited by straitjacket 
of reason and propriety, though certainly the genre is refreshing 
for its indulgence in fantasy […]. Menippean satire rises through 
time to philosophical formulations of the inadequacy of human 
knowledge and the existence of a reality that transcends reason 
[…].59  
If we consider the tone, we should realise that the Menippean satirists from 
Lucian to Blake greatly use irony in its complexity. Griffin mentions the early 
Blakean mock-symposium An Island in the Moon and analyses The Marriage as 
a Menippean satire that works largely by means of provocative paradox and wit. 
He sees that “[t]he satire in Blake’s Marriage lies primarily in its continuous 
irony […]. If we consider the rhetoric of provocation and paradox, then Blake 
stands in a long line of satirists – from Lucian through Erasmus, Fontenelle, 
Swift, and others – whose satire works not by drawing a clear line between 
‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ but by teasing readers with the play of ‘contraries’.”60 Griffin 
also discusses the problem of satiric irony which is unstable and does not operate 
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as a binary switch with which the reader can simply reconstruct the author’s 
meaning. In a satiric complexity the degree of irony should also be taken into 
consideration along with the danger that the irony of the satiric genius can run 
away with the satirist himself.  
While the Devil’s irony seems to be controlled – as he is still a reasoner 
though a false one – the I persona is likely to be taken away by his irony. In the 
description of the parallel visions of the orthodox Angel and the heretic and in 
the abundance of figures in the last “Memorable Fancy,” the same story is told 
from two opposite viewpoints – with understanding shamefully “imposed upon” 
each other (MHH 157). First, the Angel shows his fantasy about eternity with the 
symbols of Christ’s life (the stable, the church, the vault), of the institutionalised 
Church (mill, cave), and, finally, with the apocalyptic pictures of the black 
tempest, the fiery cataract of blood and Leviathan in the black sea. Afterwards 
the I persona displays ‘his’ visionary story of Christianity flying with the Angel 
towards the Sun reversing Satan’s journey through chaos described in Paradise 
Lost. Then descending into the abyss of the Bible, they reach the seven houses of 
the Church where monkeys live quarrelling, copulating and devouring each other 
“by plucking off first one limb and then the another, till the body was left a 
helpless trunk; […] one savourily picking the flesh off his own tail” (MHH 157). 
In this section, as Bloom remarks: “Swift himself could not have done better 
[…], in the repulsive projection of the incestuous warfare of rival doctrines, 
ground together in the reductive mill of scholastic priestcraft.”61 I think with his 
most disgusting and animalistic criticism of the Church, Blake uses such a 
tonality that recalls Swift’s sarcasm. 
In his analysis of the Swiftian irony, Leavis hints at the possible parallelism 
or connection between Swift’s and Blake’s satirical style stating in his promising 
final sentence that “we shall not find Swift remarkable for intelligence if we 
think of Blake.”62 Comparing Swift’s and Blake’s satires, I can start with 
Bloom’s ironic remark, namely, in The Marriage Blake is like Swift as their 
satires survived its victims.63 But to give a serious tone, it is not by chance that 
the Swiftian irony is called negative, intellectual and instrumental by Leavis64 
since it is based on ‘cold’/angelic rationality. Contrasted with Blake, Swift could 
not escape from the ‘mind-forged manacles,’ though in his great satires (in 
Gulliver’s voyages to Laputa and to the land of the clever horses) he was 
capable of highlighting the limits of reason. At his best his imagination starts 
with a parody and “takes fire from mad elaborations of metaphor” liberating 
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himself from Augustan decorum.65 Traugott also remarks that Swift, unlike the 
visionary Blake, understood that “God and the devil are ordinarily reversed by 
the pretense of reason.”66 Whereas Blake’s works especially display a harsh 
criticism of reason, the work of Locke displays a rationalist sensualism which 
“mock[s] Inspiration & Vision” (Blake, 477).  
However, on the basis of the strongly attacking tone and the satirical-ironical 
context, some parallels can be found between The Marriage and the Swiftian 
tone used in his prose writings, for example, in the one discussing religious 
problems titled “An Argument Against the Abolishing of Christianity” (1708). 
In this essay the false persona suggests that true Christianity should be 
annihilated while ‘nominal’ (false) Christianity should be maintained. With the 
usage of ironic betrayal and the emphasis of the false opinion it is revealed that 
the very opposite is meant, namely, only the ‘nominal’ and superficial religious 
‘belief’ should be abolished, while true Christianity must definitely be defended. 
In Swift’s satire, complex irony is used with a reformative intention and the tone 
itself is turned into a weapon. In the opening paragraph it is stated: “I am very 
sensible what a Weakness and Presumption it is, to reason against the general 
Humour and Disposition of the World. […] In like Manner, and for the very 
same Reasons, it may perhaps be neither safe nor prudent to argue against the 
Abolishing of Christianity, […].”67 Then the persona questions the necessary 
abolishing of Christianity, which sounds paradoxical “even for [the] wise and 
paradoxical Age,” in order to defend only nominal Christianity. From the 
beginning – from the long ironic title, “An Argument to prove, That the 
Abolishing of Christianity in England, May, as Things now Stand, be attended 
with some Inconveniencies, and perhaps, not produce those many good Effects 
proposed thereby” – the reader is trapped into following the logical though false 
reasoning of the work and into realising that the displayed opinion of the persona 
is negatively emphasised; that is, its opposite is meant. 
On the one hand, due to the ironic intensity aimed at the defence, to quote F. 
R. Leavis’s expression, “the positive itself appears only negatively.”68 Bullitt 
says that in the technique based on enthymemes: “Swift frequently tended, then, 
to adopt indirect refutation as the most persuasive form of demonstrating the 
logical absurdity of his opponents. Instead of refuting directly the arguments of 
an antagonist, Swift’s enthymemes were constructed in such a way as to display 
them, if possible, as ridiculous, and in the process of doing so, of course, to 
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imply the affirmation of his own opposed premises. […] It is only a short step 
from this method of introducing his arguments to that adopting those arguments 
as his own – in short, to using irony, as the vehicle for his refutative 
enthymeme.”69 One of the best examples is when the persona, realising that the 
nominal Christian will lose their truly Christian allies, suggests that they should 
“trust to an Alliance with the Turk,” but he admits that the Turk, opposed to the 
nominal Christians, “believe a God.”70 
On the other hand, the persona’s argumentation is shockingly logical 
operating with abstract rationality and the “position is defended ironically by a 
logic so patently false that we are almost laughed into agreement with Swift.”71 I 
think that like Swift’s conception it could also have been Blake’s mission to lead 
men in such an indirect way beyond reason towards the experience of true 
Christianity – even if he had to use the destroying fire of irony in his satire. This 
central idea is not only expressed in the Devil’s ironic statement and the 
proverbs, but also in the I persona’s Swedenborg-critique. On Plate 21 the 
master is mentioned together with the Angels who “have the vanity to speak of 
themselves as the only wise; this they do with confident insolence sprouting from 
systematic reasoning” (MHH 157). In his satirical tone, the persona blames 
Swedenborg for only conversing with the religious Angels and “not with Devils 
who all hate religion” (MHH 157); where religion – like Swift’s attack – refers to 
the institution of the Church, nominal Christianity and the rational religion, Deism.  
In his Marriage the rational ‘either-or’ typed point of view is attacked: if 
devils and angels separately exist in our world, the persona deliberately acts for 
the devil’s party. In this (ironic) sense he can be said to be the devil’s advocate 
who puts not only the ‘case of reason’ but also the reasonable (Swiftian) satire to 
the acid test. As Relihan remarks, “the anatomy of folly can only be ironically 
performed”;72 that is, irony is used upon irony, or the technique of betrayal with 
a false persona. The ending is not satiric but ironic and can be taken as an 
imaginative poetic ending, not a reasonable one, where the “fiery polemic 
uttered for its fire and not its light.”73 But after the promise of “The Bible of 
Hell” another shock awaits the reader: the warning of the ‘devilish’ illustrator 
who shows us the repressive and degenerate state of Nebuchadnezzar. That is, 
the final ‘word’ is uttered by the illustrator putting on the Devil’s/his complex 
ironic mask.  
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The (An)ironic Vision 
While the textual ending of The Marriage describes the Angel’s enlightened 
consummation, the last illustration on the same plate shows the biblical 
Nebuchadnezzar’s degenerated state which can be taken as “the ironic emblem 
of Reason losing his reason.”74 In his essay “Irony and False Consciousness” 
Andrew Cooper emphasises the overwhelming ironic tonality of the work which 
he compares to the Romantic hovering of the Schlegelian irony. In his repetition 
of self-creation and self-destruction, due to his masks used in his works, the 
ironist is able to free himself from the limitations of self-consciousness.75 
Besides referring to the famous “doors of perception” as revolving doors, 
Cooper also claims that Blake’s irony is aimed at “[the] antinomian striving to 
transcend ‘the Body’ and identify the indeterminacy of rhetorical self-
consciousness with the unshackled energies of a genuinely world-consuming 
apocalypse.”76 
In fact, concerning the different and intertwined voices of the work, the very 
first and very last voice – before and after Rintrah, the I persona, the Devil and 
the Angel – is the voice of the illustrator.77 From the starting plate of The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell, from the title and its first ‘illumination’ of the 
title-page, the reader is contrasted with a Blakean twofold or rather a ‘threefold 
vision’: the union of two contrary forces.78 If we want to understand, or rather 
imagine its meaning, we should go beyond and accept the challenge of what the 
whirlwind of these apparent ‘contraries’ indicates. Having analysed the work, I 
should realise that even from the very beginning in the satirical-ironical context 
Blake acts as the devil’s advocate, the advocatus diaboli representing a higher 
state of imaginative vision. If the reader can accept the illogical though 
imaginative marriage of good and evil, then (s)he can see the contraries already 
united – in its double negative, assertive way. We have an artist who not only 
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peace. This is the land of sexual harmony and dreams lighted by the Moon (the realm of the 
Subconscious) which Blake calls Beulah in his late prophecies, while it is named Innocence or 
the Vales of Har in the early works (e.g. In The Book of Thel). Its name means ‘married’ 
referring to the restored happy relationship, the reconciliation, between God and Palestine (cf. 
Damon, A Blake Dictionary, 42-43). In his ‘cosmology’ Beulah is also the world of creative 
energy and poetic inspiration characterised by the imaginative ‘threefold vision’, where the 
contraries live side by side in harmony.  
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works with ‘flaming fire,’ but uses its power in the creation of the “great 
synaesthesia” of his art. As Professor Mitchell sees, “Blake’s pictorial style, like 
his poetic form and the total form of his composite art, is organised as a 
dramatic, dialectical interaction between contrary elements.”79 In his 
‘illuminated’ works, in his artistic threefold vision, words and pictures – and the 
sculpture-like letters, motifs of the relief etchings – are composed to show the 
synaesthetic presentation of sensory elements, in order to open the dynamic 
vortex of imagination. In this sense his illustrated/illuminated prints do also 
function as windows, as sensory openings, and through his pictures the 
spectator’s sensual enjoyment can be improved by “designing visual illusions 
which continually demand and imply [all] the other senses in their structures.”80  
I cannot agree with Erdman that the usage of the word ‘marriage’ in the title 
of the work – on the basis of Blake’s aversion of this institution – can only be 
taken as a ‘half-jest’. In Blake’s poetic and prophetic works marriage has 
different meanings, from the burdensome bondage of loveless and forced 
marriages, through the happy sexual union, to the spiritual wedding between 
God and Man. According to Wittreich, “[i]f Milton thought that the marriage of 
truth would not occur until the Apocalypse, Blake thought the Apocalypse 
would not occur until such a marriage had been accomplished.”81 However, the 
argument of the work fails to show up the promised ‘marriage’ since the Devil’s 
voice is fully developed through his utterances, proverbs and the I persona 
having been converted to his party, but the Angel’s figure is less described. That 
is to say the text of the Blakean Marriage presents the weak and unbalanced 
union between the fully described figure of the Devil and the flat reasoning 
character of the Angel – consequently, the true expression of marriage should be 
looked for in the illustrations.  
The title of the prophecy – written to the experienced living in di-vision – 
clearly refers to the world of ‘threefold vision’ and sexual unity. In the work it is 
visualised in the title page, in its illustration and typography, and verbalised in 
the last “Memorable Fancy”. The title-page can be taken as an illustration to the 
section where all the voices are present: the I persona records the conversation 
between an Angel and a Devil that is finally/originally depicted by the illustrator 
on the title-page. In the textual vision, the devil in flaming fire addresses an 
angel sitting on a cloud and questions the ancient traditions of orthodox 
Christianity, while putting emphasis on Christ’s humanity instead of his divinity. 
As the angel failed to defend his own ideas he “stretched out his arms, 
embracing the flame of fire, & he was consumed and arose as Elijah [viz. the 
prophet, or John the Baptist]” (MHH 158).  
                                                     
79 Mitchell, Blake’s Composite Art, 74. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Wittreich, Angel of Apocalypse, 203. 
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Although in the text the two figures are masculine (referred to as ‘he’), or can 
be taken as androgynous, in the title-page below the level of the ground or 
consciousness we can see an embracing love-couple: the devil is characterised 
with flames of fire and a nice feminine bottom, and the angel’s masculine nude 
is shown reclining on a bluish cloud. The harmonious moment of their kissing is 
made dynamic by the moving fiery flames and the other embracing couples 
flying above the central one. The whole picture shows the whirlwind of ecstasy 
rooted in and raised by the union of the two main principles. That is, the main 
schematic form dominating the entire space of the design is the vortex, which 
can be “the configuration of [the Blakean] ‘progression’” and “the focus of the 
encounter between conflicting forces.”82 Besides the vision of the whirlpool 
there is another little vortex coiling around the uniting conjunction, ‘and,’ which 
seems to go into the (imagined) space of the drawing. Above the ground in 
accordance, or toning, with the visionary scene, we can see that the branches of 
the trees move towards each other in the wind (of passion), as if the word, 
‘marriage,’ had united “the abstraction of typography [of HEAVEN and HELL] 
with the flowing, organic forms of Blake’s pictorial style.”83  
Finally, after regarding the ironic, satiric and apocalyptic tone of the other 
voices, we should pay attention to the illustrator’s attitude and the Blakean 
irony. In his Horizons of Assent Alan Wilde distinguishes mediate, or primitive; 
disjunctive, or modern; and suspensive, or postmodern ironies.84 He argues that 
all irony – or rather the mediate and disjunctive ones – “regarded as a perceptual 
encounter with the world, generate[s] in response to [its] vision of disparity (or 
in some cases is generated by) a complementary, more conceptual vision of 
wholeness or singleness,” which he calls the anironic. Being taken not as “anti-
ironic” but a complementary countervision, this anironic vision accompanies 
irony and the absolute ironist is capable of the intertwining of the ironic and the 
anironic so as to hover “folding back on himself in the sanctuary of his art.”85 
Unlike the hovering of modern irony, in Blake’s ‘primitive’ irony, the anironic 
apocalyptic vision about the realm of fantasy ironises the Devil’s ironic tone. It 
means that the Devil’s irony is “Blake’s vehicle for carrying reason to excess, 
making it undermine itself and become energy,”86 which is displayed in the 
illustrator’s (an)irony. In this sense, marriage can refer to the intertwined unity 
                                                     
82 Mitchell, Blake’s Composite Art, 70. 
83 Mitchell, Blake’s Composite Art, 75. See more on the symbolism of Blake’s typography and 
calligraphy in W. J. T. Mitchell “Visible Language: Blake’s Wond’rous Art of Writing” in 
Morris Eaves and Michael Fischer (eds), Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell UP, 1986, 46-86), 83-86. 
84 Alan Wilde, Horizons of Assent. Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Ironic Imagination (Bal-
timore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 9-10. 
85 Wilde, Horizons of Assent, 34. 
86 Cooper, Doubt and Identity in Romantic Poetry, 48. 
137 
of the different tones which are tensed then braided. Thus, The Marriage does 
not only mean the Devil’s and the Angel’s spiritual union but also the marriage 
of satire and irony in a prophetic/apocalyptic ending-beginning.  
According to Wittreich, the work’s final irony  
[l]ies in the fact that what is true from the human perspective is 
not true from a demonic one, just as what the Devil says in The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell may be true from the perspective 
of history, but it is not true from the perspective of eternity that 
the prophet enjoys. The irony […] [of] Blake’s Devil lies in the 
fact that Blake [is] in possession of a larger consciousness and 
thus aware of subtleties that his devil does not perceive […].87  
I agree with Wittreich’s calling Blake a “supreme ironist” but ‘the irony lies in 
the fact’ that while in the final irony he sees “the formation of the prophetic 
character” I would rather see the illustrator and the engraver’s perspective here. I 
think, Blake’s supreme irony is expressed in the annihilation of the tones in the 
fiery ending and also in the illustrations where the artist represents his anironic 
vision of prophecy. The illustrator’s “spiritual eye” is truly meant to be “the eye 
through which the rest of the world might see”88 and in this sense ironically the 
cover-page is rather an uncovering, apocalyptic page.  
In his essay on the apocalyptic tone, Derrida refers to a flower of rhetoric, the 
eucalyptus, which, as the ironic flower of revelation, after flowering remains 
closed, “well hidden [cf. the Greek word, eu-kaluptos] under the avowed desire 
for revelation.”89 In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, besides the puzzling 
multitonality, the author’s ‘true’ voice remains concealed – like the Derridean 
apocalyptic flower of rhetoric, the eucalyptus. Moreover, the eucalyptus is also 
remarkable for its cleansing and healing oil, which can be associated with the 
corroding acid of Blake’s irony. In his writing Blake ‘argues’ against all 
restraints, limitations and bondage, and he is capable of loosening the strict 
tension of the tonos, due to the elasticity of his ironic tonality. In spite of my 
first satirical remark on Professor Keynes’s explanation, I should accept that 
instead of ‘the devil’ this ‘he’ is “all that was needed.” In the conception, context 
and tonality of The Marriage, the ‘pronoun’ – with the Greek anto-nymia 
embracing its own opposite denomination – and, what’s more, its hiatus/gap, is 
definitely enough. As He in his mask/incognito says in the “Proverbs of Hell”: it 
is “more than enough,” or “too much” (MHH 152).90 The ironically apocalyptic 
                                                     
87 Wittreich, Angel of Apocalypse, 215. 
88 Wittreich, Angel of Apocalypse, 218. 
89 Derrida, “On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy,” 149. 
90 Interestingly enough, Derrida opens his Parergon with satis, ‘enough’, recalling the tone of the 
Blakean Devil in his “Proverbs”: “Opening with the satis, the enough (inside and outside, 
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work marks not the ending but the beginning of Blake’s prophetic career where 
heaven and hell, angels and devils do not exist – there is no reason for their 
existence.  
                                                                                                                                   
above and below, to left and right), satire, farce on the edge of excess” (in The Truth in 
Painting, 17). I wonder what Derrida could have said about this strange parallel with Blake’s 
The Marriage.  
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THE BESTIAL FIGURES OF THE SOCRATIC IRONY  
 
Just as philosophy begins with doubt,  
so also a life that may be called human begins with irony. 
(Kierkegaard) 
 
My doctoral thesis titled On the Concept of Irony — With (Continual) Reference 
to Kierkegaard, discusses different theories of irony. As the title itself 
(ironically) indicates, my thesis is greatly inspired by Søren Kierkegaard’s 
doctoral treatise, The Concept of Irony, With Continual Reference to Socrates 
(1841), which is the most thorough theoretical work ever written on the concept. 
The Kierkegaardian irony-conception (and irony) is being formed in the 
discussion of the Socratic ironical method and the early German Romantic irony 
(Schlegels, Solger, Tieck) so as to ‘display’ a specific irony of life-work. On the 
one hand, in the elements of this formation, we can read about the 
Kierkegaardian evaluation of the Hegelian irony-criticism and its effects upon 
the philosophical argument. On the other hand, in the rhetoric of the treatise 
Kierkegaard tries to display irony itself, allowing it to speak for once.1  
In Kierkegaard’s reading, Socrates with his questioning of ‘true beliefs’ and 
claims of ignorance becomes the first real individual, as his ironic method due to 
its “infinite, absolute negativity” made his (negative) freedom possible. In the 
first part of the dissertation, which is about the Socratic irony, the author gives 
the genealogy of the concept. Taking into account that the term, irony, is a 
‘negative concept,’ if one tries to interpret the ironic philosophical position, he 
takes a great risk. To undertake the role of helping its coming into 
light/existence – either as its ‘midwife’ or father – one risks assisting with a 
miscarriage or a stillbirth. In this case it is not really consoling that the infant 
could have been a child of love, and its conception was conceived/con-
ceptualised by an amorous observer. As Kierkegaard says, “the observer ought 
to be an amorist” and the observed phenomena are always of the feminine 
gender.2 
                                                     
1 Kierkegaard writes about it in his collected papers and journal (Pap. III B 2). Cf. “Selected 
Entries from Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers Pertaining to The Concept of Irony,” in The 
Concept of Irony – With Continual Reference to Socrates, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), 441.  
2 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony – With Continual Reference to Socrates, ed. and trans. 
by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), 9 (XIII 105). Further 
references are made to the English edition of Kierkegaard’s Writings and after the page numbers 
the marginal references are also given in brackets.  
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After the quite painful metaphors of delivery, the reader is asked to imagine 
other figures offered to visualise the complex problem of irony. To make it 
visible the author refers to an imaginary figure of Scandinavian fairy tales: 
If we now say that irony constituted the substance of his [viz. 
Socrates’s] existence […], and if we further postulate that irony 
is a negative concept, it is easy to see how difficult it becomes to 
fix the picture of him – indeed, it seems impossible or at least as 
difficult as to picture a nisse with the cap that makes him 
invisible.3  
In the next chapters the reader is given other more (or less) playful and puzzling 
figures/tropes embedded in the philosophical discussion, which are supposed to 
stand for the work of irony. In the peculiar rhetoric of the text these figures 
result in a “way of cutting [into], perforating” the philosophical argumentation 
unveiling the true topic.4 While Kierkegaard examines the famous Socrates-
interpretations (in Xenophon’s, Plato’s, Aristophanes’ and Hegel’s works), he is 
presenting his own understanding of the Socratic irony emphasising its 
deconstructive negativity. Analysing the Kierkegaardian criticism of the Socratic 
irony we can find its rhetoric ‘monstrous’ since all of the rhetorical figures are 
associated with the ‘demoniac’ figure of Socrates. Therefore, it is not by chance 
that he appears in a ‘bestiary’ – as Derrida says in a footnote in Plato’s 
Pharmacy.5  
But in the Kierkegaardian dissertation, the ironic-demoniac displays more 
than its ‘animalistic’ features; as if the figure similarly to the Greek god, Proteus, 
were given the ability of infinite changing. Therefore, instead of the word, 
bestiary, I suggest using bestiality, because this one would rather cover and 
show the torturing and brutal forms of the Socratic irony. Nevertheless, Derrida 
also refers to other appearances of Socrates; namely, his figure can also be 
understood as a pharmakeus – a magician or sorcerer. These remarks gave me 
the idea of collecting and interpreting the brutal and bestial images in 
Kierkegaard’s ‘pseudo-philosophical’ text – relying on the ironic agility of the 
                                                     
3 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 12 (XIII 108). According to the explanatory note in the 
English edition: “In Scandinavia, an elflike household creature, benevolent if treated properly, 
vexatious otherwise, and, according to some traditions, invisible when wearing his pointed red 
stocking cap” (468). I often wonder if somebody is made invisible wearing such a magical piece 
of clothing (in some other tales, it is a mantle), when the item itself can be seen or does it have 
the magical power over itself as well. That is, if someone uses irony, the ironical cap, can it be 
seen revealing/displaying the hidden (meaning or intention)?  
4 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. by Richard Miller (London: Basil Blackwell, 
1995), 8-10. 
5 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 119.  
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Socratic negative position. Now, right at the beginning, I can assert that the 
shocking and sometimes shockingly plastic figures are used to express the lack 
of positivity and the agonising an-nihil-ation. During my analysis we should 
keep in mind that these rhetorical figures are embedded in the philosophical 
treatise – as if cutting into its body, they were brutalising it.  
The bestial figures are gathered around the relations of Socrates’ ironic non-
position to death and desire. Kierkegaard analyses two of the early Platonic 
dialogues, that is, the so-called Socratic dialogues, Symposium and Phaedo, 
claiming that the figure of irony connects the two works by dealing with such 
strikingly different topics. Though the former is characterised by the desire for 
life and the latter for death, Socrates with his irony can present and view both of 
them negatively:  
[…] it is the irony that in Symposium made love the substance of 
life but then took it back again with the other hand by 
interpreting love negatively as longing, the irony that here [in 
the Phaedo] views life as retrospective, always wanting to go 
back into nebulosity from which the soul emerged or, more 
correctly, into a formless, infinite transparency.6 
However, the main topic of the two dialogues is desire: in Symposium it is the 
desire to possess (carnal desire), in Phaedo the desire to lose (death-wish). The 
two kinds of longings are strongly related as both of them are aimed at getting 
something missing, non-existent and unknown. But their connection is shown in 
an ironic totality, for “both qualifications are equally negative, since both 
longings are ignorant of the what into which the one wishes to hurl itself and 
into which the other wishes to be volatilized by dying into.”7  
As this ironic totality is given by Socrates’ non-position in his life (and 
death), it is the right time to pay attention to his ‘negative’ longings. We should 
accept that he definitely has a death-wish – of course, in the intellectual sense. 
To the philosopher, death means contemplation and complete detachment from 
everyday reality, that is, it presents the desire to die and to be dead: “the 
philosopher wishes to forsake actuality, yet, as far as possible to be dead already 
while still alive […t]his, then, is the tragic self-contradiction of the subjective 
position.”8 Although in his cataleptic and omphalopsychic staring (cf. omphalo-
centrism, É.A.) the philosopher seems to exist “in-and-for-himself,” thinking 
about nothingness and even enjoying it, he still needs actuality. Kierkegaard 
offers two analogies to express Socrates’ unique position hovering between the 
                                                     
6 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 64 (XIII 158). 
7 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 72, footnote (XIII 165). I should draw the reader’s attention 
to the expression ‘to be volatilized’ that clearly refers to annihilating work of irony.  
8 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 75 (XIII 168).  
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actual world and the world of abstract ideas. One of the figures is borrowed from 
Aristophanes, because in his comedy, The Clouds, the philosopher is placed in a 
basket suspended in the air. The other – for us now a telling one – is a reference 
to Mohammed’s coffin, “which, according to legend, floats between two 
magnets – the one attracting and the other repelling.”9 Socrates’ ironic non-
position made him a ‘living-dead’ free individual, who was – and could be – 
only negatively free in his negative subjectivity.  
Practically, in his everyday questioning (in his dialogues) Socrates ‘posits’ 
himself negating the others’ opinions and true beliefs. Besides claiming that he 
does not know anything, he accepts and knows about his non-knowledge, his 
ignorance, which gives him a superposition floating above the others. He does 
not only undertake his annihilation as a mission, but he also enjoys transmitting 
his ironic knowledge. What is more, his dialogue-partners find him aristocratic 
and his freedom seducing:  
In this way he admittedly freed the single individual from every 
presupposition, freed him as he himself was free; but the 
freedom he personally enjoyed in ironic satisfaction the others 
could not enjoy, and thus it developed in them a longing and a 
yearning.10 
In Kierkegaard’s thesis Socrates is shown as a “consummate eroticist” or an 
“amorist of the highest order” with all the seductive gifts of rhetoric and 
intellect. He is a seducer who with his puzzling questions awakens longings in 
the youths but does not – and cannot – satisfy them.  
Although the philosopher seems to be indifferent to the young men’s 
unfolding intellect, from the mask of this indifference they can feel “the piercing 
sidelong glance that instantly pierced their souls like a dagger.”11 The ironist 
suffers and makes the others suffer by torturing them with his questions without 
giving answers. In his discourses, Socrates seduces and imprisons his pupils by 
using his irony as a mysterious aphrodisiac or poison (see Derrida’s pharmakon). 
One of his lovers, Alcibiades, complains that Socrates seems to be the lover, and 
later becomes the beloved. This remark reveals not only the ironist’s ability to 
change his masks while hiding his irony, but also shows that he likes extremes 
and sudden turns upside down.  
Speaking about Socrates’ seducing personality, Alcibiades says that his 
master resembles a carved image of Silenus, the aged satyr. Just like in the case 
                                                     
9 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 48, footnote (XIII 143). Later the coffin is again referred to: 
“The ironist, to be sure, is lighter than the world, but on the other hand he still belongs to the 
world; like Mohammed’s coffin, he is suspended between two magnets” (152, XIII 237).  
10 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 176 (XIII 258). 
11 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 190 (XIII 272).  
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of the openable small figure, Socrates’ ugly outlook hides his inner divinity, but 
very seldom does he open up. In Kierkegaard’s text this hidden divinity is 
expressed with the Greek ‘κατά κρύψιν,’ which is usually used to refer to 
Christ’s divinity in Lutheran theology; here the divine fullness is concealed by a 
satyr-mask.12 Later the word appears again in the phrase, “cryptic nothing” 
referring to the emptiness of Socrates’ ignorant-ironic awareness, which his best 
pupil, “Plato trie[s] to fill up […] by giving him the idea” – his ideas.13 In the 
word, cryptic, not only is it hidden, but also its sepulchral meanings are 
embedded, since the word embodies the hidden lifeless quality of the Socratic 
irony. The crypt as an underground tomb with its own secrecy marks the stillness 
of silence. In a passage Socrates is said to be like a dash in world history – 
For the observer, Socrates’ life is like a magnificent pause in the 
course of history: we do not hear him at all; a profound stillness 
prevails – until it is broken by the noisy attempts of the many 
and very different schools of followers to trace their origin in 
this hidden and cryptic source.14  
To cover the above mentioned complexity of the Socratic irony together with its 
brutal, erotic and mysterious images, Kierkegaard offers a brilliant figure: the 
living-dead, an aristocratic and seducing vampire. The first blood-sucking 
remark is given in the description of the ironic method, where the Socratic 
questioning tries to annihilate and hollow the ideas of the given answers. As 
Kierkegaard explains, in the ironic way “one can ask without any interest in the 
answer except to suck out the apparent content by means of the question and 
thereby to leave an emptiness behind.”15 While in his living-dead existence the 
vampire feeds himself by sucking the blood of his victims, the ironist, being 
another parasite in his unsubstantial hovering non-position, asks devastating 
                                                     
12 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 50 (XIII 145). 
13 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 153 (XIII 238). 
14 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 198 (XIII 279). Besides the crypt and the coffin, there is a 
third ‘death-image’ in the text – a puzzle-picture of Napoleon’s grave that presents the working 
of Socrates’ irony: “Two tall trees shade the grave. There is nothing else to see in the work, and 
the unsophisticated observer sees nothing else. Between the two trees there is an empty space; 
as the eye follows the outline, suddenly Napoleon himself emerges from this nothing, and now 
it is impossible to have him disappear again. […] So also with Socrates’ rejoinders. One hears 
his words in the same way one sees the trees; his words mean what they say, just as trees are 
trees. There is not one single syllable that gives a hint of any other interpretation, just as there is 
not one single line that suggests Napoleon, and yet this empty space, this nothing, is what hides 
that which is most important” (19, XIII 115. Italics are mine. É.A.). See more on it in Stephen 
Prickett, Narrative, Religion and Science – Fundamentalism versus Irony, 1700-1999 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 41-44 and in Bøggild, “An Inquiry into a Couple of 
Examples in Kierkegaard and Paul de Man,” 256-258.  
15 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 36 (XIII 132). Italics are mine. É.A. 
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questions. Socrates’ questions, such as, for example, what good is or what 
justice is, cannot be answered, because he claims that he is ignorant. That is to 
say, that in the course of the master’s philosophical (ironic) inquiry, the listener 
is bereft of his everyday beliefs, but not given clear answers and left hollow, 
sucked out, in aporetic living-dead despair.  
What is more, this blood-sucking in the master-pupil dialogues means/gives 
perverted pleasure to the participants, and in the dissertation we can read about 
the suffering of Socrates’ amorous victims. Kierkegaard – with pleasure – 
analyses the most detailed and most figurative part of Symposium showing 
Alcibiades’ feelings in his love for his master. This part luxuriates in brutal 
pictures; for instance, the (negative) love-relation starts as if the young man were 
bitten by a snake, while its development is compared to a mortal disease. In 
Kierkegaard’s reading, the ironist does not only torture the lover while deluding 
him with his fascinating speech, but he also imprisons the lover in the 
inextricable bonds of this ironic passion. That is, Socrates, the ironist, is said to 
behave and act like an intellectual vampire, “who has sucked the blood of the 
lover [cf. the student] and while doing so has fanned him cool, lulled him to 
sleep, and tormented him with troubled dreams.”16 We read about torture, pain 
and agony – this seems to be the most infamous and warped section of the 
treatise, where the author’s figurative fantasy ‘deforms’ the philosophical frames 
of the doctoral dissertation. I think, it is worth quoting the closing paragraph of 
this warping:  
The question could now be raised: Why this whole exposition? 
My reply: The intention is twofold. In the first place, to show 
that even in Alcibiades’ view of Socrates irony is his essential 
aspect; in the second place, to suggest that the love-relation that 
has developed between Socrates and Alcibiades and what we 
can learn from it about the nature of love are negative.17  
Seemingly, the usage of philosophical argument makes it possible to suppress 
the seductive images, but it is momentary. Being a figure of speech and a trope, 
irony likes turning upside-down and inside-out, and the images of the Socratic 
torture-chamber are frequently ‘flashed’ in the philosophical text to shade the 
love of the negative. Irony traps the victims or the readers again and again 
playing its jokes on them (or us). Discussing Aristophanes’ Socrates-
interpretation in The Clouds, Kierkegaard refers to an episode when the student 
is bereft not only of his everyday beliefs, but also of his mantle, which can be 
                                                     
16 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 49 (XIII 144). 
17 Ibid. And it is also stated here: “the love described here is that of irony, but irony is the negative 
in love; it is love’s incitement” (51, XIII 146). 
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understood as an attempt at the victim’s skinning.18 In another paragraph the 
Socratic method is said to work like a “dialectical vacuum pump” under which 
“he placed the individuals […], pumped away the atmospheric air they were 
accustomed to breathing, and left them standing there. For them, everything was 
now lost, except to the extent that they were able to breathe ethereal air.”19 
Besides presenting the suffocating effect of irony, this analogy expresses its 
mechanism: the ironist is believed to be able to show something above reality, 
above our atmosphere, but we can easily asphyxiate till the promise of the ether 
with the perfect ideas is fulfilled.  
There are less drastic demonstrations of the ironical method in which the 
individual feels dizzy as though he had stumbled into an abyss/whirlwind and 
was continuously falling. The loss of the ground stands for the puzzling activity 
of Socrates’ questioning:  
And then, when all the bonds of their prejudices were loosened, 
when all their intellectual sclerosis was softened, when his 
questions had straightened everything out and made the 
transformation possible, then the relation culminated in the 
meaningful moment, in the brief silvery gleam that instantly 
illuminated the word of their consciousness, when he turned 
everything upside down for them at once, as quickly as a glance 
of the eye and for as long as a blink of the eye, when everything 
is changed for them.20  
The reader could think that some positivity has crept into the description of the 
living-dead ironic method, for it is worth considering what happens after this 
‘gleaming moment’. After the flash, darkness is more visible; that is, the evoking 
of the abstract ideas is followed by value-loss of the known world. But that is all 
Socrates can give and – ironically – with this divine glance he enchains the 
student, who willingly takes the role of his devoted victim and gets victimised 
by (his) irony.  
With his irony, Socrates does not want to posit anything, instead like a gadfly 
(as he calls himself in Apology 31 a) he tries to stir up others, while the ironist 
himself cannot escape his whirlwind that finally carries him away. In Meno, he 
claims that one of the bestial figures used to present his activity is the poisonous 
sea fish, the sting ray (cf. the Greek narke) which “makes other numb in the 
process of numbing.”21 In this remark he accepts that he has a fatal illness, 
because irony as Kierkegaard says “is an endemic disease that only a few 
                                                     
18 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 140, footnote (XIII 225).  
19 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 178 (XIII 260). Italics are mine. É.A.  
20 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 190 (XIII 272). 
21 Plato, Meno 79e-80d.  
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individuals catch and from which fewer recover.”22 What is more, his illness is 
infectious and he regards its transmittance as a divine mission (cf. trans-
mission), and the figures referring to this mission again emphasise its ironic 
content. Socrates’ mission is “a divine madness” and he is shown as a vengeful 
angel raising his sword (his irony) over the Athenians (XIII 291). In these 
metaphors he is shown as a godlike figure: the judge and the punisher in one, 
something like an ironic-nemesis (XIII 256).  
Then in the chapter discussing Socrates’ trial, the ironic-nemesis is again 
presented as a vampire: this time as the vampire of the state. The philosopher 
claims that he does not know the state as so far he has only met individuals. But 
according to his accusers, in his conversations Socrates steals the young citizens 
one by one from the actuality of the state, weakening the respect towards the 
laws and the parents: “it is obvious that […] from the viewpoint of the state his 
offensive had to be considered most dangerous, as an attempt to suck its blood 
and reduce it to a shadow.”23 This figure of speech displays that the vampire-
parasite ‘lives on’ sucking the blood of the living and he also ‘reproduces’ other 
vampires with his poisonous bite. However, the shadow of the state haunts in 
two other pictures. In Protagoras discussing the definition of virtue, Socrates 
asserts the existence of one virtue, not of different ones. Kierkegaard compares 
the Socratic idea on the unity of virtue to “a tyrant who does not have the 
courage to rule over the actual world but first murders all his subjects in order to 
be able to rule proudly and with perfect security over the silent kingdom of pale 
shadows.”24 This series of monstrous figures is ended by Charon, Hades’ 
ferryman, since like him Socrates transmits the individuals from the world of 
actual empiria to the other world of the abstract nothing: 
Just as Charon took people across from the fullness of life to the 
shadowy land of the underworld, just as he, lest his frail boat be 
overloaded, had the travelers divest themselves of all the 
manifold qualifications of concrete life, of titles, honors, purple 
robes, pompous words, sorrows, anxieties, etc., until only the 
sheer human being remained, so Socrates also shipped 
individuals from reality to ideality; and the ideal infinity as the 
infinite negativity was the nothing into which he had the entire 
multiplicity of reality disappear.25 
On the whole, irony is a ‘show-off’: at once a picture faker and an image-worship. 
The common features of these (ironic) figures are emptiness, hollowness and 
                                                     
22 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 77-78 (XIII 170). 
23 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 178 (XIII 261). Italics are mine. É.A. 
24 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 58 (XIII 153). 
25 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 236 (XIII 312). 
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annihilation, as Socrates/Kierkegaard cannot show anything else in his 
philosophising. However, in the philosophical treatise the figures dis-member the 
text as if they tried to demon-strate something hidden. Irony as a “prodigious 
daemon” (XIII 211) hovers over the thesis and the shaded sections together with 
the argumentative parts give the ‘true’ theory of irony. Kierkegaard – with his 
telling name meaning ‘churchyard’ – displays the ground on which the Socratic 
irony can manifest itself: “the ironic nothing is the dead silence in which irony 
walks again and haunts.”26 The vampire becomes the figure of irony, the ironic 
figure par excellence, while blood sucking stands for the ironic/vampironic 
method. In my paper I ‘vamp-ironise’ the Kierkegaardian text, just like he with 
pleasure ‘took the blood’ of other authors’, Plato’s or Hegel’s textual bodies – and 
now all of them are the ghosts of (my) irony. The reader who is susceptible to 
irony is also invited to ‘the banquet of vampires’ and descending through the 
“secret trap-door”27 he can freely join the phantoms of the text. 
The rhetorical (de Manian) “trope is not a derived, marginal, or aberrant form 
of language but […] the figurative structure […] characterizes language as 
such.”28 Irony as the trope of the rhetorical tropes – similarly to Nosferatu, the 
master of the living-dead – together with its philosophical or theoretical 
implications has been eternally haunting ever since. Irony displays not only the 
impossibility of understanding the world around us, but also all of our fears 
caused by the unknown with its strangeness. (And strangely, what is more, I 
claim this strangeness or foreignism in English, not in my mother tongue.) I can 
say that the rhetorical figures stand between the truth of life experience and the 
human mind; on the one hand, they seem to give the feeling of our control over 
language, on the other hand, they become its fearful phantoms. As we know 
from de Man, “rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous 
possibilities of referential aberrations.”29 Thus, irony is the figure of the 
rhetorical figures, showing that there is something threatening and terrible in 
‘our’ rhetoric; we should admit that rhetoric is literally a linguistic monster. 
                                                     
26 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 258 (XIII 332).  
27 “and […] the ironic infinite elasticity, the secret trap-door through which one suddenly plunges 
down – […] into irony’s infinite nothing” (26, XIII 122). 
28 de Man, Allegories of Reading, 105. 
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